LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. 

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 



ELEMENTARY COUESE 



OF 



0hristian J^hllosophy, 

BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF 

THE BEST SCHOLASTIC AUTHORS. 

Chiefly fnyrf I the French of 
.. BROTHER LOUIS OF POISSY. 




PART I. 



^^c- ^tO't^er-i^ o^ i^xZ' ©Ivr-io-ticP'K' Jdvool^. 




F. S. C. PKOCURE 

50 Second Street, 

NEW YORK. 
1889. 



c 






\^ 



^' 



THE UBRARYJ 

OF C(JNURESS 

WASHINGTON 



Entered According to Act of Congress, in the year 1881, by 

JOHN P. MURPHY, 

In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. 



Electrotyped and Printed at 
The New York Catholic Protectory, 
West Chester, N. Y. 



i 



Approbation of the Rt. Eev. Bishop of Montpellier. 

MONTPELLIER, Aug. 15, 1875. 

It is with pleasure that we authorize Brother 
Louis, Sub-Director of the Boarding School of Be- 
ziers, to publish for the use of his pupils his Course 
of Christian Philosophy based on the Principles of the 
best Scholastic Authors, which by our order he sub- 
mitted to a careful examination. The learned priest 
to whom we entrusted the revision of the work has 
returned it with a flattering testimonial of its merit. 
We shall, therefore, be glad to see it in the hands of 
the young men of our schools, and to learn that its 
principles have been made familiar even to the pupils 
of our first classes. For it is these old philosophical 
teachings, which prepared our fathers to become 
such good theologians, and which rendered their 
faith so enlightened and their reasoning so sound. 

^ Fr. M. Anatole, 
Bp. of Montpellier. 



iii 



BRIEF OF OUE HOLY FATHER, POPE PIUS IX. 



Dilecto Filio, I): Aloisio de Foissy, 
Congr. Fratrum Scholarum Chris- 
tianarum, Biterras. 

PIUS PP. IX. 

DiLECTE FiLI, SaLUTEM ET ApOS- 
TOLICAM BeNEDICTIONEM, 

3i sedulo cavendum est in quali- 
bet arte aut scientia, ne quoqiio 
modo principia deflectant a vero, id 
maxime profecto curandum est in 
philosophia earum duce, prsesertim 
vero in tanta errorum colluvie, 
quae ah ipsius nimirum corruptione 
manavit. 



Grratulamur itaque te, Dilecte 
Fili, scientise hujus elementa tradi- 
turum, rejectis recentiorum com- 
toentis, Angelicum Doctorem et 
ceteros fuisse sequutum, qui, Ec- 
clesia veritatis magistra praelucente, 
sapientia et operositate sua philo- 
sophiam mirifice illustrarunt ; et ex 
iis deprompsisse doctrinas, quibiis 
mentes fingeres commissorum tibi 
adolescentium. 



To our Beloved Son, Brother Louis 
of Foissy, of the Congregation of 
the Brothers of the Christian 
Schools, Beziers. 

PIUS IX. POPE. 
Beloved Son, Health and 
Apostolic Benediction. 

If in any art or science whatever 
special care must be taken that 
principles may in no way conflict 
with truth, this is above all neces- 
sary in philosophy, the queen 
and moderatrix of the arts and 
sciences. But especially must we 
be on our guard in the great flood 
of errors, of which the corruption 
of philosophy has been the unfail- 
ing source. 

"We, therefore, congratulate, you. 
Beloved Son, on the manner in 
which you have treated of the 
elements of this science. Setting 
aside the false systems of more 
recent writers, you have followed 
the Angelic Doctor and those who, 
guided by the light of the Church, 
the Mistress of truth, have, by 
their wisdom and diligent labor, 
wonderfully illustrated philosophy. 
From their works you have drawn 
the doctrines by which to form the 
minds of the young men confided 
to your care. 



Ti APOSTOLIC BRIEF OF HIS HOLINESS, PP. PIUS IX. 



Gaudemus autem, Eleinentarem 
Liursum Phllosophue Christiame, a 
te editum, probatura fuisse egregio 
Kpiscopo tuo; et cum ipso tibi 
ominamur, ut illud in plurimorum 
utilitatem vergat. 



Interim vero divini favoris au- 
spicem et patemje Nostrae benevo- 
lentijB pignus Apostolicam Bene- 
dictionem tibi Dilecte Fili, pera- 
manter impertimus. 

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum 
die 13 Martii, anno 1876, Pontifi- 
catiis Nostri anno tricesimo. 

PIUS PP. IX. 



We are glad that the Elementary 
Course of Christian Philosophy, 
which you have pubhshed, has 
received the approbation of a 
Bishop so distinguished as yours ; 
and with him we earnestly wish 
that it may prove beneficial to 
many. 

In the meantime, as a presage of 
the divine favor and a pledge of our 
paternal love, we very affectionately 
impart to you, Beloved Son, the 
Apostolic Benediction. 

Given at Rome, near St. Peter's 
March 13, 1876, in the thirtieth 
year of Our Pontificate. 

PIUS IX., POPE. ' 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



Page 

Preface - - - - xiii 

Introductory xix 

PHILOSOPHY OF RATIONAL BEING, 

Divisions of Philosophy of Rational Being - - 1 

LOGIC. 

Its Definition. — Its Utility . — Its Divisions - - 1 

Part First. 

Reasoning and the Elements of which it is composed. 

CHAPTER I. — Simple Apprehension - - - - 3 

Art. i. — Nature of Simple Apprehension - - . 3 

Art. II. — Tlie Mental Term and the Oral Term - 4 

Art. III. — Divisions of Terms - - . - 4 

Art. IV. — Universals ------ s 

Art. V. — Predicaments or Categories - - 9 

Art. VI. — Properties of the Terms in a Proposition 11 
Art. VII. — Means to Insure Exactness in Terms. — 

Definition 14 

• Art. VIII. — Division 16 

CHAPTER II.— Judgment ..... 17 

Art. I. — Nature of Judgment - - -. - 17 

Art. II. — The Proposition and its Elements - 18 

Art. III. — Divisions of the Proposition - - - 19 

Art. IV. — Properties of Propositions - - . 23 
vii 



viii Contents. 

PAGE 

CHAPTER III. —Reasoning 26 

Art. I. — Definition and Elements of Reasoning 26 

Art. ir. — Divisions of Reasoning - - - - 27 

Art. III. — The C-ategorical Syllogism and its Rules 28 

Art. IV. — Modes and Figures of the Syllogism - 31 

Art. v. — The Hypothetical Syllogism and its Rules 33 
Art. VI. — The Imperfect Syllogism and the Com- 
l)ound Syllogism ; or, the Enthymeme, 
the Prosyllogism, the Epichirema, the 

Sorites, and the Dilemma - - 35 

Art. VII. — Induction - - - - - 37 

Art. viii. — The Probable or Dialectic Syllogism - 39 

Art. IX. — The Finding of the Middle Term - 40 

Art. X. — The Sophistical Syllogism - - - 42 

xVrt. XI. — Utility of the Syllogism . - . 45 



Part Second. 
Truth and Science. 
CHAPTER I.— Truth and the Different States of 

THE Mind with respect to Truth 46 

Art. I. — Truth - 46 

Art. II. — In which Operation of the ^Mind Logical 

Truth is found . . . . 47 
Art. III. — Different States of the :Mind with respect 

to the True ----- 48 

Art. IV. — Ignorance, Error, and their Causes - 49 

CHAPTER II.— Demonstration 51 

CH.VPTER III. — ScriENCE. — Divisions of Science. — 

Co-ordination of the Sciences 54 



Contents. ix 

PAGE 

Part Third. 
Method. 

CHAPTER I .—Method in General and its Laws 57 

Art. I. -Method ------- 57 

Art. II. — Analysis and Synthesis in relation to 

Method ------ 58 

CHAPTER n. — Different Kinds of Method and 

THEIR Laws ----- 60 

Art. I. — Different Kinds of Method - - - 60 

Art. II. — Special Laws for each Method - - 61 

CHAPTER III.— Processes proper to certain Methods 62 

Art. I. — Hypotheses 62 

Art. II. — Experimentation 6S 

Art. III. — Classification 66 

IDEOLOGY. 

General Ideology. 

CHAPTER I.— The Idea in General . - _ 68 

Art. I. — Nature of the Idea - - - _ 68 

Art. II. — Characters of the Idea - - - - 69 
CHAPTER 11. — Systems concerning the Origin of 

Ideas 70 

Art. I. — Principal Systems concerning the Origin 

of Ideas ------ 70 

Art. II. — Sensism - - - - - - 71 

Art. III. — Transcendental Rationalism - - 73 

Art. IV. — The System of Innate Ideas - - - 74 

Art. V, — Ontologism - - . . _ 76 

Art. VI. — The Intermediate System - - _ 77 

Art. VII. — Traditionalism 79 

Art. VIII. — The Scholastic System - - - - 80 



>' Contents. 

PAGE 

CHAPTER III. — Universals 84 

Art. I. — Nature of Universals - - - - 84 
Art. II. — Different Opinions on the Nature of 

Universals . . . . . S7 

Special Ideology. 
CHAPTER I. — How Human Knowledge is Acquired 90 
Art. i. — The First Operation of the Mind and the 

Perception of Essences - - - 90 

Art. h. — How the Human Soul Knows Particular 

Bodies - 93 

Art. III. — The Knowledge that the Human Soul 

acquires regarding Itself - - 94 

Art. IV. — "Whether the Human Soul can know Pure 

Spirits 95 

Art. v. — How the Human Soul knows God - 96 

Art. VI. — Necessity of Sensible Images for the Act 
of the Human Intellect in the Present 

Life 98 

Art. VII. — Mode of Cognition in the Disembodied 

Soul 100 

CHAPTER II.— Knowledge of First Principles - 101 
Art. i. — What is meant by Principles of Knowl- 
edge 101 

Art. ii.— The Principle of Contradiction - - 102 

Art. III.— The Principle of Causality - - - 104 
Art. IV.— The Principle of Substance - - 106 

CHAPTER III. — Lajjguage in its relations to the De- 
velopment OP Knowledge - 108 
Art. I. — Utility of Language in Developing the 

Mind 108 

Art. II. -The Origin of Language - - - 109 



Contents. xi 



CRITERIOLOGY, 

Or, a Treatise on Certitude, 

CHAPTER I. — Our Faculties as means of Arriv- 111 

iNG at Truth ----- 

Art. I. — Which are our Cognoscitive Faculties 111 

Art. II. — Veracity of the Senses - - - 112 

Art, III. — Veracity of Consciousness - - - 113 

Art. IV. — Veracity of the Intellect and the Reason 114 

CHAPTER II.— Scepticism 115 

Art. I. — Nature of Scepticism. — Different Kinds 

of Scepticism - - - - 115 

Art. II. — Refutation of Scepticism - - - IIG 

CHAPTER III. — The Ultimate Foundation of Certi- 
tude - . - . - iig 

Art. i. — What is meant by the Ultimate Founda- 
tion of Certitude - - - - 118 
Art. II. — The Intrinsic Principle of Certitude 118 
Art. III. — The Extrinsic Principle of Certitude - 121 
Art. IV. — The Means by which Testimony is trans- 
mitted 122 

Art. v. — Authenticity of the Testimony of Com- 
mon Sentiment and of Scientists - 125 
Art. VI. — Importance to our Cognitions of the Au- 
thority of Testimony as a Principle of 
Certitude 127 



PREFACE. 



The object of this work is to present, in as brief an 
outline as possible, a complete course of philosophy. 
Besides questions immediately useful for examina- 
tions, we have endeavored to introduce, at least 
summarily, many others of real importance, without 
which there can be no philosophy properly so-called. 

A few words will suffice to explain our mode of 
procedure and the use which may be made of this 
work. Each paragraph contains an abridged formula 
intended to be learned verbatim, and a short develop- 
ment, which may serve as a basis for the explanation 
of the professor. The formulas will prove of great 
utility to the student who takes pains to memorize 
them : they classify in the mind distinctly and 
logically all the notions indispensably required in 
philosophy ; they render the preparation for an ex- 
amination easy ; and very often they are a brief, 
precise, and full answer to the questions proposed. 
The part called the development usually indicates 
the principal proofs of the foregoing formula, re- 
duced to what is essential. Comparisons, multiplied 
examples, detailed commentaries, have been purpose- 
ly retrenched. We have confined ourselves to simple 
summaries, which will enable the student to follow 
and remember the instructions of the professor. 
Experience has proved that this method, apparently 
somewhat abstract and barren, is in reality very ad- 
vantageous, since it obliges the student to have 

xiii 



xiv Preface. 

recourse to that direct and personal work without 
which there can be no true intellectual formation. 

Some, doubtless, ma}^ be of opinion that this work 
introduces questions too difficult for beginners : for 
example, ideas^ universah. matter and form, space, time, 
and others, which offer serious difficulties even in 
treatises which investigate them in detail. But, these 
questions being essential, it seems to us that they 
cannot be altogether omitted without leaving philoso- 
phy destitude of foundation and consistency. This 
remark is especially applicable to the treatise on Gen- 
eral Metaphf/sics. Presented in its present concise 
form, it will, perhaps, be found too abstruse ; still we 
have thought proper to retain it, should it prove of 
no other use than to serve as a summary for those 
who wish to make a more profound study of the sub- 
ject. 

Another charge may be brought against this course, 
that of being based on the method and doctrine of 
the Scholastics. For we have, in fact, everywhere 
endeavored faithfully to reproduce the principles of 
the Thomistic school, as interpreted by Goudin, San- 
severino, Liberatore, Kleutgen, Prisco, Gonzalez, Tap- 
arelli. and other-", wliose text we have often merely 
summarized and sometimes embodied in full. But 
this reproach, were it really merited, would be as- 
suredly in our eyes the best eulogy that could be be- 
stowed on this modest work. The Scholastic philoso- 
phy, which was adopted during many centuries by all 
the universities of Europe, and the abandonment of 
which has been accompanied by such fatal results, 
has undeniably in its favor, not only the sanction of 
time and the authority of the greatest geniuses, but 
that which to the Christian is of more value, the sane- 



Preface. xv 

tion of the Church. Following this philosophy we are 
sure never to stray from Catholic teaching ; while out- 
side of it we find only discordant, unsubstantial doc- 
trines, often evidently erroneous and proscribed. 

But some may object that we must pay due def- 
erence to the necessities of the times, and therefore 
the wisest course nowadays is, indeed, to avoid mani- 
fest errors, but still not to return, at least openly, to 
these old doctrines, which would expose us to be re- 
garded as not only not progressive but even retro- 
grade minds. To this we reply that to reject the 
false without affirming the true is to leave the mind 
in suspense, without knowing where to rest ; it is to 
take from it all energy and vitality, by depriving it 
of its proper and necessary element ; it is, in fine, to 
deliver it over without power or defence to the seduc- 
tions of error. 

May this humble work be free from that vagueness, 
or rather absence, of doctrine, too often met with in 
certain elementary works on philosophy ; and may it 
contribute, in its own modest way, to the diffusion of 
the beautiful and faithful teachings of the Scholastic 
philosophy. 



Shortly after the publication of the first edition of 
this work, a Latin translation of it was made at Eome 
by Mgr. Amoni, canon, at present secretary of the 
Apostolic Nunciature of Vienna. 

We give below the preface of the learned translator : 
" I will be brief, kind reader, but I wish that you 
should know the two principal motives which have 
led me to consider the publication of this Element- 
ary Courfie of Philosophy as eminently opportune. 



x\'i Preface. 

First, thongli distinf^uished bv an admirable brevity, 
it omits nothing necessary to a full knowledge of the 
suV)ject ; secondly, and this is much more important 
at tlie present time, the method of teaching adopted 
by the French author is conformable to that of the 
okl Scholastics, and his doctrines agree on all points 
with those of St. Thomas of Aquin. Now, however 
little you consider with what earnestness the learned 
Roman Pontiff Leo XIII. recommends to all the faith- 
ful of Jesus Christ the philosophy of the holy Doctor, 
you will surely understand that, in our day especial- 
ly, this w^ork merits the preference over all others. 

'' In fact, if the love of truth should always and 
everywhere move the minds and hearts of men, and 
if every one should direct all his efforts to acquire 
truth, since its possession constitutes man's happi- 
ness, we must apply ourselves so much the more 
earnestly to the task, now that the war against truth 
has become more active, and w^e are exposed to great- 
er danger of falling into error. Although charged 
during seventeen years with the duty of teaching 
philosophy to young men, I shall never regret having 
undertaken this translation, because, in my opinion, 
there can be found in no other work anything more 
methodical, more exact, or more useful." 

At the time of the publication at Rome of the 
Latin translation, the Osservatore Romono recom- 
mended the work in a lengthy article, from which we 
extract tlie following: 

*' He who desires to make use of this work, either 
for himself or others, must not expect to find therein 
anything new in matter or form. We assure him, 
however, that he will find in it a special advantage : 
it contains an abridged and lucid exposition of all the 



Preface. xvii 

parts of a sound philosophy, — principles, method, 
and doctrine, — all is conformable to or rather bor- 
rowed from the most accredited and safe source of a 
sound philosophy, whether ancient or modern. In 
short, errors are briefly exposed and so successfully 
refuted as to make young men certain of the truth 
and competent to defend it against Eationalism and 
Naturalism, which, in our day more than in any other 
age, infect society. 

" Those who study philosophy should feel thankful 
to the author, as well as to the learned translator, 
who has favored Italy, and especially institutions of 
scientific education, with a book entirely safe on all 
points. It is also extremely useful on account of the 
principles which it contains and expounds, the matter 
for reflection which it offers to young men, and the 
opportunity of making a fuller exposition which it 
furnishes to professors of philosophy. We believe, in 
fact, that it is neither useful nor advisable to put into 
the hands of young students a book which fatigues 
by its copiousness and the unnecessary difficulties 
introduced, and which, moreover, renders the oral 
instruction of the teacher superfluous. " 

A Vienna journal, the Vaterland^ in the issue of April 
9, 1882, concludes an article upon the same work 
translated by Mgr. Amoni in these words : 

*' This work, by the richness of the matter presented, 
must take its place among the best works on Chris- 
tian Philosophy which have appeared in these latter 
times. We do not possess in German any manual of 
philosophy which, in 416 pages, contains such a large 
amount of matter so happily and perfectly elabor- 
ated." 



INTRODU CTORY, 



Philosophy is the hioivledge of things in their ultimate 
causes— Its object is being in general ; but this object 
may be considered under three aspects : as 7'eal and 
possessing attributes independent of our cognition : 
as ideal and having attributes which result from our 
mental activity ; or as moral when regarded as the 
term of voluntary action. Philosophy, therefore, 
may treat of the ultimate principle of things either in 
the order of reality, or of knowledge, or of morality ; 
in other words, it comprises philosophy of real being, 
philosophy of rational being, and moral philosophy. 
Philosophy of rational being or logic is studied first, 
because it points out the laws of the human mind in 
the acquisition of knowledge, and enables it to dis- 
cern the true from the false, thus furnishing the 
means to study real being with greater ease and cer- 
tainty. 



XIX 



PHILOSOPHY OF RATIONAL 
BEING. 

ITS DIVISIONS. 

Philosophy of rational being is divided into Logic, 
Ideology, Criteriology . — As rational philosophy con- 
siders being in respect to our knowledge of being, it 
ought, first, to investigate the laws which govern the 
mind, the instrument by which we know; secondly, 
to treat of ideas, the means by which we know ; 
thirdly, to determine the value of the knowledge ac- 
quired by the mind. Hence rational philosophy is 
divided into three principal parts : 1. Logic, or the 
science of the laws of thought ; 2. Ideology, or the 
science of ideas ; 3. Criteriology, or the science of the 
criteria of certitude. 



LOGIC. 

DEFINITION OF LOGIC. — ITS UTILITY. — ITS 
DIVISIONS. 

1. Logic is the science of the laios luhich the mind 
must obey in order to acquire readily and luitli certainty 
the knowledge of truth. — The human mind in its search 
after truth is subject to laws imposed on it by its. 
very nature. The study of these laws constitutes 
Logic. Logic is a science rather than an art, because 
it considers the laws of the mind in their intrinsic 



2 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

principles and general applications, and is not con- 
lined to an enumeration of practical rules. 

2. Logic is of great utility in acquiring truths in 
guarding against errors and in advancing in any science 
whatever. — As Logic habituates the mind to classify 
and co-ordinate knowledge, it gives us a great facility 
for the acquisition of truth; moreover, by familiariz- 
ing the mind with all the aberrations of reasoning, it 
enables us readily to discern the flaws of a fallacy 
and the false appearance by which error seeks to 
mislead the mind. Finally, it is evident that, as the 
sciences can advance onl}^ by means of reasoning, 
notliing is more conducive to their progress and easy 
acquisition than Logic, which is, in fact, the very 
science of reasoning. 

3. Logic is divided into three j^rincipal parts : tlie first 
investigates the nature and lows of reasoning; the second 
treats of the general conditions of knoiuledge ; the third, 
determines the general rules of method. — The object of 
logic is reasoning ; but in reasoning three things may 
be considered : the nature of reasoning, the end of 
reasoning, which is science, and, lastly, the process or 
method followed to reach this end readil3\ Logic, 
therefore, is divided into three parts, corresponding to 
the three aspects under wliich reasoning may be con- 
sidered. 



PART FIRST. 

EEASONING AND THE ELEMENTS WHICH 
COMPOSE IT. 

4. Tlte first part of Logic, ivhicJi has reasoning for its 
object, treats :1. Of simple apprehension ; % Of judgment ; 
3. Of reasoning. — Reasoning is a complex operation, 
whose elements are judgment and simple apprehen- 
sion. All reasoning supposes several judgments, and 
every judgment supposes the apprehension of two 
objects. Hence, before considering reasoning in 
itself, we must treat of judgment and simple appre- 
hension. 



CHAPTER I. 

Simple Apprehension. 

ART. I. — NATURE OF SIMPLE APPREHENSION. 

6. Simple Apprehension is the first operation of the 
mind, an operation by ivhich it perceives an object ivithout 
any affirmation or negation concerning it. — The first act 
of the mind is a simple glance, by which it apprehends 
objects presented to it, without affirming or denying 
anything. The result of this operation is an ideal 
reproduction of the object perceived ; this reproduc- 
tion is called a mental term. If the mental term is 
•expressed in words, it is called an oral term. 



4 . CHRISTIAN PHILOSOrHY. 

ART. II. — THE MENTAL TERM AND THE ORAL TERM. 

6. The mental term is the ideal and formal re/tresenta- 
tioii in which the objf ct perceived is reproduced and hiown. 
—When sensible objects have made an impression on 
our external senses, this impression passes to the im- 
agination, which forms an image of the objects. The 
intellect, instantly apprised of these images, acts on 
them ; it cognizes the objects by more perfect simili- 
tudes, in which it discerns many things which the 
senses could not perceive, such as the character of 
cause, of heinrf, of substance, etc. From this the 
mind may afterwards rise to a knowledge of spiritual 
beings, God, virtue, vice, etc., which are not in the im- 
agination. These similitudes, greatly differing in 
Dature and number from those of the imagination, 
are called ideas, concepts, reasons of things; but in 
Logic they are named mental terms, because they are 
the elements in which the decomposition of judgment 
and reasoning terminates. 

7. The oral term is a conventional icord luhicji ex- 
presses the mental term. — Unlike the mental term, which 
from its very nature represents the object, the oral 
term has a meaning only in virtue of the usage and 
agreement of men. It directly denotes only the 
mental term, and only by means of this term does it 
express the object itself ; but habit leads us usually 
to unite the idea of the word with the idea of the 
thing. 

ART. III. — DIVISIONS OF TERMS. 

8. The mental term, is intuitive or abstract, clear or 
obscure, distinct or confused, comple'e or incomplete. — 
Considered with reference to the manner in which 
the object is presented to the mind, the mental term 



SIMPLE APPEEHENSION. 5 

is concrete, when the object is a^pprehended in its 
physical realit}" ; it is abstract, when the object is ap- 
prehended apart from its real existence. Considered 
in respect to the degree of perfection with which the 
mind apprehends the object, the mental term is dear, 
when the object can be distinguished from any other 
object ; it is obscure, when the object cannot be dis- 
tinguished from another object ; the mental term is 
distinct, when the object, besides being distinguished 
from other objects, is known in its constitutive ele- 
ments ; it is confused, when the object, though dis- 
cerned from other objects, is not known in its con- 
stitutive elements ; the mental term is complete or * 
adequate, when all the constitutive elements of the 
object are known ; it is incomplete or inadequate, when 
some only of the constitutive elements are known. 

9. The orcd term is significative or- non-significative, 
fixed or vague, univocal or equivocal, analogous by at- 
tribution or analogous by proportion. — The oral term is 
significative, if it means something, as Man; it is 
non-significative, if it has no meaning, as Tervoc. 
The oral term is fixed, if it has a settled meaning, as 
God ; it is vague, if its meaning varies at the will of 
him who uses it, as Nature, which sometimes means 
the visible universe, sometimes the essence of a thing, 
etc. The oral term is univocal, when it has but one 
meaning for the several objects to which it is applied, 
as 3Ian, which signifies one and the same thing when 
applied to Peter and to Paul ; it is equivocal, when 
its meaning varies for each of several different things, 
as Bog, which is applied to a star and to an animal. 
The oral term is analogous, if it signifies several 
things which are not wholly identical, nor yet alto- 
gether different, as Foot, which is applied to a 



6 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

member of an animal and to the base of a mountain. 
The term is analogous by attribution, when it denotes 
one thing principally, and applies to others only on 
account of the relation which they have to the first, 
as in the foregoing example ; the term is analogous 
by j>ro;Jor^iO'/^ when it signifies several things which 
difier in reality, but which are, nevertheless, identical 
in a certain proportion, as Principle, which is ap- 
plied in a certain proportion to source, heart, and 
point. 

10. Th- mental term, like the oral, is significative of 
itself or by means of another term, positive or negative, 
concrete or abstract, real or logical, absolute or connotative, 
simple or complex, transcendental or categorical, connected 
or unconnected, p)T'^dicate or subject, antecedent or conse- 
quent, collective or distributive, singular or universal, — 
The term, whether mental or oral, is ^significative of 
itself, when of itself it has a meaning, as 3Ian; it is 
significative by means of another, when it has no mean- 
ing of itself, as Some. The term is positive, when 
it signifies the thing itself, as. Sight; it is negative, 
when it denotes the absence of something, as Blind- 
ness. The term is concrete, when it denotes a thing 
as it really exists, as Peter; it is abstract, when it 
denotes a thing apart from the subject to which it 
belongs, and from which it has no separate exis- 
tence, as Wliifeness. The term is real, when it signifies 
something having physical existence, as God; it is 
logical, when it signifies a thing which has no exist- 
ence except in our mind, as Species. The term is 
absolute or substantive, when it denotes a thing exist- 
ing in itself, as Man; it is connotative or adjectivey 
when it denotes a thing as the accompaniment of 
another, as Good. The term is simple, when it de- 



SIMPLE APPREHENSION. 7 

notes one thing by a single sign, as Angel; it is com- 
plex, when it includes several ideas or several words, 
as Poet, which is complex in idea, for it compre- 
hends the man and his art ; Julius Caesar, which is 
complex in word, for it expresses one idea in two 
words ; the Emperor Charlemagne, which is complex 
in word and in idea, for it embraces two words and 
two ideas. The term is transcendental, when it signi- 
fies something applicable to all beings, as Being, 
Thing, Something, One, True, Good; it is categorical, 
when it signifies something which applies only to 
certain beings ; as Man. Terms are connected, when 
one includes or excludes another, as Man and 
Animal, White and Blach; they are unconnected, when 
they have no relation of exclusion or subordination, 
as White and Learned. The term is predicate, when it 
is afiirmed of another ; it is subject, when another is 
affirmed of it ; thus, in the proposition, God is just, 
God is the subject smdjust the predicate. The ante- 
cedent term is that which includes another, as, Ma7i 
in respect to animal ; the consequent term is that 
which is included in another, as. Animal in regard 
to man. If the terms are deduced from each other, 
they are called reciprocal, as Man and Rational. 
The term is collective when it denotes several things 
taken conjointly, as The City; it is distributive, when 
it denotes several things in such a manner that it may 
be applied to each in particular, as Man. A term is 
singidar, when it signifies one thing only, as Aris- 
totle; it is universal, when it applies to several things 
univocally and distributively, as Animal. In con- 
nection with universal terms, two things may be con- 
sidered : 1. Universal terms in themselves and the 
five Species into which they are divided ; 2. Their 



8 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

division into different Supreme Genera, called Cate- 
gories. 

ART. IV. — UNIVERSALS. 

11. Universah are terms luhlch are applied univocal- 
J[l ami cUstribtitively to many things. — When the mind 
has perceived the essence of an object abstracted 
from the individual characteristics of that object, 
it may consider the mental term representing the 
essence as applicable to every being which has the 
common essence ; the term is then called universal, 
as Man. Its opposite is the singular term, which is 
applied to one thing only, as Socrates. The ^:>rt>*^ic- 
nlar term is a universal affected by the sign of 
particularity, which limits it to a part of its signifi- 
cation, as Some men. 

12. Unlversals have two properties : comprehension 
and extension, which are in inverse ratio to each other. 
— The essence represented by the universal is formed 
of one element or of many elements ; thus : The essence 
of man consists of animality and rationality; hence 
the comprehension of the universal is the sum of the 
elements which it contains. The essence represented 
by the universal is found in a greater or less number 
of beings ; thus : The essence of man is found in all men; 
hence the extension of the universal is the number of 
beings to which the universal applies. The greater 
the comprehension of a term, the less its extension, 
and vice versa, 

13. There ore five modes according to which a uni- 
versal term may be applied to individuals; there are, 
therefore, five kinds of universal, viz. : genus, species, 
difference, ^^ro^^erf?/, and accident. These unlversals are 
called predlcahles or categorema. — A universal term 



SIMPLE APPREHENSION. 9 

expresses either the essence of a thing or something 
joined to the essence. If it expresses the essence, it 
expresses either the whole essence or a part of the 
essence. If it. denotes the Avhole essence, it is the 
species, and the beings to which it is applied are 
called individuals, as 3Ian. If the universal denotes 
a pa.rt of the essence, it expresses either the part 
common to other species, or the part by which the 
essence differs from other species : in the first case 
it is called the genus, and in the second the difference; 
thus : Ammality expresses what is common to both 
man and brute, and Bationality what distinguishes 
man from the brute. If the universal denotes what 
is joined to the essence, either this attribute cannot 
be separated from the essence, but is a necessary 
effect of it, in which case it is a property; or it can 
be separated without changing the essence, and then 
it is an accident; thus : Free Will is a property, Learn- 
ing is an accident of man. Genus, species, and differ- 
ence are divided into highest, intermediate, and 
lowest or proximate. 

Highest Genus : j Incorporeal ) Highest Species and 

Substance \ Corporeal ) Difference. 

Intermediate Genus : j Inanimate ] Intermediate Species and 
Body \ Animate f Difference. 

Lowest or Proximate j Irrational / Lowest Species and 
Genus : Animal { Rational f Difference. 

ART. V. — PREDICAMENTS OR CATEGORIES. 

14. Predicaments or categories are generic terms 
under ivMch all the species of things are co-ordinated. — 
When the mind examines an object, it endeavors to 
find out what attributes or predicates it can affirm or 
deny of the object. Now, all the species of attributes 
which can be predicated of an object have been ar- 



10 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

ranged in logic under certain supreme genera ; these 
genera are called predicaments or categories. ^ 

15. There are ten predicaments or categories : sub- 
stance, quality, relation, quantity, action, passion, time, 
place, posture, habiliment. — Every being exists either 
in itself or in another. If it exists in itself, it is 
called substance ; if it exists in another, it is called 
accident. The accident is subdivided into nine genera ; 
for, if we want to know the accidents of a sub- 
stance, Charlemagne, for instance, we may put the 
following questions : 1. How large a man is he ? 
which gives the quantity ; 2. Whose father or son is 
he? which gives the relation; 3. What are his quali- 
fications? which gives the quality; 4. What does lie 
do ? which gives the action ; 5. What does he suffer ? 
which gives the passion; 6. In what age did he live ? 
which gives the time ; 7. Where is he ? which gives 
the place ; 8. Is he sitting or standing ? which gives 
the j^osture ; 9. How is he clad ? which gives the 
habiliment. 

16. Comparing things arranged under the j^redica- 
ments with one another, we may consider their opposition, 
priority, simultaneity, mutation, and mode of having ; 
these terms are called post-predicaments.— Opposition 
is the repugnance of one thing to another. There 
are four kinds : 1. Contrary, when the two things, fal- 
ling under a common genus, are mutually incompat- 

' " What is the difference between the Predicaments or Categories 
and the Heads of Predicates ? The Categories are a classification of 
all existing things as they are themselves regarded in their own proper 

being, as the object of our mental concepts or ideas The Heads of 

Predicables are, on the other hand, a classification of the forms of 
thought, that is to say, of the various relations our ideas or concepts 
bear to each other. " Clarke's Lorjic, Manuals of Catholic Philosophv 
p. 190. 



SIMPLE APPREHENSION. 11 

ible with the same subject ; as Heat and Cold ; 2. 
Belative, when the repugnance arises from a mutual 
relation, as Father and Son ; 3. Privative^ when the 
repugnance arises between a thing and its privation, 
as Sight and Blindness , 4 Contradictory, when the 
repugnance is between being and not-being, as Man. 
and not-Man. — Priority is that by which one thing 
precedes another. There are five kinds : 1. Priority of 
duration ; as Youth and Old Age ; 2. Of consequence ; 
as Man and Rationality ; 3. Of order, as Grammar 
and Literature 4. Of dignity, as a King and his Sub- 
jects ; 5. Of nature, as the Sun and its Rays. — Simul- 
taneity is opposed to priority, hence it is also of five 
kinds. — Mutation is the passage from one state to an- 
other. There are six kinds : 1. Generation or the 
passage from non-being to substantial being ; 2. 
Decay or the passage from a state of being to non- 
being ; 3. Augmentation or the passage from a less to a 
greater quantity ; 4. Diminution, which is the opposite 
of augmentation ; 5. Alternation or the passage from 
one quality to another ; 6. Locomotion or the passage 
from one place to another. The modes of having a 
thiyig are five : 1. By inherence, as Knowledge in man ; 
2. By containing, as Wine in the cash ; 3. By Posses- 
sion, as The mans field ; 4. By relationship, as Father 
and son ; 5. By juxtaposition, as The garment on 
the man. 

ART. VI. — PROPERTIES OF THE TERMS IN A 
, PROPOSITION. 

17. Terms ha.ve six properties : supposition, appel- 
lation, state, amplification, restriction, alienation. — Sup- 
position is the special meaning of a word in a given 
proposition, as Angel is a ivord. Angel here means 



12 CHIUSTIAN PHILOSOPHi'. 

materially the word Ancjel. AppeUafion is the appli- 
catiou of one term to something denoted by another 
term, as God is good; here good is applied to God. 
— St((fc is the acceptation of a term for the time in- 
dicated by the verb, as Fefei^ sings.— Amplification 
is the acceptation of a term for a time different from 
that indicated by the verb, as The dumb speoL — Be- 
sfrictioii is the limitation of the broad signification 
of a term to a narrower sense, as Eve is the mother 
of the living ; here the word living is restricted to 
men. — Alienation is the transfer of the meaning of 
one term to another by the addition of a second 
term, as The Sun of Justice, used to designate the 
Saviour. 

18. Supposition is material or formal, real or logic- 
al, particular^ collective, or distributive. — The supposi- 
tion of a word is material, when the word signifies 
the term itself, as Man is a word. It is formal, when 
the word denotes the object, as Blan is rational. It 
is real, when the word expresses the object such as it 
really exists, as 3Ian is a living being. It is logical, 
when the word denotes the object abstracted from its 
individual characteristics, as 3Ian is a species. It is 
particular, when the word signifies some only of the 
beings which it can represent, as Some men are de- 
ceitful. It is collective, when the word signifies all 
the beings which it can represent, taken conjointly, 
as The Apostles are twelve. It is distributive, when 
the word expresses all and each of the beings which 
it can represent, as Man is mortal. 

19. Supjwsition is subject to the following rules : 
1. A term affected by a universal sign has a distributive 
or collective supposition ; as, All the Evangelists are 
saints ; All the Evangelists are four. 2. A term 



SIMPLE ArPREHENSION. 13 

affected hij a ijnrticular sign has a particular siqoposi- 
tion ; as, Some men are just. 3. When the subject 
of a proposition is not affected hy a sign, it has a 
universal supposition in necessary matter, that is, luhen 
the predicate must he attributed to the subject ; as, 
Man is rational ; it has a 2^ct^^ticular supposition in 
contingent matter ; as, The French are courageous. 
4. In an affirmative proposition, the supposition of the 
predicate is always particular ; as, Man is immortal ; 
in a negative proposition, the supposition of the predi- 
cate is universal ; as, Man is not a vegetable. 5. In 
every proposition, the sujjposition of the subject is ac- 
cording to the requirement of the predicate ; thus a 
numerical term requires a collective supposition ; as. 
The Apostles are tv/elve ; a necessary term requires 
a distributive supposition ; as, The animal is sensitive ; 
a contingent term requires a particular supposition ; 
as. The French are courageous. 

20. Appellation is material or formal. — Appellation 
is material when the predicate is applied to the 
matter of the subject, of the quality or form denoted 
by the subject, and not to the form itself ; as, The 
physician sings. It i^ formal when the predicate is 
applied to the form of the subject, i. e., to the quality 
or form which the subject expresses, as, The physi- 
cian cures. ^ 

21. Appellation is subject to the following rules : 1. 
When the predicate is a concrete term, the appellation 
is material ; as, Man is a living being. 2. Wlien the 
subject is qualified, the predicate is affirmed of the 
sid)ject only and the appellation is material; as, St. 

' In the first example the predicate singing must be applied, not to 
the form or quality of physician^ but to the matter, man^ to which the 
form is united. In the second example, curing naturally belongs to the 
physician as such and therefore is applied to the form. 



14 CHRISTIAN THILOSOPHY. 

Thomas of Aquin was the disciple of Albertns Mag- 
nus. 3. ly/ien the predicate is qaalijied, it is ajinited 
of the subject as having the quality expressed by the 
qualifier, and the appellation, is formal ; as, Thomas of 
Aquin was a saintly disciple of Albertus Magnus. 
In this example, disciple is aflirmed of Thomas of 
Aquin, but as being saintly. 

ART. VII. — MEANS TO INSURE EXACTNESS OF TERMS. — 
DEFINITION. 

22. Terms, to be perfect, must be clear and distinct. 
To obtain this result, we must have recourse to defini- 
tion and division. — The object of these two processes 
being to clear up what is obscure or confused, it is 
evident they should not be employed wdien things 
are in themselves sufficiently clear and distinct. 

23. Definition is a brief exjjlanation of the meaning 
of a icord or the nature of a thing. — Whence it follows 
that there are two kinds of definitions, the nominal 
and the real ; the first explains the meaning of the 
word, the second explains the nature of the thing 
signified by the word. It should be observed : 1. 
That the nominal definition ought to precede the 
real, when the nature of a thing is in question and 
the meaning of the word expressing it is not under- 
stood ; 2. That the nominal definition, in reasoning, 
must never be considered tantamount to the real def- 
inition ; 3. That the real definition only is scientific. 

24. There are three kinds of nominal definition : 1. 
According to etymology; 2. According to nsage;3. Ac- 
cording to the meaning ivhich the person ivho uses the 
word loishes to attach to it. — The real definition is either 
causal or essential. — A nominal definition may be 
given according to etymology, as Intelligence (from 



SIMPLE APPREHENSION. 15 

the Latin intus legere, to read within,) signifies intimate 
knowledge. We may also define a word in accordance 
with usage ; as By the word God, all understand the 
Infinite Being. Finally, we may attach to a word 
whatever meaning we choose. In this case, however, 
care should be taken : 1. Not to be so arbitrary in 
oar choice as to become unintelligible to others ; 2. 
Not to use the word in a different sense during the 
discourse. The causal definition explains a thing by 
stating the principle which produces or generates it ; 
as The sphere is a solid generated by the revolution of 
a semicircle about its diameter. The essential definition 
explains a thing by giving its essence, as Man is a 
rational animal ; this is the most perfect kind of defini- 
tion. A thing is sometimes explained by describing 
it ; such a description is called a descriptive or orator- 
ical definition. 

25. The definition should contain the proximate genus 
and the specific difference. — By the definition the thing 
defined should be distinguishable from every other 
thing and should be known in its characteristics. 
But without the proximate genus the characteristics 
of the thing are not known ; and without the specific 
difference the species to which the thing belongs is 
not known. In the definition, Man is a rational am- 
mal, animal determines the proximate genus, and 
rational the specific difference. This rule includes 
that laid down by the modern logicians, viz., The def- 
inition must embrace the whole of the thing defined 
and nothing but the thing defined. Three rules are 
laid down for framing a definition : 1. The definition 
must be plainer than the thing defined ; 2. The def- 
inition must be convertible with the thing defined ; 3. 
The thing defined must not enter into the definition. 



10 CHRISTIAN rHILOSOPHY. 

ART. VIII. — DIVISION. 

26. Division is the distribution of a whole into its 
/xtrts. Division is actual ^ or potential. — As division is 
the separation of a whole into its parts, there are as 
many kinds of division as there are different kinds of 
whole. But a whole may be actual or potential, 
hence division may be actual or potential : actual, 
when the whole is divided into parts which it has 
actually, as Man is composed of body and soul; po- 
tential, when the whole is divided into parts which 
it has in virtue of a logical consideration, as Sub- 
stance is corporeal or incorporeal. 

27. The division must be adequate, it must be made 
njJ of the most universal members, and of parts that 
exclude one another. — 1. The division must be complete, 
and hence equal to the whole thing divided ; thus 
we should not divide trianrjles into isosceles and equila- 
teral. 2. It should be made in such a way as to 
proceed from the more general parts to those which 
are less general ; thus the division of living tilings into 
plants, animals, and men would be defective ; they 
should first be divided into sentient and non-stntient. 
3. The division should be such that the members in 
some way exclude one another, that is, no one must 
contain any other, much less all. so as to be equal to 
the whole divided ; thus man should not be divided 
into snul, body, and arms. To these three rules may 
be added a fourth : The division must be brief, that 
is, tlie members should be few in number. 

' The actual wliole is ehher jihyskal or metaphysical ; physical when 
composed of physical parts, as body and soul in man ; metaphysical when 
composed of metaph3-sical parts, as animal nature and rational nature in 
:n:in. 



CHAPTEE II. 

Judgment. 

ART. I. — NATURE OF JUDGMENT. 

28. Judgment is the second operation of the mind, hy 
ivhich it perceives the agreement or disagreement of the 
predicate loith the subject. — By apprehension, the mind 
perceives the subject and predicate separately ; but, 
after this operation, it compares the subject and 
predicate, and perceives their relation, that is, it forms 
a judgment. The mind, by this second act of knowl- 
edge, perfects the first, which is initial and imperfect. 

The chief division of judgments is that based on their 
nature, and embraces the two classes of a 2^™ri and 
a posteriori judgments. 

An a ^^rzori judgment is one in which the agreement 
or disagreement of the ideas compared is necessary, 
and either is manifest or can become so from their 
mere consideration ; as God is infinite. 

An a jDosteriori judgment is one in which the agree- 
ment or disagreement of the ideas compared is not 
necessary and can be known from experience alone ; 
as Columbus discovered America. 

A priori judgments are also called necessary, analyt- 
ical, pure, metaphysiccd, absolute. A posteriori judg- 
ments are styled contingent, synthetical, empirical, 
physiccd, hypothetical. 

29. The a priori synthetical judgment of Kcmt must be 
rejected. — In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant lays 
down this third kind of judgment, the a priori syn- 
thetical. He holds rightly that all apriori or analj^ical 



18 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

judgments must fulfil three conditions : 1. Tlie pred- 
icate must be included in the notion of the subject ; 
2. It must be necessary ; 3. It must be univeral. But 
he further maintains that such judgments as Every effect 
has its cause, or 7 and 5 arc 12, are wanting in the first 
condition. But ever}^ judgment implies the percep- 
tion by the mind of the identity or diversity of the 
ideas compared. This identity or diversity can be 
apprehended either from the consideration of the 
ideas, and in this case the judgment is a j^'i^iori or 
analytical ; or from the consideration of the objects 
represented by the ideas, and then the judgment is 
a posteriori or synthetical. Between these there is, 
therefore, no middle. Moreover, if the second and 
third conditions are fulfilled, evidently, the first must 
also be fulfilled, since from it the other two result.^ 

ART. II. — THE PROPOSITION AND ITS ELEMENTS. 

30. A proposition is the expression of a judgment. 
The elements of the proposition may he reduced to tiuo, 
the noun and, the verb. — The proposition, being the 
expression of the judgment, must contain as many 
terms as the judgment. But the judgment is com- 
posed of three elements : the subject, the predicate, 
and the copula. To these three elements of the 
judgment correspond three elements of the pro- 
position : two terms, which express the subject and 
the predicate, and the copula, which unites them. 
The two terms are generally nouns ; the copula is a 
verb. The copula is called a verb, because the word 
(verbiim) of our mind is not complete without the 
judgment, and the judgment is formally constituted 

* See the clear but extended explanation in Clarke's Logic, p. 62 et 
seqcj. 



JUDGMENT. 19 

only by the copula. The terms constitute the matter 
of the proposition ; the copula, which gives being to 
the proposition, is its form. 

The verb to be, is often contained in the predicate, 
as in Hove God, which is equivalent to I am loving 
GocL ' 

Besides the noun and the verb. Grammar recog- 
nizes other parts of speech, as the pronoun, adverb, 
conjunction, etc. ; but logic is not concerned with 
these terms, because tliey do not constitute an essen- 
tial element of the proposition, and because they 
serve only to represent or modify or correct nouns 
or verbs. 

ART. III. — DIVISIONS OF THE PROPOSITION. 

31. The divisions of the projoosition are the same as 
those of the judgment The proposition is simple or 
compound, according to the nature of the judgment 
expressed. The simple proposition is either categorical 
or hypothetical. — The proposition, being regarded in 
logic simply as the expression of the judgment, is 
divided into as many kinds as the judgment. But 
the judgment is simple or compound : simple, when 
the relation is established between one subject and 
one predicate ; compound, when there are several 
subjects or several predicates. When the judgment , 
is one, the predicate or subject may be absolutely 
simple, or simple by reason of the connection be- 

1 The use of the term predicate m Logic must be carefully distin- 
guished from that iu Grammar. In logic the predicate never includes 
the copula. Moreover, the copula, as the formal element of the judg- 
ment, must be iu the present tense, indicative mood. Henoe, such 
propositions as. The Martyrs suffered for the Faith, must be resolved into 
the equivalent, The Martyrs are persons who suffered for the Faith. 



20 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

tween the parts which compose it ; in the first 
case, the judgment is categorical, as God is good ; 
in the second, hypothetical, as // 2jou are good, you 
will be rewarded. The proposition, then, considered 
logically, is categorical, hypothetical, or compound. 

32. Tlte categorical proposition, considered in respect 
to its quantity, is universal, particular, or singular, def- 
inite or indefinite; considered in respect to its quality, 
it is affirmative, negative, or infinite ; considered in re- 
spect to the mode or manner in ivhich it asserts that the 
predicate applies to the snbjict, it is modal. — The cate- 
gorical proposition may be divided in the same 
manner as the judgment which it expresses. Hence 
according to its quantity, that is, according to the 
extension of its subject, it is universal if the subject 
is universal ; as All men are mortal ; particular, if the 
subject is particular, as Some men are just ; singular, 
if the subject expresses only one individual, as Peter 
is just. The proposition may sometimes appear uni- 
versal without in reality being so, as Men are de- 
ceptive. Propositions are called indefinite, ^ when the 
subject is not affected by a determinate sign, as The 
French are courageous ; and definite, when the subject 
is affected by a determinate sign, as So7ne men are 
deceptive. According to its q^iality, that is, according 
to the affirmation or negation indicated by the copula, 
the proposition is affirmative, as God is good ; or neg- 
ative, as The soul is not mortal. If the negation does 
not affect the copula, but the predicate, the proposi- 
tion is then said to be infinite, as The human soul is not 

* Tlie singular proposition is tlic most limited case of the particular 
proposition. The indefinite proposition is universal or partic\ilar ac- 
cording as it expresses a necessary or a contingent truth. See Clarke's 
Loi/ic, pp. 274, 275. 



JUDGMENT. 21 

mortal A proposition is modal when it expresses the 
mode or manner in which the predicate is attributed 
to the subject, as, God is necessarily good. The pred- 
icate may be asserted of the subject according to four 
modes : the necessary, the contingent, the possible, and 
the impossible. There are, then, four kinds of modal 
proposition : as 3Ian is necessarily rational ; Man may 
be good ; Man can be bad; Man cannot be an angel. 
The truth of the modal proposition depends on the 
mode according to which the predicate is attributed 
to the subject ; thus, the proposition, Man is necessarily 
bad, is false. ^ 

33. The hypothetical proposition is copulative, disjunc- 
tive, conditional, causal, relative, adversative, exclusive, 
exceptive, comparative, or reduplicative. — The hypothet- 
ical proposition consists of several propositions ex- 
pressing several judgments which make but one in 
virtue of some logical bond established between them ; 
as If you are good, you icill be reivarded. The truth 
of the hypothetical proposition depends not upon 
each judgment, but upon the connection between the 
various judgments ; as // the said is material, it is not 
immortcd. ^ The hypothetical proposition is copula- 
tive, when the several categorical propositions are 
united by the conjunction and, expressed or under- 
stood ; as Time and Truth are friends. It is disjunc- 
tive, when the several categorical propositions are 

^ The mode always aJfects the copula in true modal propositions. They 
are always capable of being resolved into another proposition of which 
the word or words expressing the mode is the predicate. Thus, Man 
can be bad is equivalent to That man be bad is possible. 

2 Hence either subject or predicate, or both, in a conditional propo- 
sition may be affected by a negative, but the proposition will not be 
negative imless the dependence of the consequent on the antecedent be 
not true. 



22 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

united by the particles either, or ; as It is either day 
or night. It is conditional, Avhen, by means of the 
particle if, it unites two categorical propositions, one 
of wliicli contains the reason or condition of the 
other ; as If he is good, he will he rewarded. The first 
proposition, which contains the reason of the other, 
is called the antecedent, the second the consequent. 
The causal proposition states the reason why the an- 
tecedent contains the consequent, by means of the 
particle because or a word of similar import ; as 
He is 2^youd, because he is rich. The relative proposi- 
tion expresses some similitude between the proposi- 
tions which compose it ; as Such as life is, such shall 
death be. The adversative proposition, on the con- 
trary, expresses some opposition between its mem- 
bers by means of the particles hut, nevertheless, etc. ; 
as Virtue is persecuted, hut it icill be rewarded. — Be- 
sides these hypothetical propositions proper, there 
are others, hypothetical in reality, though seemingly 
categorical, and called expositive. They are of four 
kinds : exclusive, exceptive, cortiparative, and redupli- 
cative. The first is affected by an exclusive particle ; 
only, alone, etc. ; as Virtue only is p)raiseivorthy. The 
second is affected by an exceptive particle, besides, 
except ; as All is lost except honor. The third is 
affected by a comparative particle, expressed or im- 
plied ; as Gentleness effects more than violence. The 
fourth is a proposition whose .subject is affected by 
a particle which repeats it, inasmuch as, in the sense 
th(tf, etc. ; as Fire, inasmuch as it is fire, burns. 

3-4. The jn-opositions composing the compound j^ro- 
position may be j^^'i^i^^ip^^l or i))cidentcd. — The com- 
pound proposition is that which, in one proposition, 
contains several independent judgments, which may 



JUDGMENT. 23 

be expressed in several propositions ; as, Patience 
and meekness are virtues ; Charity is meek and patient. 
That the compound proposition may be true, all the 
parts which compose it must be true ; thus, the 
proposition 3Ien and angels are mortal is false. 

The compound proposition may be resolved into 
several grammatical propositions either co-ordinate, i. 
e., simply in juxtaposition, as in the foregoing example, 
or into propositions some of which are principal and 
others explanatory incidents ; as Siuy detested by 
God, sullies the soid, which is equivalent to the two 
independent judgments, Sin is detested by God, and 
Sin sidlies the soul. If the propositions joined to the 
principal one are subordinate or are restricting inci- 
dents, the whole proposition is not compound but 
simple. 

ART. IV. — PROPERTIES OF PROPOSITIONS. 

35. The properties of propositions are three: opposi- 
tion, conversion, equiptollence. 

36. Opposition is the affirmation and negation of one 
and the same thing on one and the same point. 

37. Opposition is tivofold, contradictory and con- 
trary. — Contradictory opposition is the repugnance 
between two opposite propositions, the one being 
universal and the other particular, or both being 
singular. Contrary opposition is the repugnance be- 
tween two opposite universal propositions. Some 
recognize what is called Suhcontrary opposition, 
which holds between two opposite particular proposi- 
tions ; but this is not true opposition, since the sub- 
jects of the two propositions may express different 
things. Still less can we consider as opposition that 
which is called Subaltern, and which holds between 



*24: CHRIS riAN PHILOSOPHY. 

two affirmative or two negative propositions, the one 
being universal and the other particular. In this 
case there is no opposition, since there is no affirma- 
tion and negation of one and the same thing on one 
and the same point. Of the four propositions : All 
me)) are wise, No man Is wise, Some men are wise. Some 
men arc not icise, the first and second are contraries; 
the first and fourth, the second and third, contradic- 
tories ; the third and fourth, subcontraries ; the first 
and third, the second and fourth, subalterns. 

Representing the universal affirmative proposition 
by A, the universal negative by F, the particular 
affirmative by 7, and the particular negative by 0, 
we have the following diagram : 

A CONTliARIES E 



o 






I %. .#"• 



1 cP^ \^ i 

I SUBCONTRARIES O 

38. Contrary or coniradictonj propositions cannot 
both he true. Of two contradictories, the one must be 
true and the other false. Contraries may both be false. 
Subcontraries may both be true, but cannot both be 
false. Subalterns may both be true or both false, or, 
the one may be true and the other false. 

39. Equipollence is the equivalence in meaning of two 
propositions which are expressed in different terms. — 
Equip(^llence may also be defined, The reduction 



JUDGMENT. 25 

of two opposite propositions to the same meaning ; 
as, Every man is a rational being ; Every rational being 
is a man. These two propositions are said to be 
equipollent. 

40. When the subject of a contradictory 2^'^^oposition 
is affected by a negation, it becomes equivalent to its 
contradictory. When the predicate of a contrary proj)- 
osition is affected by a negation, it becomes equivalent 
to its contrary. When the predicate of a subcontrary 
proposition is affected by a negation, it becomes equiva- 
lent to the other subcontrary. When the negation 
affects both subject and predicate of a subaltern prop- 
osition, it becomes equivalent to the other subaltern. — 
These three rules result from what has been said 
concerning the nature and rules of opposite proposi- 
tions. 

41. Conversion is that change in a proposition by 
ivhich, tvithout altering its truth, the predicate is made 
the subject, and the subject the predicate. — The proposi- 
tion susceptible of being converted is called convert- 
ible, the proposition which results from its conversion 
the converse. 

42. Conversion is simple, per accidens, and by contra- 
position. — The conversion is simple when, the predi- 
cate being made the subject, the proposition retains its 
quantity ; as, No man is a plant ; No plant is a mem. 
It is per accidens, when, the predicate being made 
the subject, the proposition changes its quantity ; as, 
The French are men ; Some men are Freyicli. It is by 
contraposition, when, the predicate being made the 
subject, finite terms are changed into infinite ; s,^ All 
men are animals ; All not-animals are not-men ; Only 
animals are men. 

The universal negative propositions and the par- 



26 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

ticular affimative are converted simply, as, No man is 
(fit ((iKjel ; No cnigel is a man. 

The universal affirmative and the universal negative 
are converted /jer accidens, as. All men are mortalSy 
Some mortals are men. ^ 

The particular negative and the universal affirma- 
tive are converted by contraposition, as, Some men 
are not just ; Some individuals not-just, are not no-men. 
Some luho are not just are men. 



CHAPTER III. 

Reasoning. 

ART. I. — DEFINITION AND ELEMENTS OF REASONING. 

43. Reasoninrj is the third operation of the mind, by 
icliich, from the relation existing between two judg- 
ments, it infers a third as the result of the other two. — 
There are two kinds of judgments- Some are self-evi- 
dent, and, on that account, are called intuitive or im- 
mediate. Others are not self-evident, and are called 
deductive or mediate ; the relation between the 
^predicate and the subject cannot be perceived with- 
out comparing them with a third term. The act by 
which we seek to determine the relation of two terms 
by comparing them with a third is reasoning. 

44. The elements of reasoning are three terms and 
three judgments, and the relation existing between these 

' *' Conversion by contraposition is based on the fact that to assert an 
agreement of two objects of thought is to deny the agreement of either 
of them with the contradictory of the other. "-See Clarke's Logic^ pp. 
301, 302. 



KEASONING. 27 

tei^ms and judgments. — Reasoning must contain three 
terms, since its end is to establish the relation be- 
tween a subject and a predicate bj means of a third 
term. Again, it must contain three judgments : two 
to show the relation of the subject and predicate 
with a middle term, a third to point out the relation 
of the predicate with the subject. The three terms 
and the three propositions constitute the matter of 
reasoning, their connection constitutes its /orm. 

45. The truth of a reasoning may he considered in 
respect both to its matter and its form. — That a reason- 
ing may be materially true, it suffices that the prem- 
ises and the conclusion be separately true ; but that it 
be formally true, the connection between the conclu- 
sion and the premises must be true ; hence it is clear 
that reasoning may be materially true and formally 
false, and vice versa. 

46. All reasoning is based on one of these two axioms : 
1. Ttuo things ivhich agree luith a third, wholly or in 
part, agree ivith each other, luholly or in part ; 2. Tivo 
things, one of which agrees, wholly or in part, luith a 
third, with ivhich the other does not agree, do not agree 
ivith each other. — The first axiom is the principle of 
affirmative reasoning ; the second is the basis of 
negative reasoning. 

ART. II. — DIVISIONS OF EEASONING. 

47. Beasoning considered in respect to its form, is 
deductive or inductive ; considered in respect to its mat- 
ter, it is categorical or hypothetical. — In a reasoning a 
predicate is affirmed or denied of a subject, because, 
after comparing each of them with a middle term, it 
becomes manifest whether the middle term does or 
does not contain the other two. Now, as one thing 



28 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

may be in auotlier as a part is in the whole, or as 
the whole is in the sum of its parts, reasoning is of two 
kinds, according as we proceed from the whole to its 
parts, or from the parts to the whole ; that is, ac- 
cording as we proceed from genera to species and 
from species to individuals, or from individuals to 
species and from species to genera. The first is 
il'ducfive reasoning, the second is inductive. Rea- 
soning considered in respect to the judgments entering 
into it, is categorical or lujpotheiical. But whether 
reasoning be inductive or deductive, categorical or 
hypothetical, the truth of the conclusion is always 
mediate and deduced. Hence the regular form of 
all reasoning is deduction or the syllogism. 

ART. III. — THE CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISM AND ITS RULES. 

48. The syllogism is th<;Lt form of reasoning in which 
the two extremes of a 2^^^oposition are compared affirm- 
atively or negcdiuely luith a third, in order to determine 
luhether their relation icith each other is affirmative or 
negative. — It is easily seen from this definition that 
the syllogism must contain three terms and three 
propositions. The subject of the deduced proposi- 
tion is called the minor term or minor extreme ; the 
predicate is called the major term or major extreme, 
because the predicate, when not identical with the 
subject, has always a greater extension than the sub- 
ject. The term with which the extremes are com- 
pared is called the middle term. The two proposi- 
tions in which the two extremes are compared with 
the middle are tlie premises or the antecedent ; that 
wliich contains the major term is called the major 
premise ; that which contains the minor term is 
called the minor premise. The proposition whicli is 



REASONING. 29 

deduced from the other two, or in which the minor 
term is compared with the major, is called the con- 
clusion or consequent. 

-iO. The syllogism is subject to thefolloiving eight rules: 

I. The syllogism must contain only three terms. 

II. No term must have a greater extension in the con- 
clusion than in the j^remises. 

III. The middle term must he ialcen universally at 
least once in the premises. 

IV. The middle term must not enter into the conclu- 
sion. 

V. Nothing can he concluded from tivo negative 
premises. 

VI. A negative conclusion cannot he draivn from tivo 
affirmative premises. 

VII. The conclusion ahvays foUoivs the iveaJcer part. 

VIII. From tivo particular premises nothing can he 
concluded. 

I. The first rule flows from the very essence of the 
syllogism, which consists in establishing a relation 
between two terms by means of a third. This rule 
is usually violated by using one of the terms in two 
different senses ; as, Every sp)irit is endoived luith in- 
telligence ; hut cdcohol is a spirit ; thereforCy it is endoived 
with intelligence. 

II. The conclusion cannot be more extended than 
the premises ; otherwise, we should have a conse- 
quent not contained in the antecedent, an effect 
which transcends its cause ; as. The eagle is an animals- 
hut the eagle flies in the air; therefore , all animals fly 
in the air. 

III. The middle term must be taken, at least once, 
universally ; otherwise, being twice particular, it 



30 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

would be equivalent to two different terms, and we 
should have a syllogism containing four terms ; as, 
Some an'unate heuigs are endoiued with reason; but the 
horse is an animate heing ; therefore, the horse is en- 
doired luith reason. 

lY. The middle term must not be found in the 
conclusion ; because, being used as a term of com- 
parison, for the pui'pose of finding a relation between 
the other two terms, its proper place is in the prem- 
ises, where this relation is established. Its appear- 
ance in the conclusion really introduces a fourth 
term into the syllogism ; as, Astronomers are learned ; 
Peter is an astronomer ; therefore, Peter is a learned 
astronomer. 

Y. Two negatives give no conclusion ; for, in that 
case we simply see that the term chosen for the 
middle cannot serve to establish any relation be- 
tween the extremes ; hence the antecedent is null, 
and no consequent can be drawn from it ; as. Shep- 
herds are not learned ; hut Peter is not a shepherd. It 
cannot be concluded either that Peter is or is not 
learned. 

YI. A negative cannot be inferred from two affir- 
matives, for two things identical with a third cannot 
but be identical with each other. 

YII. Tlie conclusion alwa^^s follows the weaker part; 
that is, if one of the premises is negative the conclu- 
sion must be negative ; if one of the premises is par- 
ticular, the conclusion must be particular. In the 
first place, it is evident that, if one of two things is 
identical with a third, and the other is not, the two 
things cannot be identical with each other. In the 
second place, if one of two premises is particular, the 
conclusion cannot be universal, otherwise it will 



BEASONING. 31 

have a term more extended here than in the premises. 

YIII. Two particulars afford no conclusion ; because 
if both are affirmative, the middle term must be 
twice particular ; if one of the two is negative, the 
conclusion must contain a universal term which is 
particular in the premises. 

All these rules may be reduced to the following 
Ride of Modern Logicians : The conclusion must he 
contained in one of the premises, and the other premise 
must show that it is therein contained. 

ART. IV. — THE MODES AND FIGURES OF THE 
SYLLOGISM. 

50. The mode of the syllogism is its form according 
to the quantity and quality of the three propositions 
lohich enter into it. — Propositions, considered in re- 
spect both to their quantity and quality, are of four 
kinds : 1. Universal affirmative ; 2. Universal negative ; 
3. Particular affirmative; 4. Particular negative. 
Logicians have designated these four kinds of propo- 
sitions by the letters- A, E, I, O. It is evident that 
these four propositions, combined in threes, give 
sixty-four possible combinations ; but applying to 
these the rules of the syllogism, there will be found 
only ten valid modes. These are : AAA, AAI, 
AEE, All, AOO, EAE. EAO, EIO, lAI, OAO. 

51. The figure of the syllogism is its form according 
to the position of the middle term in the premises. — 
The middle term in the premises may be : 1. Sub- 
ject of the major and predicate of the minor ; 2. 
Predicate of both ; 3. Subject of both ; 4. Predicate 
of the major and subject of the minor. There are, then, 
four figures ; but many logicians make no account of 
the fourth, or turn it into the first. Each figure is 



32 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

susceptible of tbe ten modes, because the proposi- 
tions may preserve their quality and quantity with- 
out changiug the place of the middle term. 

52. There are only nineteen conclusive modes: they 
are chsignated by the folloicing lines : 
I. Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio. 
II. Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco. 

III. Darapti, Felapton, Disamis, Daiisiy Bocardo, 
Ferison. 

lY. Banudipton, Camentes, Dimatis, Fresapno, 
Fresisonornm. 

Applying the rules of the syllogism to these modes, 
we see that i\\Q first figure, in which the middle term 
is subject of the major and predicate of the minor, 
excludes : 1. Modes whose minor is negative ; 2. 
Modes whose major is particular ; 3. AAI, EAO as 
useless. The second figure, in which the middle 
term is used twice as predicate, excludes : 1. Modes 
whose two premises are affirmative ; 2. Those in 
which the major is particular ; 3. EAO as useless. 
The third figure, in which the middle term occurs 
twice as subject, excludes : 1. Modes in which the 
minor is negative ; 2. Modes in which the conclusion 
is universaL HhQ fourtli figure, m \\\\ic\\ the middle 
term is predicate of the major and subject of the 
minor, excludes : 1. Modes having an affirmative 
major with a particular minor; 2. Modes having an 
affirmative minor with a universal conclusion ; 3. 
OAO as contrary to the second rule. There remain 
only the following nineteen valid modes : 

1st Figure, AAA, EAE, All, EIO. 2d Figure, 
EAE, AEE, EIO, AOO. 3d Figure, AAI, EAO, 
lAT. All, OAO, EIO. 4th Figure, AAI, AEE, lAI, 
EAO, EIO. 



REASONING. 33 

All tliese modes may be converted into tlie four 
modes of the first figure, which, on that account, are 
called perfect. They are summed up in the four 
lines already given, which, by a happy disposition 
of vowels and consonants, designate at once a par- 
ticular mode, the perfect mode into which it may be 
converted, and the diverse operations by which the 
conversion is affected. The first three vowels of 
each word indicate the mode ; the initial consonant 
shows to what mode of the first figure this mode may 
be reduced ; the consonants S, P, C, M, denote the 
operation to be performed in order to effect the re- 
duction. S indicates that the proposition designated 
by the vowel before it must be converted simply ; P, 
that it must be converted per accidens ; C, that the 
syllogism must be reduced j^e?^ impossihile ; M signifies 
that the order of the premises must be changed. 

Thus the syllogism, What is material is not simple ; 
one simple being is the soul ; therefore, the soul is not 
material; is designated by Fresisonorum of the fourth 
figure ; for the mode is seen from the three vowels 
E A O, and the figure is known by the position of the 
middle term. This mode may be reduced to that 
mode of the first figure that begins with F, viz., Ferio. 
The letter S following E and I in Fresisonorum indi- 
cates that the premises represented by these two 
letters are to be converted simply. Hence the syllo- 
gism becomes: What is simple is not material; 
the soul is simple ; therefore, the soul is not material. 

AET V. — THE HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISM A^D ITS EULES. 

53. The hypothetical syllogism is that in which one of 
the premises is hypothetical, — If one premise of the 
syllogism is a disjunctive proposition, the syllogism 



34 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

is called disjunctive. If one premise is a conjunctive 
proposition, the syllogism is conjunctive. Finally, if 
one premise is conditional, the syllogism is condi- 
tional. TLe hypothetical syllogism, of whatever kind, 
besides the rules peculiar to it, is subject to the eight 
rules of the categorical syllogism. 

54. The disjunctive syllogism is suhject to the tivo fol- 
loiving rules: 1. One of the incompatible j^redicates being 
affirmed in the minor, all the others must be denied copu- 
latively in the conclusion; 2. One of the incompatible 
predicates being denied in the minor, all the others must 
be affirmed disjunctively in the conclusion. — It is evident 
that, for the legitimacy of the conclusion of the dis- 
junctive syllogism, the disjunctive premise must 
make a complete enumeration of all the predicates 
that can agree with the subject. Hence this syl- 
logism is false: The rich must either squander their 
money or hoard it; but they should not hoard it; there- 
fore, they should squander it. The disjunction is not 
complete ; it has omitted a third term, which is to ex- 
pend money prudently. 

55. The conjunctive syllogism, from the affirmation of 
one of the members, infers the negation of all the others; 
but not vice versa. — It is clear that the conclusiveness 
of this syllogism requires that the members enumer- 
ated in the conjunctive proposition be opposed to 
each other in such a way that they cannot agree 
with the same subject at the same time ; as. No one 
can serve God and Mammon; but many serve Mammon; 
therefore, many do not serve God. From this example 
it is clear that, if the minor were negative, as, But 
the spendthrift does not serve Mammon, we could not 
infer the affirmative : Therefore, he serves God. ^ 

1 The minor of a conjunctive syllogism always denies one of the two 
alternatives expressed in the major. 



REASONING. 35 

56. The conditional syllogism concludes in tivo loays: 
1. From the affirmation of the antecedent it infers the 
affirmation of the consequent; 2. From the negation of 
the consequent it infers the negation of the antecedent; 
hut not vice versa. — In fact, the antecedent contains 
the reason of the consequent ; therefore, the affirma- 
tion of the first implies that of the second, as the 
negation of the second implies that of the first ; as, 
If Clirist arose from the dead, he is God; hut he did 
arise from the dead; therefore, he is God. But since an 
effect may depend on several causes, the inverse of 
the rules laid down would not give a logical conclu- 
sion ; as, // Peter is studious, he merits a reward; but 
he is not studious; therefore, he does not merit a reward. 
It is clear that a reward may be merited for some 
other reason besides that of being studious. ^ 

ART VI.— THE IMPERFECT AND THE COMPOUND SYLLOGISM, 

OR THE ENTHYMEME, THE PROSYLLOGISM, THE 

EPICHIREMA, THE SORITES, AND THE 

DILEMMA. 

57. The enthymeme is an imperfect syllogism, one 
premise of ivhich is understood; as, God is Just; there- 
fore, he ivill reiuard the good. 

58. The prosyllogism is a syllogism composed of two 
syllogisms J the conclusion of the first becoming the major 
of the second; as, Every virtue is rewarded by God; hid 
humility is a virtue; therefore, humility is rewarded by 
God; hut the bearing of injuries is humility; therefore^ 
the hearing of injuries is reivarded by God. 

59. The epichirema is a syllogism composed of premises 
<it least one of which is accompanied ivith proof ; as, God 

1 The minor of a conditional syllogism must always assert the ante- 
cedent or deny the consequent. 



36 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPEIY. 

1)1 Its f he (idored; but Jesus Christ is God, as his life and 
miracles attest; therefore, he must he adored.^ 

60. The sorites is a form of reasoning com.posed of 
several propositions so connected tJiat the predicate of the 
first becomes the subject of the second, and so on, until 
the jrredicate of the last is joined to the subject of the 
first. — This form of reasoning may be separated into 
as many syllogisms as there are propositions less 
two. It rests on the principle that whatever is said 
of the predicate may be said of the subject. Ex. 
Sin offends God; lohatever offends God separates us 
from him; lohateoer separates us from God deprives 
us of the sovereign good ; ivhatever deprives 2is of the 
sovereign good is the greatest of evils; therefore, sin is 
the greatest of evils. 

61. 7Vie dilemma is a compound syllogism, in ivhicli 
each member of a disjunctive major premise is taken in 
a minor consisting of several conditional propositions, 
and serves to conclude against the adversary. — In this 
form of reasoning care must be taken : 1. That the 
disjunction of the major be complete ; 2. That 
each member of the minor be indisputable. Ex. 
A general said to a soldier ivho had alloived the enemy 
to pass: " Either you 2vere at your post or you ivere not; 
if you ivere^ you deserve death for neglecting to give 
notice of the enemy; if you were not, you deserve death 
for breach of discipline.'' 

62. To these arguments may be added the Example, a 

* Both the enthynicnie and the epichircina have chanjjed in meaning 
since the days of Aristotle, who defines tlie former as a syllogism drawn 
fiom probabilides and signs of the conclusion; and the latter as a dialect- 
ical syllogism^ in which the conclusion is reached after a careful exami- 
nation of objections and (Htlicnlties. See PV.ther Clarke's Logic, pp. 
35G. :{59. 



REASONING. 37 

species of reasoning in ivJiich one proposition is dratun 
from another to luhich it has a relation of resemblance, of 
opposition, or of superiority. — Tliis argument may be 
reduced to a syllogism whose major is confirmed by 
a particular fact bearing on the consequence which 
we wish to draw. Ex. 1. Our Lord pardoned St. Peter 
on account of his repentance; therefore, he ivill pardon 
you, if, having imitated St. Peter in his faidt, you like- 
loise imitate him in his repentance. — -2. Louis XIV. and 
Napoleon I. caused great evils on account of their love of 
luar; it is therefore desirable that a p)eople have a sover- 
eign icho loves peace.— ^. " Behold the foivls of the air, 
for they soiv not, neither do they reap, nor gather into 
barns; yet your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are not 
you of much more value than they ? " (St. Matt. vi. 26.) 
In the first example we conclude a paW; in the 
second, a contrario or cd) opposito; in the third, a for- 
tiori. 

"When the example is drawn from the words and 
actions of an adversary and used against him, it is 
then called argumentum ad hominem. 

ART. VII.— INDUCTION. 

63. hiduction is that process in ichich the mind, after 
affirming or denying a predicate of each part of a ivhole, 
pronounces the same judgment of the whole. — As has 
been said already, the reasoning process is twofold : 
it proceeds either from the whole to the parts which 
compose it, or from the parts to the whole which they 
constitute. In the first case the mind makes a de- 
duction, and in the second an^induction. Example of 
induction : The Gospel has penetrated into Europe, Asia, 
Africa, America, and Oceanica ; but these five Grand. 
Divisions make up the whole hioivn world ; therefore. 



38 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

fhe Gospel has penetrated into all the hwivn ivorld. 
From this example it becomes manifest that the mid- 
dle term in the inductive syllogism is simply the 
enumeration of the parts. These parts united are in 
reality identical with the whole, though logically dis- 
tinct from it ; they can, consequently, perform the 
function of a middle term. 

64. The legitimacy of the inductive syllogism rests on 
the jyrincij^le that, the sum of the parts being identical 
tvith the whole, luhatever is affirmed or denied of all the 
parts may he affirmed or denied of the ivhole. — Hence, 
that the inductive syllogism may be rigorously con- 
clusive, it is essential that the enumeration of the 
parts composing the whole be complete. But this 
enumeration may be actually or virtually complete : 
actually, when what has been predicated of tlie wliole 
has been verified in each of its parts ; virtually, when 
the predicate has been verified only in a certain num- 
ber of the parts, and we suppose it applicable to the 
others on the pinnciple of analogy. In virtue of this 
principle, the mind regards that which is constant in 
a certain number of beings as essential to their na- 
ture. Hence, knowing that whatever proceeds from 
the nature of a being is always verified in that being 
and in all others having the same nature, the mind 
concludes that a quality which it has verified in some 
beings must be found under the same circumstances 
in all beings having the same nature. 

When induction is really incomplete, it does not 
authorize a universal and absolute conclusion.^ It 

' " In spite of tin's, these methods (of incomplete induction) cannot 
be passed over in the present day. They are too important a factor in 
the present condition of human society to admit of our neglecting 
them. . . . Besides, we must understand and appreciate them in order to 
protest against tiieir abuse. . . . Mill and his followers drag down all the 



REASONING. 39 

gives only a greater or less degree of probability, in 
direct ratio to the number of parts in which the predi- 
icate has been verified. 

ART. VIII. — THE PROBABLE OR DIALECTIC SYLLOGISM. 

65. The probable syllogism is that luhich gives only a 
probable conclusion. — Apart from the sciences and in 
the affairs of life, we cannot ordinarily arrive at com- 
plete certitude ; we must be satisfied with probability. 
The argument which is thus concerned with contin- 
gent matter and with things known only in part is 
called a probable argument, and its expression, a pi^ob- 
able syllogism. 

66. When ive argue in probable 'matter, ive must seelc 
certitude in all that is susceptible of it. — Hence : 1. We 
must be assured of the possibility of the thing ; 2. 
We must establish the certainty of all the circum- 
stances of which we can be sure ; 3. We must deter- 
mine with certainty whether there are stronger motives 
in favor of one side than of the other. Made use 
of in this way, the probable syllogism often prepares 
the way to complete certitude and leads to science 
properly so called ; at all events, it gives solidity to 
the mind, prevents it from advancing anything rashly, 

a priori laws to the level of the a posteriori, or rather deny the exist- 
ence of a priori laws at all. This is the fatal result of the neglect of 
scholastic methods, which began at the Reformation, and has been 
carried further day by day." Clarke's Logic, p. 387. The whole 
chapter is worthy attentive study. 

Father Clarke sums up the place in Logic of Inductive Methods by de- 
veloping the following heads : 1. They certainly claim a place in Material 
Logic, if not in formal; 2. These Inductive Methods can never give us 
absolute certainty, but they can give us physical certainty; 3. "We must 
always be on our guard against allowing ourselves to be persuaded into 
a conviction of the truth of some general hypothesis when the concur- 
rent evidence is not sufficient of itself to establish it. 



40 CHIUSTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

iiud from judging of an accomplished fact without 
reflection. 

ART. IX. — THE FINDING OF THE MIDDLE TERM. 

67. T/iat which is most essential in a reasoning is the 
Jindiug of the middle term. — As the art of reasoning 
consists in showing, by means of a term called the 
middle, the agreement or disagreement between the 
two extremes of a conclusion, it is of the utmost im- 
portance, in examining a question, to discover the 
middle term ; hence logic should teach how and 
where this term is to be found. 

68. The rules for finding the middle term may he re- 
ddced to two : 1. JVhen the conclusion is a universal 
affirmative, the middle term must, he universallij affirm- 
ahle of the suhject, and the jjredicate must he universally 
qffirmahle of the middle term ; 2. When the conclusion 
is a universal negative, the middle term must disagree 
with the suhject and agree icith the predicate, or agree 
with the suhject and disagree ivith the predicate. — All the 
modes of reasoning may be reduced to the four per- 
fect modes ; but of these four modes, the first two 
only are scientific, because they only are universal. 
Hence the rules for finding the middle term may be 
reduced to those which relate to the middle term in 
these two modes. But in a universal affirmative con- 
clusion, the predicate is found to be included in the 
subject b}^ means of a term which contains the predi- 
cate, and which itself is contained in the subject. We 
must, therefore, look for all the superior predicates 
of the subject of the conclusion, and all the inferior 
subjects of the predicate of the conclusion. In a 
universal negative conclusion, the predicate and sub- 
ject being denied of each other, it suffices to find a 



REASONING. 41 

term which, disagreeing with the one, agrees with the 
other. We often determine the middle term by 
pointing out the inconvenience which would arise if 
an affirmative proposition were denied, or a negative 
one affirmed. 

69. The sources tohence middle terms are taken are 
called topics or common-places. Ten of them are usual- 
ly assigned : cause, effect, subject, accessories, contrariety, 
likeness, name, definition, division, and autJwrity. — We 
are effectually aided in finding the middle term by an 
examination into the cause or effect of the subject or 
predicate of the proposition to be established. We 
are also assisted by examining the subject to which 
either cause or effect is applicable, the accessories or 
circumstances which accompany the cause and effect, 
what is contrary to them or like them, the name 
which is assigned to them, the definition which is 
given of them, either by genus or species or simple 
difference ; also by observing how the subject or 
predicate is divided and what parts compose it ; and 
finally, by noting on what authority or testimony the 
affirmation may be supported. The common-place of 
authority comprehends law, custom, luritten documents, 
testimony, oaths, report ; these are exfruzsic topics, that 
is, topics taken from outside the thing ; the others are 
intrinsic topics, that is, topics taken from the nature 
of the thing. With the intrinsic topics may also be 
classed those of genus, species, property, accident, ante- 
cedents, consequence, repugnance, comparison, the ivhole, 
and the parts. All the topics, intrinsic as well as 
extrinsic, are called probable or dialectic, because 
they afford middle-terms to probable or dialectic rea- 
soning. Some, however, as those of cause, division, 
and above all, definition, are used in demonstrative or 



42 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

and analytical reasoning, because they express a neces- 
sary and evident agreement or disagreement between, 
the extremes of the proposition. 

ART. X. — THE SOPHISTICAL SYLLOGISM. 

70. A sophism is a syllogism which leads into error , 
and yet has the appearance of truth. — The better to 
enable us to arrive at truth by means of reasoning, 
logic not only lays down the rules to which a syllo- 
gism must conform to be conclusive, but, moreover, 
exposes the artifices by which our minds are liable to 
be led into error, and thus enables us the better to 
defend ourselves against them. These artifices are 
called sophisms, when they suppose in him who makes 
use of them the desire to deceive ; they are called 
paralogisms when they are employed through inadver- 
tence or through ignorance of the rules of reasoning ; 
in either case they may be called fallacies. Taken 
together, the}^ constitute the art of sophistry, which 
was particularly taught and practised by the Greek 
orators, in order that by enabling them to support 
at pleasure all causes and parties, it might be to them 
the means of acquiring wealth and influence. 

7 1 . Fallacies are divided into those of ivord and those 
of thought^ according as they lead into error by an abuse 
of words or by captious thought. — Fallacies in tuord are 
six in number : (a) Equivocation, {b) Amphibology, (c) 
Fallacy of composition, (d) Fallacy of division, (e) Fallacy 
of accent, (/) Fallacy of diction. — Fallacies in thought 
are seven in number : {a) Fallacy of accident, (b) Passing 
from the absolute to the relative and vice versa, (c) False 
cause, (d) Evading the question j or, Irrelevant conclusion, 
(e) Fallacy of consequent, (/) Begging the question and 
vicious circle, (g) Fallacy of many questions. 



REASONING. 43 

The principal fallacies in words are six : 
(a) Equivocation^ which consists in using an equivo- 
cal term ; as, The dog is a constellation ; hut Rover is a 
dog ; therefore, Rover is a constellation. 

{h) Amphibologij , which consists in making use of a 
phrase in a twofold sense, as, God has given us riches 
for our happiness ; therefore, in employing riches for 
our pleasures, ive fulfil the design of God. 

(c) The fallacy of composition, which arises when 
things which are separately true are taken as collect- 
ively true, as, The Gospel states that the blind saw ; hut 
that the hlind shoidd see is a contradiction ; therefore, 
tlie Gospel contains contradictions. 

(d) The fallacy of division, which is the reverse of 
the preceding ; as, According to the ScrijDtares, the 
impious shall not enter the kingdom of heaven ; there- 
fore, it is useless for the impious to repent. 

(e) The fallacy of accent, which changes the mean- 
ing of a word by changing the accent ; as, He 
conjured me not to hetray my country, therefore, he 
practised the Mack art. ^ 

(/) The fallacy of diction, which passes from the 
identity of the thing to the identity of the quality ; as, 
The man who ivas ivith you three years ago is 
buried ; hut the man was alive ; therefore, a man has 
been buried alive. 

The principal fallacies in the thought are seven : 
(a) The fallacy of accident, which occurs when 
what is only accidental is affirmed as necessary ; as, 
Orators often mislead the people ; therefore, eloquence 

1 The fallacy of accent also includes the mistaking of one word for 
another having the same pronunciation but a different spelling ; as if 
I should say that there were small islands in the church, because it 
has many aisles. 



44 CHRISTIAN THILOSOPHY. 

IS to be condemneL With tins fallacy may be classed 
that which is called iniperfect enumeratio)i. 

(h) The fallacy of passing from the absolute to the 
relative, and vice versa, which occurs when we argue 
from what is true absolutely to what is true only 
relatively, and vice versa ; as, We must obci/ our 
parents ; but my parni^s command me not to discharge 
my duties towards God; therefore, etc. 

(c) The fallacy of false cause^ which occurs when 
we assign as the cause of an effect what is not really 
such ; as, Inebriety is bad ; but luine inebriates ; there- 
fore, wine is bad. 

(d) Evading the question, or, irrelevant conclusion, 
which occurs when we prove something which is 
not in question, as would be the case if a minister of 
state, being pressed to modify certain laws, should 
demonstrate the necessity of law. 

(e) The fallacy of consequent, which occurs when in 
a reasoning we convert things which are not convert- 
ible ; as, // that be a man, it is an animal ; therefore, 
if it be not a man, it is not an animal. 

(/) Begging the question, which occurs when we as- 
sume, in fact or in principle, the thing in question, or 
that which requires to be proved ; as would be the 
case if we should undertake to prove that the earth 
revolves about the sun thus : The sun is at rest ; 
therefore, the earth revolves about it. When this fallacy 
proves one of two disputed propositions by the other, 
it is called a vicious circle; as if after relying on 
the veracity of a ivitness to prove a fact, I should rely 
on the truth of the fact to prove the veracity of the 
witness. 

(g) The fallacy of many questions, or oiinterrogation, 
occurs when several questions requiring different 



REASONING. 45 

answers are asked, and the answer given to one is 
assumed as applicable to the others ; as, Are virtue 
and vice good or evil ? Whether we answer yes or no, 
we fall into error. 

We may also classify among fallacies all reasonings 
in which any one of the rules of the syllogism is 
violated. 

ART. XI. — UTILITY OF THE SYLLOGISM. 

72. The use of the syllogism gives clearness, strength, 
and flexibility to the mind. — By the use of the syllo- 
gism the mind discerns more readily the value of a 
reasoning and detects more easily the vices of a 
fallacy. As gymnastics strengthens the body and 
makes it supple, so the use of the syllogistic art 
gives solidity, flexibility, and precision to the mind. 
It is evident, however, that, though the use of the 
syllogism presents these great advantages, its abuse 
may easily generate stiffness and subtlety, and im- 
pede the progress of intelligence instead of aiding it. 



LOGIC. 
PAET II. 

Truth and Science. 

73. The second part of logic, having for its object the 
end of reasoning, that is, science in general, treats : 1. 
Of the different states of tlie mind in respect to truth ; 
2. Of demonstration ; 3. Of science in general and 
of its divisions. — Before treating of science in itself, 
and the way in which the sciences are divided and co- 
ordinated, it is well to examine : 1. What is truth, 
the object of science, and what are the different states 
of the mind in respect to truth ; 2. What produces 
science, viz., demonstration. 



CHAPTER J. 

Truth and the Different States of the Mind 
in respect to it. 

ART. I. — TRUTH. 

Truth is the conformity between the miiid and the 
thing. — I judge that God is good ; this judgment corre- 
sponds to what God is in reality ; hence it is true. 
In the same way, every creature* corresponds to the 
idea which God has of it ; that is, every creature is 
true. 



STATES OF THE MIND IN RESPECT TO TRUTH. 47 

75. Truth is metaphysical or logical. — Truth is in the 
thing or in our cognition of the thing. In the for- 
mer case, it is the conformity of the thing to the 
divine intellect ; this is objective or metajjhysical 
truth. In the latter case, it is the conformity of our 
cognition to the thing known ; this is subjective or 
logical truth. Logical truth, according to its object, 
is of the spiritual or corporeal order, general or par- 
ticular, natural or supernatural. To metaph3^sical and 
logical truth may be added moral truth or veracity, the 
opposite of which is falsehood. Moral truth depends on 
logical truth, as the latter depends on metaphysical. 

76. The opposite of logical truth is error ; metaphys- 
ical trutli has no opposite. — Our intellect is not the 
cause of creatures, and the knowledge which it ac- 
quires of them may represent them differently from 
what they are. There may, therefore, exist in our 
mind logical falsit}^ or error. On the contrar}^ the 
divine intellect being the cause of everything that 
is, every being is necessarily such as God knows it ; 
every being, therefore, must necessarily be metaphysi- 
cally true. Hence being and metaphysical truth may 
be affirmed of each other, and it may be said that 
whatever is is true, and whatever is true is, and that 
God, the absolute Being, is also the absolute truth. 

ART. II. — IN WHAT OPERATION OF THE MIND LOGICAL 
TRUTH IS FOUND. 

77. Logical truth is, properly speaking, found only in 
the act of judgment. — Logical truth is a correspond- 
ence between the mind and the thing ; it can, therefore, 
strictly speaking, be found only in that operation of 
the mind which perceives and expresses this corre- 
spondence, that is, in the act of judgment. 



48 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



nor 



78. Truth is not properly in simple apprehension 
(iven in sensation.— Every cognoscitive facult}^ put in 
presence of its object, must apprehend the object as 
it is. Hence simple apprehension, and even sensa- 
tion, knows things as they are, and this knowledge is 
laaterialhj true or conformed to the thing. But as 
the mind has no cognition of this conformity, since 
there is no judgment, it follows that there is not, in 
apprehension or sensation, formal truth or truth 
properly so called. 

ART. III.— DIFFERENT STATES OF THE MIND IN RESPECT 
TO TRUTH. 

79. There are three different states of the mind in re- 
spect to truth : 1. Certitude, 2. Opinion or prohahilitij, 
3. Doubt.— Certitude is that state of the mind in which 
it firmly adheres to a known truth without fear that 
the contrary may be true. Opinion is that state of 
the mind in which it adheres to something known, but 
with fear that the contrary may be true. Doubt is 
that state of the mind in which it is in suspense and 
adheres neither to the affirmative nor the negative of 
the thing proposed. Doubt is negative when tJie 
mind perceives no motive to adhere either to the af- 
firmative or the negative ; doubt is iiositive when the 
mind has as strong motives for adhering to the af- 
firmative as to the negative. 

80. Probabilitif, whatever its degree, is spedficalhj 
distinct from certitude.— Vvoh.ihWiiY holds a middle 
place between doubt and certitude ; it is susceptible 
of increase and diminution and may have several 
degrees ; but none of these degrees, however -reat 
will constitute certitude. This latter, on the conLarv! 
cmnot admit of degrees; it is or it is not. The calcula- 



STATER OF THE MTND IN RESPECT TO TRUTH. 



49 



tion of probabilities lias its fouiKlation in the ascer- 
tained relation existing between the probable thing 
and its contrary. This calculation confined within 
proper bounds may become a legitimate source of 
knowledge, on which are based certain social institu- 
tions, such as insurance companies. 

81. The elements of cert'dade being, 1. The truth of 
the object, 2. The firmness of conviction, 3. The motive 
which produces conviction, it may be divided according 
to the loarticular element in reference to ivhich it is con- 
sidered. — Relatively to the truth of the object, certi- 
tude is experimental or scientific, immediate or mediate, 
according as the truth itself is experimental or specu- 
lative, known immediately or by means of reasoning. 
In respect to the firmness of adhesion, this adhesion, 
while it always excludes doubt, may be more or less 
perfect according to the perfection of the motive 
producing it ; we have, therefore, certitude of evidence, 
which is produced by an intrinsic motive, and certi- 
tude of faith, which is produced by an extrinsic 
motive. Certitude of evidence is metaphysical, physi- 
cal, or moral; for the intrinsic motive which produces 
it is nothing more than the perception of the connec- 
tion existing between a thing and its attribute. But 
this connection belongs either to the metaphysical 
order, that is, is absolutely necessary, or to the 
physical or the moral order, that is, it is necessary 
in accordance with the laws of the physical or of the 
moral world, established by God. The certitude of 
faith is divine or human, according as it rests on 
divine or on human authority. 

ART. IV. — IGNORANCE, ERROR, AND THEIR CAUSES. 

82. Ignorance is the absence of truth in the mind.— 



50 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Igiiorauce and error Lave not been reckoned among 
the states of the mind in respect to truth, since, in- 
stead of being a cognition of truth, they are respec- 
tively its absence and its negation. 

83. The causes of ignorance are: 1. The limited nature 
of our mind ; 2. A luant of intellectual culture.— The 
first cause of ignorance arises from the very nature 
of man, who is essentially a finite being. To this 
cause may be referred the organic defects, which, in 
certain men, impede the cognition of truth. The 
second cause is the absence of intellectual culture. 
Truth is not infused into man ; he must acquire it 
either by instruction from others, or by his own 
efforts. If he has not been taught and does not 
himself labor to develop his intellectual faculties, 
he must remain in ignorance of many truths. 

84. Error is the adhesion of the mind to a false judg- 
ment—Since error is an adhesion to a false judgment, 
it can be found neither in the senses nor in simple 
apprehension, but solely in the act of judgment. It 
would be wrong to regard error, with Cousin, as in- 
com])lete truth. An incomplete truth is none the 
less a truth ; whereas error is the opposite of truth. 

85. The principal causes of error are : 1. PrecifA- 
tanct/ of judgment ; 2. Liveliness of imagination ; 
3. Prejudice: 4. Pc/.ss/o^^— Precipitancy of judg- 
ment consists in judging of a thing not suflficiently 
known. It is remedied by attention and reflection. 
The imagination often obscui'es truth by presenting 
too lively images of sensible things. Its excesses 
are corrected by keeping it under a severe control of 
the judgment. Prejudices are judgments adopted 
without examination. A prudent man will weigh his 
])reju Hces in the balance of reason ; he will not 



DEMONSTRATION. 51 

rashly reject them, neither will he blindly follow 
them. The passions are the most fruitful source of 
our errors ; they obscure the intellect and present 
things to it in the borrowed light of a badly regulated 
will. The remedy for this evil is found in virtue 
alone. To these internal causes may be added ex- 
ternal ones, as education, the school, the vices of 
language ; all of which are remedied by a prudent 
scrutiny and a sincere love of truth. Bacon has 
divided our errors into four classes : 1. Idols of the 
tribe, that is, errors arising from the weakness of 
our common nature ; 2. Idols of the cave, that is, 
errors arising from our individual character ; 3. 
Idols of the mar'ket-place, that is, errors resulting 
from the vices of language ; 4. Idols of the theatre, 
that is, errors of the school. Evidently the causes 
assigned by Bacon for our errors may be reduced to 
those already indicated. 

86. Man, in his actual condition, cannot constardly 
avoid all error. — If man always made use of his facul- 
ties in conformity to the laws imposed on him, he 
would not err. But, owing to his natural weakness, 
he is incapable of always conforming to these laws, 
and, consequently, of avoiding all error. 



CHAPTER II. 

Demonstration. 

87. Demonstration is a syllogism lohich produces 
science, or it is a reasoning which, by the aid of premises 
evidently true, gives a certain and evident conclusion. — 
The sophistical syllogism is a source of error ; the 



0*2 CHlilSTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

probable syllogism gives only doubtful knowledge ; 
the demonstrative syllogism alone produces science, 
tliat is, cfertain and evident knowledge of a truth. 

88. Demonstration is necessarily preceded hy that 
s-periesi of douht called methodic, and ivhlch is defined as 
Dotihf icli'ich attends a thesis before it is demonstrated. — 
A truth to be demonstrated is first proposed in the 
form (3f a question, and the mind is in suspense be- 
tween its affirmation and negation ; that is, it doubts. 
This doubt, called methodic, bears only on the truth 
or truths to be demonstrated, and not on the inde- 
monstrable principles. Unlike the systematic doubt 
of sceptics, methodic doubt is not absolute, perma- 
nent, or universal ; unlike the Cartesian doubt, it not 
only admits the veracity of consciousness, but also 
that of all the cognoscitive faculties, and does not 
touch self-evident truths. Methodic doubt may bear 
on one of these four questions : 1. Does the thing 
exist ? 2. Wliat is its essence ? 3. Wliat are its acci- 
dents ? -i. Why does it exist ? The question regard- 
ing the existence of the thing presupposes at least 
its nominal definition ; the question regarding its 
essence supposes that of its existence already 
solved ; the question concerning its attribute pre- 
supposes at least the notion of the attribute ; finally, 
the question of the wherefore of a thing can find its 
solution only in the principles or reasons of the 
thing; hence it is this last question that properly 
comes under the head of science. 

89. All demonstration presupposes three notions : 1. 
That of the subject ; 2. That of the predicate ; 3. 
That of tlte middle term. — For all demonstration has 
for its end to show that a certain predicate agrees 
or disagrees with a certain subject by compearing 



DEMONSTRATION. 5d 

both with a third term ; hence it is clear that, prior 
to all reasoning, we must have the notion of these 
three terms. 

90. The middle term of a demonstraiion must ftdfil 
three conditions : 1. It must contain the reason of the 
thing ; 2. It must he knoivn as the reason ; 3. This 
reason must he certain. — For demonstration produces 
scientific knowledge by means of a middle term ; but 
to know a thing scientifically, we must know the 
reason of the thing, know that we know it, and know 
it as certain ; hence the middle term must comply 
with these three conditions of science. 

91. Demonstration is divided into : A priori and a 
posteriori ; Direct and indirect, or ad absurdum. — A 
priori demonstration is that which descends from 
cause to effect, as when/ro?/?. the existence of Providence 
lue infer the order of the universe ; a posteriori demon- 
stration ascends from effects to their cause, as when 
from the order of the universe ive infer the existence of 
Providence. Direct demonstration proves not only 
that a thing is, but, moreover, why it is ; as. The soul 
is immortal, hecause it is a spirit. Indirect demon- 
stration simply shows that we must admit the thing 
on account of the absurdities which would flow from 
its denial ; as, // the soul is not immortal, evil 
triump>hs. This kind of demonstration serves to pre- 
pare the way for science and to defend it, but it 
does not constitute science. To indirect demon- 
stration may be referred the argumentation called 
ex datis, so designated because from the concessions 
of an adversary w^e draw conclusions which are evi- 
dently against him ; as, You grant that the ivorld could 
not make itself ; then God must have created it. The 
demonstration called circidar or regressive is at the 



54: CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

same time a lyr'wri and a posteriori ; a posteriori, since 
it ascends from effect to cause ; a jorioriy since, from the 
cause better known, it returns to the effect for a 
better knowledge of it ; as, Tlte order ive behold in the 
world proves the existence of Providence ; and as there is 
a Froi-ide)ice, we are certain that even events unknoion 
to Ks are ordained by it. 



CHAPTER III. 

Science —Divisions of Science. — Co-ordi- 
nation of the Sciences. 

92. Science considered subjectively is the certain and 
evident cognition of the idtimate reasons of things, ob- 
tained by means of reasoning ; considered objectively, it 
is a complete system of demonstrated truths dependent 0)^ 
one principle. — Science considered as existing in our 
mind, that is, subjectively, must be certain cognition, 
otherwise it woukl not be perfect ; it must be evident 
cognition, otherwise it would not account to the mind 
for the subordinate truths contained in the principles 
which constitute the object of science. Finally, it 
must be the cognition of the ultimate reasons of things, 
for the mind knows things perfectly only when it knows 
tliem in their first principles. Science considered 
objectively is a body of co-ordinated truths dependent 
on one and the same principle and constituting what 
is called a scientific system. It is in this latter sense 
that the word science is usually understood. 

93. Scie}ice must be both one and midtiple : one in re- 
spect to the /n'iiH'if)le whence floiv the truths embraced 



DIVISIONS AND CO-ORDINATION OF THE SCIENCES. 55 

imdei^ the science ; multiple in resjject to the deductions 
made from the principle. — That first principle, from 
which the mind develops the truths contained therein, 
is the proper object of science and constitutes its 
unity. This unity is formal and not material ; for, 
though a science treats of objects materially multiple, 
yet these objects are considered under an aspect 
by which they are referred to one and the same 
principle, and hence the science is one. 

94. A science is specified by its object. — The object of 
a science constitutes its unity and makes it this or 
that science ; hence the sciences are distinguished 
from one another by the diversity of their objects. 
Thus, science is natural or supernatural, according as 
its object is a natural or supernatural truth ; it is 
speculative or practical, according as its object is a 
purely speculative truth or a truth the knowledge of 
which may serve as a rule of action. Two sciences 
are said to be distinct, when the object of the one has 
certain relations to that of the other ; as, Geometry 
and Astronomy. They are said to be separate, when 
their objects have no relation to each other ; as, 
Algebra and Morals. 

95. Philosophy is the science that governs all the others. 
They may be divided and co-ordinated according to the 
divisions instituted in philosophy. — Philosophy is the 
supreme and fundamental science. For it treats of 
being in itself and in general; but as every other 
science treats of being under some particular aspect, 
it follows that each has its foundation in philosophy, 
and that philosophy lays down its first principles. 
The general division of the sciences may be made to 
correspond to the divisions of philosophy by taking 
care to co-ordinate them and establish their dignity 



56 CHRISTIAN THILOSOPHY. 

on the greater or less degree of abstraction of their 
object from matter. Thus, to the philosophy of real 
being the physical or ?<a^Mrrt? sciences and mathemat- 
ics are related ; to the ])hilosopliy of rational being, 
the philological sciences ; to rnoral philosophy, juris- 
prudence, aesthetics, and the political sciences. But if 
philosophy may justly claim superiority over all oth- 
er human sciences, it depends itself on the divine 
science of theology, which is as far above philosophy 
as the divine intelligence is above human reason. 



LOGIC. 
PAKT THIKD. 

Methodology. 

96. The third part of logic, ivhich has for its object the 
collection of the processes hij which the human mind ar- 
rives at knowledge by reasoning J treats : 1. Of method in 
general and its general laws ; 2. Of the different hinds 
of method and their laws ; 3. Of the processes peculiar 
to certain methods. 



CHAPTER I. 

Method in General and its La^vs. 

ART I. — METHOD. 

97. Method is the direction given to the cognoscitive 
faculties, according to their nature, that they may read- 
ill/ and surely arrive at knowledge. — It does not suffice 
for the acquisition of knowledge that we know the 
laws governing our mind, and what constitutes 
science in itself ; we must also know the way by 
which science is acquired, the particular path by 
which we may readily and surely attain to this or 
that science. This way or path which leads to sci- 
ence is method. 

98. Both reason and experience prove the great 



58 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

importance of method. — As we speedily and surely 
reach the end of a journey when we know the road, 
in like manner we readily and surely arrive at the 
knowledge of a science, when we know the process 
which the mind should pursue. Ignorance of method 
necessarily causes much loss of time and often leads 
into error, a truth which experience likewise confirms. 
To good method is due the rapid progress of the 
natural sciences for the past three centuries ; to a 
faulty uiethod followed in philosophy in our own day, 
we owe the false systems which retard its progress. 

99. Method should not be artificial or arbitrary, but 
should be founded on the nature of our mind and of the 
object ivhich it studies. — As method has for its aim the 
directing of the mind in the acquisition of knowledge, 
it must be based upon the very nature of the mind 
and of the object which the mind proposes to itself 
to know. This is the fundamental law of all method. 
It gives rise to several others, which may be reduced 
to the two following : 1. We must in every method 
proceed from the known to the less known; 2. JVe must 
proceed icith order from one cognition to another. 

ART II. — ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS WITH RESPECT 
TO METHOD. 

100. Two processps are common to all method: 1. 
Analysis, luhich resolves a ivhole into its parts ; and 2. 
Synthesis, ivhich reconstructs the ivhole from the parts, 
— The mind must perform two processes in order to 
arrive at knowledge. For either it seeks the nature 
of the whole by studying its parts, and thus proceeds 
from effect to cause, from the concrete to the abstract, 
from the multiple to the simple ; or it studies the 
parts in the whole, proceeding from the cause to the 



METHOD IN GENERAL AND ITS LAWS. 59 

effect, from the abstract to the concrete, from the 
simple to the multiple. The first process is analysis : 
the second is synthesis. But a method can be neither 
purely analytical, as the Experimental and Sensual- 
istic school pretends, nor purely synthetical, as the 
Idealistic school holds. It cannot be purely analyti- 
cal, since, to constitute science, it does not suffice 
that we know by analysis the whole through its 
parts, or the cause through its effects ; we must,, 
moreover, know by synthesis how the whole contains 
the parts, how the cause produces the effect. On the 
other hand, method cannot be purely synthetical,, 
since it belongs to the nature of our mind to know 
the whole in its parts and the cause in its effects. 
We must, therefore, conclude that all method, to be 
good, ought to be analyfico-syntheticaL 

101. TJie rules for analysis are: 1. It should he 
complete ; 2. It should he as extensive as possihle. — The 
rules for synthesis are: 1. It should omit nothing in 
the consideration of the ivhole ; 2. It should add 720th- 
ing. — Analysis makes known the whole in the parts, 
the simple in the multiple, the cause in the effect 
only in so far as it investigates each of the parts and 
each of the effects. If it neglect to consider any one, 
it is liable to overlook one of the essential elements 
of the whole. In the second place, it must divide and 
subdivide the whole into as many parts as pos- 
sible, since the less complex a thing is, the better 
our mind knows it. Synthesis should neither omit 
nor add anything ; for then it would either give only 
a partial or incomplete view of the object, or intro- 
duce foreign elements, which would alter our notion 
of that object. 



60 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

CHAPTER 11. 

Different Kinds of Methods and their Laws. 

Art. I. — DIFFERENT KINDS OF METHOD. 

102. TJiere are two kinds of method, the Inventive 
and the Didactic. — The mind first endeavors to find 
the truth, and afterwards to demonstrate it or com- 
municate it to others. There must, therefore, be. two 
methods : the one, of invention, which guides the 
mind in its search after truth ; the other, uf demon- 
stration or instruction, which enables it to impart to 
others the truth found. 

103. The method of invention is of three kinds : 1. 
Rational or a priori 2. Exjoey^imental or a posteriori ; 
3. Mixed. — The a j^^^iori method seeks to discover 
truth by the sole light of reason, to the exclusion of 
experience ; this is the method of German Idealism, 
which shapes facts to ideas and transforms the most 
absurd conceptions of the mind into realities. The 
a posteriori method is the reverse of the foregoing ; it 
is exclusively adopted by the Sensist school and ends 
in materialism. The mixed method is a combination 
of the other two ; it is the only sound philosophic 
method, as it brings to the aid of science all the 
means of acquiring knowledge. Although this is the 
only legitimate method, it is none the less true that 
the a priori method ought to predominate in mathe- 
matics, and the a posteriori method in the natural 
sciences. 

104. The method of instruction is of three kinds : 
1. Deductive ; 2. Inductive ; 3. Mixed. — The deductive 
method descends from axioms or principles to their 



DIFFERENT KINDS OF METHODS AND THEIR LAWS. 61 

consequences, from laws to phenomena. The imhic- 
tive method is the reverse of the preceding and 
makes the mind of the learner pass through the same 
process as is followed in arriving at truth. The 
mixed method is a union of these two. The deduc- 
tive method is the easiest, the inductive the most 
effectual ; the mixed method, being adapted to the 
ordinary requirements of students, is the one most fre- 
quently followed. 

ART. II. — SPECIAL LAWS OF EACH METHOD. 

105. The laivs of the inventive method requite: 1. 
The determination, at least vaguely, of the end in view / 
2. The attentive examination of Jcnoivn truths ; 8. The. 
co-ordination of these hnoivn truths ; 4. A careful use of 
definitions and divisions ; 5. The elimination of what- 
ever is useless or foreign to the end in view ; 6. The af- 
firmation of things as certain or douhtfid, according as 
they are really certain or douhtfid ; 7. Care to avoid all 
rash induction ; 8. Prudence to advance nothing resting 
on ivhat is only doubtful or on inconsistent hypotheses. 

106. The laws of the didactic method require : 1. The 
use of clear terms fully explained and defined ; 2. Care 
to take as a starting point only clear and evident princi- 
ples ; 3. A gradual advancement from one conclusion to 
another ; 4. Care to avoid digressions ivhich maJce us 
lose the concatenation of ideas. 



62 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

CHAPTER III. 

Processes Proper to Certain Methods. 

ART. I. — HYPOTHESIS. 

107. Hypothesis is a probable lorinciple ivMcJi is in- 
tended to explain the cause and nature of a fact, but 
tchich is not as yet verified by exjoerie^ice or demonstrated 
by reason. — The mind often cannot ascertain with 
certainty the reason of facts ; it then finds it neces- 
sary to adopt a principle provisorily, but only as prob- 
able. If experience and reason afterwards verify this 
principle, it ceases to be a supposition or hypothesis, 
and becomes a thesis. 

108. In all tJw sciences hypotheses are necessary. — 
Some philosophers maintain, with Reid, that hypothe- 
ses must necessarily be detrimental to science. This 
is an assertion contradicted by good sense and ex- 
perience. Otliers, like Condillac, admit the use of 
hypotheses in the mathematical sciences only. But 
it is evident that, with the greatest philosophers and 
naturalists, we ought to admit them in all the sciences, 
since in all there are facts not yet explained and for 
the explanation of which we may very conveniently 
resort to hypotheses, which subsequent observation 
will often transform into certain and scientific prin- 
ciples. But hypotheses are useful only in so far 
as they conform to certain laws ; otherwise they are 
liurtful, and, b;y originating false systems, are fruit- 
ful sources of error. 

109. Hyp)otlieses are subject to tiuo classes of ride, 
one regarding the formation of the hypothesis, the other 
referring to its verification. — The rules to be observed 



PROCESSES PROPER TO CERTAIN JIETHODS. 63 

in tlie formation of a hypothesis are three : 1. It 
must rest on the knowledge of a great number of 
facts ; 2. From among the circumstances which ac- 
company a fact we should select one or more, and 
see if they do not suffice for the explanation of the 
fact ; 3. The circumstances selected ought to be 
such as to account for all the others. — There are four 
rules to be observed in verifying a hypothesis : 1. 
No fact must be opposed to the hypothesis intended 
to explain it ; 2. The hypothesis should be such as 
to explain all the facts for which it has been made ; 
A hypothesis supported by certain facts should 
be preferred to one not verified by any fact ; 4 From 
among the hypotheses presented we should choose 
the simplest. It is evident that if a hypothesis con- 
flicts with a truth known as certain, it is, by the fact, 
proved false. 

ART. II.— EXPERIMENTATION. 

110. Experimentation is the art of producing or modi- 
fying at ivill the phenomena of nature in order to study 
them. — In all the sciences, and especially in the 
physical or natural sciences, it becomes necessary 
to make an attentive study of the phenomena of 
nature. The more easily to account for these phe- 
nomena, we modify or produce them at pleasure ; 
this process is called experimentation. If we confine 
ourselves to studying a phenomenon as presented in 
nature, we simply make an observation. 

111. Some of the conditions of good experimentation 
relate to ivhat is produced in the phenomenon, others to 
the person ivho experiments. — In regard to the phenom- 
enon, it is necessaryto keep an exact record of all 
the accompanying circumstances, however minute ; 



64 CHRISTIAN THILOSOPHY. 

and when it can be done, these circumstances should 
be represented by figures and exact quantities. TJie 
person who is experimenting should: 1. Vary the 
experiment; 2. Extend it; 3. Eeverse it. Above all, 
he should guard in experimentation against the 
spirit of S3'stem, which would make him see not what 
is, but what lie wishes should be. 

112. As experime)dation is mack use of to determine 
the cause of a. plieiiomenon, ive must carefully search for 
indications wJdcJi may ])oint out the cause. — These in- 
dications are four in number : 1. When one event 
invariably precedes another, except when the latter is 
counteracted or prevented by some circumstance ; 2. 
When, one event undergoing a modification, another 
event undergoes an analogous modification ; 3. When, 
one fact being absent, another fact is also absent, un- 
less the latter may also be produced by a difi'erent 
fact; 4. AVhen, one fact disappearing, the other also 
disappears, unless the latter can exist without the 
continued action of the former. 

Compare these indications with the following ex- 
perimental methods of John Stuart Mill : 

(a) Method of Agreement. — " If two or more instance- 
o-f the phenomenon under investigation have one cir- 
cumstance in common, the circumstance in whicli 
alone all the instances agree is the cause (or effect) 
of the given phenomenon." 

(/>) Method of Difference.—'' If an instance in whicli 
the phenomenon under investigation occurs and an- 
other in which it does not occur have every circum- 
stance in common save one, that one occurring onlv 
in the former, the circumstance in which alone the 
instances differ is the effect, or the cause, or an in- 
dispensable part of the cause of the phenomenon." 



PROCESSES PROPER TO CERTAIN METHODS. 65 

(c) 3IetJiod of Concomitant Variation.— " Whatever 
phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another 
phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is 
either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is 
connected with it through some fact of causation." 

(d) 3Iethod of Residues. — " Subduct from any phe- 
nomenon such part as is known by previous induction 
to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue 
of the phenomenon is the effect of the remaining an- 
tecedent." ^ 

113. Experimentation of itself does not constitute 
science; it only enables us to establish principles of ex- 
perience, — As experimentation does not go outside the 
order of facts, it cannot of itself constitute science ; 
but when well conducted, it enables us to establish 
principles of experience, as, Water slakes thirst. These 
principles, to be such, must fulfil two conditions : 1. 
The fact which we wish to transform into an experi- 
mental principle must have been found the same in 
many cases ; 2. This fact must be not an accidental, 
but a necessary physical effect. 

114 Having by exioerimentation discovered points of 
agreement among several objects, we are enahled by the 
principle of analogy to infer other points of agreement : 
experimentation thus abridges scientific investigations and 
even makes up for impossible investigations. — When 
several objects are knowm to agree in certain points, 
the principle of analogy enables us to conclude other 
points of agreement. This conclusion may be based 
either upon the simple relation of qualities, or the 
relation of means to an end, or the relation of cause to 
effect or efect to cause. But it can be considered 
legitimate only inasmuch as it rests not upon fortui- 

1 See Camments upon these Methods, Clarke's Logic, pp. 389-391. 



GO CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

tons or accidental resemblances, but upon important 
resemblances, or, in the absence of these, upon 
many resemblances. 

ART. III. — CLASSIFICATION. 

115. Classifications are the (listribution of beings in 
nature into r/enera and sj-fecies. — In every science it is 
necessary to proceed with order both in the discovery 
and in the communication of truth; in this sense, 
then, classifications are requisite in every science. 
But the term is especially applied to the distribution 
into genera and species made use of in natural his- 
tory. 

116. The advantages of classification are : 1. It aids 
the memory and facilitates the knowledge of the objects 
classified ; 2. It in a luay initiates us into the divine 
plan, by showing us the admirable order which reigns 
among the beings of nature. — Classifications, b^^the fact 
that the}^ put order into the objects which we 
study, enable us to know them better and to apprehend 
tlieir relations ; but, above all, they elevate our mind, 
by enabling it to penetrate the admirable harmony of 
the divine plan. This last result can be obtained 
only in so far as the classification is based upon 
nature itself. An artificial classification serves only 
to put a certain order into our knowledge, and is not 
in itself of any scientific value. 

117. The laws of classification are : 1. It must be 
complete ; 2. It must be based on the law of the suhor. 
dination of characteristics. — Evidently the first condi 
tion requisite for a good classification is that it 
^•omprise all the objects for which it is made. 
But it is also necessary, if we desire a natural or 
scientific classification, to base it on the hnr nf the 



PROCESSES PROPER TO CERTAIN METHODS. 67 

subordination of characteristics. In virtue of this 
law objects in nature have each a primary charac- 
teristic, to which other secondary characteristics are 
subordinate ; to these latter still others are subordi- 
nate, until we finally reach the least important charac- 
teristic. We classify according to this law when we 
establish the principal divisions according to the 
principal characteristics, then subdivide according to 
subordination of characteristics. It is easily seen 
that such a classification is nothing other than the 
science of the objects classified. Hence, if we know 
to what division an object belongs, we immediately 
know its nature and characteristics. 

The great progress made in the natural sciences since the Reforma- 
tion by the application of the experimental or a posteriori method has 
led many of its advocates to bring the same method into the field of 
philosophy in its different divisions and of theology. But such a pro- 
•ceeding has invariably been followed by results not only most disas- 
trous to all positive religion, but even suicidal to human thought. The 
Church is the " pillar and ground of truth " and has nothing to fear and 
much to gain from the daily advances of scientific research. " Grammar, 
philology, archaeology, history, ethnography, erudition, topography, aes- 
thetics, all that makes up the long line of rationalistic criticism, have 
in turn paid her a forced homage." ^ The well ascertained lesults of 
science, the well founded hypotheses, are all in harmony with her teach- 
ing. But when any rash conclusion is foisted on the public, the divine 
guardian of the truth sounds the alarm. 

" This is why in the philosophy of the Church there can be no new 
•discoveries, but only developments of truth already possessed. For 
fresh discovery means a setting aside of what exists already, and if 
what exists already is the perfect truth, to set it aside is but to intro- 
duce the destructive poison of error. We cannot, therefore, be surprised 
if the method of discovery did not fiourish among the scholastic philos- 
ophers. ISTor can it over be the adopted method of the Catholic 
Church,''"^ since she is not in search of Truth, but is its guardian and 
possessor. 

^ Ajiologie Scientifique de la Foi Chretienne, by Canon Duilhe de Saint- 
Projet, p. 105. 

^ Clarke's Logic, p. 483. 



IDEOLOGY. 



1. Ideology is the science luhich treats of ideas. — As 
philosophy of rational being treats of beings known 
by reason, it must treat also of that in which and by 
which they are known, viz., ideas. This constitutes 
the object of Ideology. 

2. Ideology may he divided into General Ideology and 
Special Ideology.— Ideology may be concerned simply 
with the nature and origin of ideas in general ; then 
it is General Ideology ; or it may treat of the special 
nature of certain fundamental ideas and the manner 
in which our mind acquires them ; then it is Special 
Ideology, 



GENERAL IDEOLOGY. 



CHAPTER I. 

The Idea in General. 

ART. I. — NATURE OF THE IDEA. 

3. In every being we must distinguish the essence from 
the parficidar conditions which individualize the es- 
sence. — God has given being to every creature ac- 
cording to an eternal type existing in his infinite mind, 
a t^^pe according to which he can create an unlimited 

G8 



THE IDEA IN GENERAL. 69 

number of similar beings. But each being, in real- 
izing by its existence the divine type, is thereby in- 
vested with particular conditions which make it that 
being and not another. But that which reproduces 
the divine type in a being and constitutes that by 
which it is being, that which makes it tvhat it is-, is 
called the essence of the being. This essence cannot 
really exist without being individualized ; but it is, 
nevertheless, distinguishable from the conditions 
which individualize it. These conditions are seven 
in number: Form, figure^ place, time, name, family, 
and country. 

4. The idea is the mental and formal representation 
ivhich our intellect naturally makes to itself of the es- 
sence of a being. — We not only know the concrete in- 
dividuality of sensible beings, but we may also know 
their essence. Our intellect naturally perceives this 
essence abstracted from its particular conditions, and 
forms in itself an image or similitude which mentally 
reproduces the essence. This image formed in and by 
the intellect is called the idea. 

5. The idea is not that lohich th" intellect immediately 
Tcnoivs, but that by which it knoios the object. — As the 
image of an object formed in the eye is not that which 
the eye perceives, but that by which the visible ob- 
ject becomes known, so that which the intellect im- 
mediately knows by the idea is the objective essence. 
But as the intellect is capable of reflecting upon 
itself, it may, in the second place, perceive the idea 
or mental representation by which it knows the es- 
sence. 

* ART. II. — CHARACTERISTICS OF THE IDEA. 

6. The idea is subjective inasmuch as it resides in 



70 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

the subject hioivimj. — The formatiou of the idea is a 
vital aud intimate act wliicli not only proceeds from 
the intellect, but is accomplished and exists in the in- 
tellect itself. Now the idea considered as residing 
in the subject knowing, is said to be subjective. 

7. IVtf iihici is objective inasmuch as that ivhich it 
immediately makes known to us is the object. — That 
which the idea immediately manifests to the subject 
knowing, is not the idea itself, but the object per- 
ceived. Hence the idea considered as the represen- 
tation of the object, a representation by which the 
object is immediately known, is said to be objective. 

S. The characteristics of the idea vary according as 
we consider it subjectively or objectively. — The idea con- 
sidered subjectively participates in the conditions of 
the intellect that has the idea. Thus, if the intellect 
is infinite and uncreated, the idea considered subjec- 
tively is infinite and uncreated ; it is finite and 
created, if the intellect is finite and created. In the 
same way, our idea, considered subjectively, is singu- 
lar like our intellectual act itself ; but, considered 
objectively, it is universal like the essence which it 
represents. 



CHAPTER II. 

Systems concerning the Origin of Ideas. 

ART. I. — PRINCIPAL SYSTEMS CONCERNl^^G THE ORIGIN OF 

IDEAS. 

9. The jjrincipol systems concerning the origin of 
ideas are the following : 1. Sensism ,• 2. Criticism : 3. 



SYSTEMS CONCERNING THE OEIGIN OF IDEAS. 71 

The System of Innate Ideas ; 4. The System if Im- 
jjersonal Eeason ; 5. Ontologism ; 6. The Scholastic 
System. — All other systems may easily be reduced to 
one or otlier of tliese six ; because the formation of 
ideas is explained either by the senses or by the in- 
tellect. If explained by the intellect, onlv one of 
the following hypotheses can be made : either the soul 
draws ideas from within itself, or God, in creating it, 
has engrayen them on it, or God communicates them 
to it directly, or a substance intermediate between it 
and God communicates them to it, or, finally, God 
gives it the power to form them itself in giving it the 
faculty of abstracting the Essence of sensible objects 
from the conditions which individualize that essence. 

AET. II. — SENSISM. 

10. Sensism is the system lohich affirms sensation io 
he the only origin of ideas. — According to this system, 
all knowledge is merely a modification or transforma- 
tion of sensation. 

11. Sensism is Atomic or Dynamic. The principal 
representatives of the former are Leucippus, Democri- 
tus, Fpicirrus ; of the latter, Locke, Condillac, Laromi- 
guiere. — Atomic sensism teaches that all bodies throw 
off subtle particles analogous to the exhalations of 
odoriferous bodies ; these particles, scattered through 
space, faithfully represent the objects from which 
they have been detached ; by means of the senses 
they find an entrance to the soul, and by their im- 
pressions produce sensation, memory, and thought. 
This system was taught by Leucippus, Democritus, 
and Epicurus. Dynamic sensism holds sensation to 
be the only primitive act of the soul, an act which by 
successive transformation produces all the other acts 



72 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

of the soul and of all its faculties, the sensitive faculty 
included. This system, taught in ancient times b}- 
Frotatforas, was renewed in the seventeenth century 
by Locke, and received its last complement from 
Condillac. Besides sensation, Locl-c admits reflection 
in the soul ; but, according to him, reflection is simply 
an observer of sensitive facts and is in no way active. 
Condillac denies that reflection or attention is distinct 
from sensation, and regards it simply as a more 
lively sensation than the others. He considers mem- 
ory as a twofold attention, — on the one hand, to a 
past sensation, on the other, to a present sensation. 
Finally, he asserts that judgment is nothing more 
than the comparison between two sensations. Laro- 
miguiere maintains the sense origin of ideas ; but 
he considers as necessary for their formation an ac- 
tivity distinct from sensation. 

12. Sensism, under loliatever form it is considered, is 
false, both because it destroys intellectual facts and be- 
cause it renders even tJie fact of sensation inexplicable. — 
The operation and the object of the intellect cannot 
be reduced to the operation and the object of the sens- 
es. For the intellect reflects on its acts, judges, and 
reasons, which the senses cannot do. The object of 
the intellect is the immaterial, the universal ; the ob- 
ject of the senses is the material, the particular. Now, 
Sensism, b}^ identifying the intellect with sensation, 
destroys the true notion of the intellect and of intel- 
lectual acts. It is to no purpose that Locke admits 
reflection in addition to sensation ; for he limits re- 
flection to the perceiving of sensation, and hence it 
does not essentially differ from sensation itself. 

Sensism, moreover, renders the fact of sensation in- 
explicable, as is evident in the Atomic sj^stem. It 



SYSTEMS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 73 

is also manifest in the Dynamic system, which by 
asserting that sensation is the principle of the sen- 
sitive faculty, becomes essentially contradictory. 
Sensism is also sufficiently refuted by its conse- 
quences : experience shows that it leads directly to 
the negation of all science and of all morality. 

ART III.— CRITICISM, OR TRANSCENDENTAL RATIONALISM. 

13. Transcendental Rationalism makes ideas the product 
of the mere activity of the thinking subject. — In this 
system, which is the opposite of Sensism, thought 
does not demand for its exercise an object outside 
itself. 

14. Transcendental Rationcdism teas represented first 
by Kant, ivhose principal disciples are Fichte, Schelling, 
and Hegel. — Ka,nt teaches that we have within us a 
priori forms or concepts, and sensations ; all our 
cognitions result from the application of these con- 
cepts to the sensations. But as, according to the 
German philosopher, the a priori forms and the sen- 
sations are purely subjective, it follows that the object 
of knowledge, as it is in itself, remains unknown to us. 
Fichte allows only one principle of knowedge, the j9?(re 
Fgo, from which he evolves all things,— God, the 
world, and the human mind, — all which he considers 
as only conceptions of the Ego. Schelling maintains 
very nearly the same system ; instead of the pure 
Ego, however, he substitutes an abstraction, the abso- 
lute, from which everything, both mind and matter, 
emanates ideally. Finally, Hegel regards as the prin- 
ciple of all things the pure idea, in which the subject 
thinking and the object thought, the ideal and the 
real, are identified, and from which all proceeds, — ■ 
God, the world, and the human mind. 



74 CllKISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

15. Transcendental Idealism, or Criticism, is absurd ; 
because, if ideas are j)^^^ely subjective, it follows either 
that the objects hiown do not exist, or that ice can af- 
firm nothing concerning their reality. — In fact, if ideas 
are pure modifications of the Ego, produced by the 
mind itself, we must hold either that nothing exists 
outside the Ego, which is Nihilism, or at least that wc 
know nothing about it, wliich is Scepticism. These 
consequences were vainly repudiated by Kant; his 
disciples glory in them, and with Fichte, Schelling, 
and Hegel, regard all existing things, even God him- 
self, as a pure creation of the human mind, or of 
the idea. 

ART. IV. — THE SYSTEM OF INNATE IDEAS. 

16. The system of Innate Ideas considers ideas as 
infused by God into the soul from the moment of its 
creation. — This system, regarding thought as consti- 
tuting the essence of the soul, supposes that the soul 
must always have been engaged in thought, even 
from the first instant of its creation ; and as the soul 
cannot think without ideas, it also holds that ideas 
are innate in the soul. 

17. The representatives of the system of Innate Ideas 
are Plato among the ancient logicians; Descartes, Leib- 
nitz, and Rosmini, among the modern logicians. — In 
Plato s system ideas are eternal types according to 
which God has ordained all things ; they reside not 
only in the divine mind, but also in the human mind, 
in wliich they are innate. The human intellect, 
Plato teaches, exists before the bod}' and recalls 
these ideas according as it perceives copies made in 
their likeness, that is, according as it perceives sensi- 
ble things. Descartes holds that innate ideas are 



SYSTEMS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 75 

perfect in the soul ; but besides these ideas he 
udmits factitious ideas, or those formed by an effort 
of the imagination, as the idea of a gold mountain ; 
and adventitious ideas, or those which come from 
without, as the idea of the sun. Leibnitz teaches that 
all these ideas are innate, but are in our mind in their 
germ ; and as, according to Descartes^ innate ideas 
become present to the soul only through sensations, 
so, according to Leibnitz, the germs of ideas become 
perfect ideas only by occasion of sensation. Bosminiy 
laying it down as a principle that we ought to sup- 
pose as innate in the soul only that which is requi- 
site to explain the fact of consciousness, believed 
that he had found this sufficient element in the idea 
of being ; he admits, therefore, no other innate idea 
than that of possible being. In his system, all ideas 
represent nothing but being with different determi- 
nations. Hence it follows that all our ideas are 
formed from the idea of being by the same means by 
which we are enabled to perceive the different deter- 
minations that beings can receive, that is, by sen- 
sation. 

] 8. The si/stem of Innate Ideas, besides not ac- 
counting for the fact of human knowledge, is absurd 
in its principles and leads to the same conclusions 
as the system of Transcendental nationalism. — In 
this system the close dependence which is shown by 
experience to exist between the senses and the in- 
tellect becomes inexplicable, and man appears no 
longer to act in the order of knowledge according to 
the laws of his nature, which is both spiritual and 
corporeal, but rather in accordance with the laws of 
angelic nature. Hence all those who advocate the 
doctrine of Innate Ideas err regarding the human 



76 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

soul and its relations with the body. Moreover, the 
principle of their theory is that the essence of the 
human soul consists in thought. Bujb if thought 
constitutes the essence of the soul, the act of the 
intellect is confounded with the essence of the human 
soul ; but in God alone is essence identical with 
intelligence. Hence there is no further need of add- 
ing to the essence of the soul ideas infused by God. 
Finally, the system of Innate Ideas, in admitting fun- 
damentally the same principle as Transcendental 
Rationalism, viz., a priori subjective forms, leads to 
the same consequence ; that is, it renders all knowl- 
edge purely subjective and thus ends naturally in 
Idealism. 

ART v.— ONTOLOGISM. 

19. Ontologism regards ideas as views of God by 
direct and immediate vision. — This system loses sight of 
the subjective character of ideas ; it considers them 
as the object of knowledge and as direct manifesta- 
tions of God himself to our intellect. 

20. The chief exponents of Ontologism are Mcde- 
hranclie and Gioherti. — According to Malehranche man 
perceives nothing by his ideas, which are only the 
idea of God viewed under different aspects. Even 
this idea we know only in so far as God directly 
manifests himself to our mind. By our ideas we 
apprehend the contingent, the imperfect, the finite, 
which are conceived only as the privation of the 
necessary, the perfect, the infinite. Hence our soul 
sees all in God. even the material world. Gioherti 
departs from the principle of 3Jalehranche, that ideas, 
being universal and absolute, must be a direct, 
though partial, view of absolute being, that is, of God 



SYSTEMS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 77 

himself ; lie regards ideas, not as the means, but as 
the very object of knowledge. He teaches that what 
we see are the divine ideas themselves, that we have 
permanent intuition of God, but that we are con- 
scious of this intuition only by reflection, which he 
calls ontological reflection. 

21. Ontologism is false in its principles, contradicted 
hy experience, and fatal in its consequences. — Ontolo- 
gists teach that the intellect has a direct view of 
God ; but to see the being of God is to see his es- 
sence. We must then admit that in perceiving ideas 
our intellect is in a state similar to that of the blessed, 
who see the divine essence directly, a conclusion 
which is absurd and contrary to faith. In the second 
place, Ontologism renders the operation of the intel- 
lect independent of that of the senses. Such a 
supposition is opposed to the nature of man and is 
contradicted by experience, which sufficiently proves 
that the idea is formed in us and by us and does not 
constitute a vision of God. Finally, if we must 
admit that ideas are not the means, but the objects 
of knowledge, it follows that the ideal order is not 
distinct from the real, and as the real order alone 
exists, we must conclude that knowledge is impossible. 
Again, if our soul does not form ideas, but sees them 
in God, it is, by the very fact, deprived of all activity 
of its own. Hence Ontologism leads directly to 
Fatalism and Pantheism. 

ART. VI. — THE INTERMEDIATE SYSTEM. 

22. The Intermediate system or system of Impersonal 
Reason supposes hetivcen God and man an imjjersonal 
reason, hy ivJiich our intellect acquires universal ideas. — 
According to this system, ideas are not innate in the 



78 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

intellect, they are not acquired of themselves, they 
are not visions of God ; but they are views in an im- 
personal reason intermediate between God and man. 

23. The principal defender of the Intermediate system 
is Cousin, tvho has done noticing more than reiieiv an 
error of Averrocs. — The reason of man, says Cousin, is 
individual and variable, and therefore cannot acquire 
of itself universal and immutable ideas. Hence man 
can form his ideas only in so far as they are revealed 
to him by a reason which, not being personal to him, 
is called impersonal. This reason is revealed to him 
from the very beginning, and the knowledge which 
the mind then has is said to be spontaneous. In 
this state, man knows, but does not know that he 
knows ; when he begins to reflect on his spontaneous 
knowledge, he acquires reflex knowledge. The 
former knowledge is always true ; not so the latter, 
for in it man may fix his attention exclusively on one 
part of the truth, and thus confound the part with 
the whole; thence arises error, which, however, 
Cousin asserts to be only incomplete truth. An 
almost analogous system was taught by Averroes, in 
the middle ages. 

24. The system of Impersonal Reason is false in its 
principle, in its nature, and in its consequences. — This 
system starts with the principle that our intellect, 
being individual, cannot form a universal idea ; but 
this is to lose sight of the twofold aspect, subjective 
and objective, under which we may consider the idea. 
Again, if Impersonal Reason is anything, it must be 
individual, and hence it is incapable, according to 
Cousin himself, of forming a universal idea. Finally, 
this system easily generates Pantheism, since it 
destroys all activity proper to the intellect of man. 



SYSTEMS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 79 

ART. VII. — TRADITIONALISM. 

25. Traditionalism explains the formation of ideas 
hy speech. — This system, devised to combat that of the 
philosophers who hold that the reason of man is 
sufficient for itself, exaggerates the impotency of 
reason and its dependence on speech and tradition. 

26. The principal representatives of Traditionalism are 
De Bonald, Bonnetty, and Ventura. — Be Bonald teaches 
the absolute necessity of speech for the existence 
of thought, so that without speech man can have no 
idea, no general notion, but only sensible perceptions. 
Bonnetty and Ventura concede the power of forming 
ideas of sensible things, without the help of speech, 
but maintain that, independently of social teaching, 
man cannot acquire notions of the spiritual and mor- 
al order, as those of God, of the soul, of duty, etc. 
Other philosophers admit that man may think without 
speech, but they deny that without it he can form clear 
and distinct ideas and that he can reflect on his 
thoughts. 

27. It is false that speech is ahsolutely necessary^ either 
for the formation of ideas of sensible things, or for the 
formation of ideas of spiritual things, or for reflecting on 
ideas already formed. — Speech, being simply a sign, 
can make known an object to the intellect only 
through the idea which the intellect already has of 
the object ; therefore, before the intellect is fixed on 
the essence of a thing by the word, it has already 
the idea of it. The idea of sensible things being 
formed, we cannot, without contradiction, deny to rea- 
son the power to attain to ideas of spiritual things ; 
for, granting that reason can form ideas of sensible 
things in virtue of the abstractive power natural to 
it, we cannot deny it the power to ascend from these 



80 CHRISTIxVN PHILOSOPHY. 

ideas to those of spiritual things, since the power of 
deduction is not less natural to reason than that of 
abstraction. Yet it is true that, owing to the feeble- 
ness of man's reason and the difficulties that beset 
his actual condition, but few men could, without the 
aid of speech, attain to those truths which regard 
God and his attributes, and even then only after much 
time and labor, with an admixture of many errors 
and great uncertainty. Besides, it is certain that, 
without speech, man would never arrive at complete 
intellectual and moral development. But, if the in- 
tellect has the power of forming its ideas without the 
aid of speech, evidently it may reflect on its ideas 
without speech, for the intellect is essentially a re- 
flective faculty, and requires for the exercise of its 
power of reflection only the idea, the object of reflec- 
tion. It will not do to cite in proof of the necessity 
of speech for the formation of ideas instances of deaf- 
mutes and savages abandoned in forests. A more 
attentive examination has shown that these facts have 
been imperfectly observed or have never existed. 

ART. VIII. — THE SCHOLASTIC SYSTEM. 

28. The Scholastic system explains the origin of ideas 
hi/ the power which the intellect has of abstracting from 
the sensible images,— The Scholastic philosophers teach 
that sensible objects first aftect the external senses. 
The impression, passing from the external senses to 
the imagination, gives rise to a more perfect image of 
the object, an immaterial image, doubtless, but yet in- 
dividual and representing the object with the sensible 
and concrete conditions which make it that object and 
no other. As soon as this image is formed, the in- 
tellect becomes conscious of it, and calling into exer- 



SYSTEMS CONCERNING THE OKIGIN OF IDEAS. 81 

cise its abstractive power, which constitutes the fac- 
ulty called the adhig hiiellect, it illumines this seDsible 
image, strips it of its sensible and individual condi- 
tions, and separates from it the intelligible. The ati- 
incj iutellccf having thus separated the intelligible, that 
is, the proper object of the intellect, the other intel- 
lective faculty, called the possible intellect, perceives the 
intelligible, and thus the idea is formed. These oper- 
ations, though distinct, are accomplished at the same 
time in virtue of the unity of the soul, and. one cannot 
take place without the other. As we shall see later, 
this sj^stem of the origin of ideas is very closely con- 
nected with the Scholastic system concerning the 
nature of the human soul, and follows from it as a 
consequence. 

29. llie Scholastic system has recourse to fewer a 
ipriori 2:)rinci2oles than any other system. — It is an axiom 
among philosophers that nature is as fruitful in ef- 
fects as she is sparing in causes ; hence the simplicity 
of a system is a strong argument in its favor. But 
w^hile the other systems concerning ideas assume gra- 
tuitously one or many a priori elements which may 
easily be dispensed with, the Scholastic system re- 
quires for the formation of the idea only that which 
is absolutely indispensable, viz., the abstractive power 
of the acting intellect. This abstractive power cannot 
be dispensed with, and it alone suffices for the solu- 
tion of the problem. 

30. The Scholastic system is true, because it is in per- 
fect harmony loith the essential laws of human nature, — 
Since the formation of ideas is an effect whose cause 
is the nature of our soul, a system concerning the 
formation of ideas is true, if it is in perfect harmony 
with the nature of the soul, if it places the effect in 



82 CHRISTIAN THILOSOPHY. 

])erfect relation with the cause. But while the other 
systeuis do not take into account the nature of the 
human soul, which is both sensitive and intellectual, 
the Scholastic system does explain the concurrence 
of sensible images in the formation of ideas. It is 
also in accord wdth experience, which shows that we 
do not possess innate ideas, that w^e do not see ideas 
in God, but that we form the idea of a thing from its 
sensible perception. Thus the Scholastic system fol- 
lows as a simple consequence from the true theory of 
the nature of man. According to that theory, man 
is neither a mere animal nor an angel, but stands, so 
to say, midway between them ; for if, on the one 
hand, his intellect, like that of the angel, does not 
depend on an organ, on the other, being the faculty of 
a soul substantially united to a body, it can form the 
idea onl}" after the senses have presented the matter 
for its operations. Hence the Scholastic system pre- 
serves the unity of man's being and yet maintains 
the distinction between the soul and the body; the 
other systems, on the contrary, either make the soul 
nnd the body two distinct beings, or destroy one ol 
these two elements of man. 

31. The Scholastic system rests on the authority of the 
greatest phiJosophei^s.— This system, first taught, though 
with a mixture of error, by Aristotle, w^as held by 
all the great philosophers of the middle ages, and espe- 
cially by St. Thomas, who developed it to its full per- 
fection. Up to the seventeenth century, it alone was 
admitted by all the great Catholic universities, and af- 
ter being for two centuries almost universally rejected, 
to the great detriment of philosophy, it has been ac- 
cepted by the most distinguished philosophers of the 
present day without restriction or modification. 



SYSTEMS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 83 

32. Tlie ScJioJasfic system gives a satisfactory solu- 
tion to all the difficulties connected with, the prohlem of 
the origin of ideas, and in no way contradicts the facts 
of common sense. — The principal difficulty connected 
with the problem of the origin of ideas is the neces- 
sity of reconciling elements apparently contradictory 
and yet evidently attested by experience, in the for- 
mation of ideas. On the one hand, there is the sensi- 
ble, particular, contingent element ; on the other, the 
intelligible, universal, absolute element. These con- 
tradictory elements cannot be united. But, while 
other systems avoid the difficulty by denying one of 
the two elements, and thus disregard both the nature 
of man and facts of experience, the Scholastic sys- 
tem shows how the two elements co-exist without 
being confounded ; how the sensible image furnishes 
the intellect with the matter of its operation ; and 
how the idea, while excluding the sensible image, 
cannot be formed without its concurrence. This 
system, explaining what is immutable and absolute 
in the idea by the nature of the essence perceived and 
not by the nature of the perception itself, accounts 
for the divine element in the idea without deifying 
the idea itself; finally, by attributing to man the 
power of forming his own ideas, it makes them de- 
pendent on him both for their causality and their 
very existence. At the same time, it enables us to 
comprehend the grandeur of the intellect, by making 
its intelligible light, its abstractive power, a sort of 
participation in the light of God himself. Thus, 
everything finds its proper place in this system, 
and far from excluding a single act of experience or 
of common sense, it admits them all, reconciles, and 
explains them. 



84 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

33. TJic Scholastic system entails none of the conse- 
quences with tvhich its adversaries rep'oaclt it ; the ob- 
jections raised against it rest on false explanations. — 
Bj recognizing tlie reality of the essence perceived, the 
Scholastic system avoids Subjectivism and Idealism, 
and it avoids Pantheism by making the idea a con- 
tingent production of our intellect. Those who object 
that it borders on Sensism in admitting a sensible 
element in the formation of the idea, forget that this 
element does not make part of the idea, but is simp- 
ly the matter on which the intellect operates in 
forming the idea. The reproach that this system is 
contradictory in making the universal proceed from 
the particular, can be uttered by those only who do 
not observe that particular beings have each a prop- 
er essence, which, abstracted b}^ the intellect, is 
capable of being considered, by another operation of 
the intellect, under the relation of universality. 



CHAPTER III. 

Universals. 

ART. II. — NATURE OF UNIVERSALS. 

34. The universal is that tvhich may he found in mamj 
or affirmed of many ; it is nothing more than the essence 
of a being or the intelligible element perceived by the in- 
tellect. 

35. The qiiesfion of the nature <f universals is closely 
connected with that of the origin and nature of ideas. — 
Ideas are universal ; by them we apprehend the uni- 
versal The solution of the problem of ideas is,. 



UNIVERSALS. 85 

therefore, closely connected with that of the problem 
of universals, nor is the latter problem less important 
than the former. As nniversals are the proper ob- 
ject of our intellectual knowledge, we can easily 
understand the lively controversy to which the ques- 
tion of universals has given rise in the histor}^ of 
philosophy. 

36. To account for the true nature of universals, we 
must cUstinguish : 1. TJie direct universal, which is the 
essence considered merely in itself hij a direct act of the 
intellect ; 2. The reflex universal, which is the essence 
considered by a reflex act of the intellect, as common to 
many individuals. — The essence of a being, abstracted 
from the conditions which make it an individual, is 
the proper object of the intellect. But the intellect 
may perceive the essence by a direct act or it may re- 
turn to consider the idea of this essence by a reflex 
act. In the first case, the intellect merely perceives 
the essence with its intrinsic characteristics, without 
adverting to the fact as to whether it is single or 
multiple, real or ideal. Thus, the intellect by a 
direct act, represents to itself the essence of man, 
conceives him as a rational animal, but does not ex- 
amine whether this essence is found in a single indi- 
vidual or in many individuals, whether it exists really 
or ideally. Evidently the direct universal is not, 
strictly speaking, a universal ; it is said to be so as 
opposed to individuals, and also as being the basis 
of the reflex universal, which is the universal, strictly 
speaking. In order to form this universal, the in- 
tellect reflects upon the essence which it has appre- 
hended directly ; it views the idea as representing an 
essence common to many individuals. Thus, after 
the perception of the essence of man as a rational 



86 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

animal, the intellect reflects "apon the idea of this es- 
sence, and recognizes that it expresses the human 
nature by which all human beings resemble one 
another. This distinction arms us with a ready an- 
swer to the objection that the universal cannot be 
drawn from the particular, since the greater cannot 
proceed from the less. If the reflex universal is 
meant, evidently it is not found in the particular ; 
but if it be the direct universal, the answer is that 
this universal, though as such not actually in the 
particular, is at least virtually in it, inasmuch as the 
essence of the particular may be considered in itself 
and abstractly. But, once the direct universal is 
grasped, nothing prevents the mind from adding to it 
the consideration of its relation to individuals, and 
thus arriving at the reflex universal. 

37. To 2:)erceive the direct universal, mere abstraction 
by the mind is sufficient ; to form the reflex universal, 
the iutellect must establish a relation betioeen the essence 
and the individuals. — The consideration of the essence 
in itself involves no scrutiny as to whether it exists 
in one individual or in many individuals, whether it 
is real or ideal ; for its perception, the intellect needs 
only abstract it from the individual characteristics. 
But the reflex universal contains a relation to indi- 
viduals, and hence supposes a comparison by the 
intellect as well as abstraction. 

38. The direct universal has a real existence in the 
thing perceived, hut not in the manner in which the thing 
is perceived : the reflex universal has only an ideal exist- 
ence. — The essence apprehended by the intellect in 
the direct act exists really in the individuals, but 
not in the manner in which it is apprehended, that is, 
as abstracted from individual characteristics ; evident- 



UNIVERSALS. 87 

ly this abstractioil is the work of the intellect. In the 
same way, the color of fruit is really in the fruit, but 
any consideration of it apart from the taste is due to 
the sight, which perceives color, and not taste. The 
reflex universal exists solely in the mind, since it is 
universal only in virtue of the reflection of the mind, 
and this mental operation can be exercised on the 
ideas of things, but not on the things themselves. 

ART II. — DIFFERENT OriNIONS ON THE NATURE OF 
UNIVERSALS. 

39. The different opinions on tlie nature of miiversals 
may he reduced to three principal systems : Nominalism, 
Conceptualism, and Realism. — It may be said that 
there have been as many opinions on the nature of 
universals as there have been diverse systems on the 
origin and nature of ideas. All, however, may be 
reduced to the three opinions which gave rise to so 
much controversy in the middle ages. The Nominal- 
ists, headed by Roscelin^ and later by Ockham, main- 
tained that universals were mere words ; the Conceptu- 
alists, represented by Ahelard, made universals merely 
conceptions ; finally, the Realists gave to universals 
a real existence outside the mind. But of this last 
class some confined themselves to attributing reality 
to the essence perceived in so far onl}^ as it is indi- 
vidual and concrete ; these are the orthodox Realists 
and have St. Thomas of Aquinat their head. Others 
attribute reality to the essence as qualified by the 
very abstraction and universality under which it is 
regarded ; these are the heterodox Realists, such as Wil- 
liam of Champeaux and Scotus Erigena. Thus, ac- 
cording to the orthodox Realists, the essence man 
really exists outside the mind in individual men, but 



88 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

not with that abstraction and iimversalitj under 
which the mind considers it , according to the het- 
erodox Realists, the essence man really exists in an 
abstract and universal manner. Nominalism is mani- 
festly the negation of all knowledge and the fruitful 
parent of Scepticism : Conceptualism, being nothing 
more than disguised Nominalism, leads to the same 
consequence; heterodox Bealism directly produces Pan- 
theism. With Nominalism are connected the sys- 
tems of Epicurus, Locl'e, CondillaCy Hume, in a word, 
of the Materialists, the Sensists, and the Empiri- 
cists of the Scotch school. With Conceptualism 
the systems of Descartes, Berkeley, Kant, and of all 
the Idealists, stand in close relation. Finally, to he- 
terodox Realism belong the sa stems of Plato, Averrocs, 
Malehranclie, HegeL and Gioherti, that is, the systems 
of the Ontologists and Pantheists. 

The chief exponents of Xominalism and Conceptu- 
alism in nur day are respectively John S. Mill and Sir 
W. Hamilton. The latter explains apprehension or 
the formation of ideas as a bundling together of 
attributes not the same, but called similar, because, 
though observed in different individuals of the same 
class, they produce in us the same effect as when 
first observed in a particular individual of that class. 
From this it follows in the teaching of Sir W. Hamil- 
ton, 1. That ideas convey not absolute but relative 
truth, relative, namely, to the object first perceived ; 
2. Ideas are merely subjective. Here tlie door is 
opened to Scepticism. 

John Stuart Mill boUls that the ideas of individuals 
belonging to the same class have nothing in common 
but the name. • When the mind perceives an object, 
in virtue of its power of abstraction, it fixes its atten- 



UNIVERSALS. 89 

tion on certain qualities to the exclusion of others, 
the qualities selected being those that are recalled 
to us whenever we perceive another object belonging 
to the same class. Hence it follows, 1. That the 
idea has no foundation in reality, and all positive be- 
lief in the most fundamental truths of religion is un- 
dermined ; 2. That the common name is merely a 
convenience, and does not express any corresponding 
idea. Hence this system is even more radically scep- 
tical than the other. 

From these principles it is easy to gather the doc- 
trine of Modern Conceptualists and Nominalist with 
regard to Universals. 



SPECIAL IDEOLOGY. 
CHAPTER I. 

Hov7 Human Knowledge is Acquired. 

ART I. — THE FIRST OPERATION OF THE MIND AND THE 
PERCEPTION OF ESSENCES. 

40. In the first development of knowledge anah/sis 
precedes synthesis, that is, tlte first operation of the mind 
is not Judy meat, bid the simple perception of an essence. 
— "^oiue philosophers, as Reid, Kant, and Cousin, teach 
that the intellect first pronounces instinctive judg- 
ments, and afterwards arrives at ideas, by abstracting 
the elements contained in these judgments. But this 
is an error. For any power which, by its nature, is 
only gradually developed, does not acquire its full 
perfection in its first act ; but judgment is an act of 
perfect knowledge, whereas apprehension is merely 
an act of initial knowledge ; therefore, simple appre- 
hension precedes judgment. In the second place, a 
judgment presupposes the knowledge of the relation 
existing between two terms ; but, in order to perceive 
this relation, evidently we must first know the two 
terms. It is also a mistake to assert that the intel- 
lect by one and the same act perceives the two terms 
and the connection existing between them ; for, in 
order to perceive the connection existing between 
two things, we must first have an idea of them, and 
then compare these ideas by a reflex act. Hence one 
and the same act would be both direct and reflex, 
which is contradictory. We must, therefore, conclude 

00 



HOW HUMAN KNOWLEDGE IS ACQUIRED. 91 

that the mind begins by analysis, and that it first 
seizes the essence, separating it by abstraction from 
the conditions by which it is affected in nature ; then 
follows synthesis, Avhich is constructed by the judg- 
ment, when it establishes the union between the terms 
perceived. 

41. Tlie first object of the intellect in our present life 
is the essence of material things. — As the intellect, in 
our present life, can form an idea only when the 
imagination has presented it a sensible image, and as 
this image must have for its object something mate- 
rial, the first object of the intellect, in our mortal life,, 
must be the essence of material things. 

42. Among the essences of material things, some are 
immediately known, ivhile others are Icnoivn mediately, 
or by means of deduction. —Certain essences, as those 
of 7^est, motion, etc., are self-evident ; this must be the 
case, otherwise human knowledge would be impossi- 
ble. But, on the other hand, many essences, even of 
sensible things, are known to us only by means of 
reasoning ; for example, the essence of life. 

43. Essences, ivhetlier perceived immediately or medi- 
ately in sensible objects, are of three lands : some cannot 
he conceived apart from matter ; others may be con- 
ceived apart from matter, but cannot really exist apart 
from it ; others, in fine, may be conceived and may 
exist ajjart from matter. — Among the essences which 
we recognize in sensible objects, some are of such a 
nature that they cannot be conceived as separated 
from matter viewed abstractly ; such an essence is 
that of body. Others may be conceived apart from 
matter, but cannot really exist apart from it ; such 
are the essences oi figure and number. Finally, some 
essences may not only be conceived apart from 



92 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

matter, but ma}- also really exist apart from it 
such as the essence of heing, substance, accident, etc. 
It is evident that essences of the last class, even 
though realized in sensible things, may be abstracted 
from them. These are distinguished from other 
essences in this, that they can be affirmed of incor- 
poreal beings. Of these three kinds of essence, the 
first is the object of the physical sciences, the second 
of mathematics, the third of metaphysics. 

44. /// the immediate perception of essences, the 
mind beyins luith the most universal concepts. — Although 
adapted by nature to acquire knowledge, the intellect 
at first knows nothing. It proceeds gradually in the 
net of cognition, and does not, by its first efi'ort, 
attain to perfect knowledge. Thus, before possessing 
a determinate and distinct cognition, it begins with a 
Tery universal notion. It is the same with the intel- 
lect as with the senses, which, in a23prehendin«g an 
animal, for example, first perceive it as a body, then 
as an animal, and afterwards as a particular animal. 
Experience also confirms this truth : for the less per- 
fect the language of a people, the more is it wanting 
in precise and definite terms ; the more perfect the 
language and the more civilized the people who speak 
it, the richer is it in exact and well defined expres- 
sions. 

45. The first idea formed by the intellect is that of 
being, — The intellect first perceives that which is 
most universal ; but since the most universal idea is 
that of being, the first thing perceived by the intellect 
is the essence of being ; other things are known only 
as some determination of being. It must not, how- 
ever, be supposed that, when the intellect is once 
developed, it must begin by perceiving the idea of 



HOW HUMAN KNOWLEDGE IS ACQUIRED. 93 

being before any other essence whatever, for this 
occurs only in the first development of our mind ; 
eventually, it first perceives some determinate 
essence, and afterwards attains to more universal 
ideas by an analysis of its reflections. 

ART. II.— HOW THE SOUL KNOWS PARTICULAR BODIES. 

46. The intellect perceives 'particular hodies hy reflec- 
tion npon the act of the imagination and of the senses. — 
The intellect judges and. reasons about particular 
bodies ; it must, therefore, know them. But, as the 
universal alone can be the object of the intellect, the 
knowledge which it has of the individual is not direct, 
but indirect, that is, it does not know the individual 
as its proper object, but only through the act of the 
faculty which has the individual as its proper object. 
The intellect thus apprehends the act of an inferior 
power or faculty perceived on account of the unity of 
the soul, in virtue of which one faculty cannot act 
without all the others being apprised of its action. 
Hence particular bodies are known by the soul in 
two ways : directly, through the senses and the im- 
agination ; indirectly, by the intellect, which reflects 
upon the representations of the imagination. 

47. The reflection of the intellect upon the act of the 
imagination and of the senses is both consciousness of 
that act and the perception of the particular object ap- 
prehended by the act. — The intellect in reflecting on 
the act of sensation must know both the act and the 
object perceived by the act. Thus, when the senses 
perceive a flower, at the same time that the intellect 
knows that the senses perceive, it knows that the ob- 
ject perceived is the flower. This reflex act of the 
intellect receives the name of consciousness when it 



94 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

hears on the sensation as a modification of the soul, 
hut when it is extended to the ohject perceiveil by 
the senses, it is called the intellective perception of 
the material and individual. 

48. Our intellect cognizes the material and individual 
through the senses; hut it adds something to the sensitive 
imjoression, since it regards the individual not merely as 
a facty hut as the concrete realization of the essence ivhich 
it has ahstracted from the individual— When the m 
tellect is directed to the consideration of the individ- 
ual, it is already in possession of the idea which it has 
abstracted from it; hence it cannot prevent the light 
of this idea from being reflected upon the individual 
object, nor the individual from being presented to the 
mind as the concrete realization of the essence per- 
ceived by the idea. 

The reason of this fact is not only subjective, inas- 
much as the senses and imagination have their seat 
in the same soul as the intellect ; but also objective, 
since the individual perceived by the senses is truly 
the same as that from which the intellect has ab- 
stracted the universal. 

ART. Ill — THE KNOWLEDGE WHICH THE SOUL ACQUIRES 
REGARDING ITSELF. 

49. The sold does not knoio itself immediately hy //> 
essence, hut only hy its oj^e rat ions. — The soul has no 
innate idea; it does not, therefore, know itself from 
its very origin, through its essence. But since its 
essence is present to it, the soul is capable of per- 
ceiving its own existence immediately and readily. 
And it attains to this perception as soon as it becomes 
conscious of any one of its operations. 

50. The soul does not know the nature of its cffsence 



HOW HUMAN KNOWLEDGE IS ACQUIRED. 95 

immediately; it knows its essence only hy means of 
reasoning. — In order that the soul may perceive its 
own existence, it suffices that it be present to itself 
and perceive an act of which it is the principle. This 
is not the case with the knowledge which the soul 
acquires of its essence, for it attains this by means 
of deduction. For in perceiving another being, the 
soul perceives that the idea by which it apprehends 
the being is immaterial. The idea being immaterial, 
it is evident that the principle whence the idea pro- 
ceeds is also immaterial. From this property of im- 
materiality the soul afterwards deduces the other 
properties which it possesses. 

ART. IV.— WHETHER THE HUMAN SOUL CAN KNOW PURE 
• SPIRITS. 

51. In our present life, the said cannot, of itself, 
know the existence of pure spirits; hut it may conceive 
their existence as possible and even as very probable. — 
The intellect of itself cannot here below know pure 
spirits directly, since they are not present to it by 
any relation of Avhich it can have consciousness, and 
since their existence cannot be deduced with certain- 
ty from the existence of the objects which we know. 
We can, however, conceive the possibility of the ex- 
istence of pure spirits, by the fact that we perceive 
essences which may exist without matter. Moreover, 
the intellect can prove the existence of pure spirits 
to be very probable, from the harmony existing 
throughout the universe, a harmony which would be 
imperfect, if, besides beings purely material and those 
both material and spiritual, there did not also exist 
purely spiritual bpings. 



96 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY 

ART. V. — HOW THE HUMAN SOUL KNOWS GOD. 

52. TJie soul does not I'noic God immediately, hut it 
rises from created things to a hioivledcje of liis ixistencc. 
— The intellect perceives directlj' the abstract essence 
of sensible things. From the perception of these 
essences follow immediately the judgments called 
first principles of reason. By reflection on these acts 
of the intellect and on those of the senses, we imme- 
diately perceive our existence and that of corporeal 
individuals distinct from us. In this all other knowl- 
edge, including that of God, has its source, and is, 
consequently, only mediate knowledge. 

53. Tlie first notion which ive acquire of God is thnt 
of his existence, binder the relation of first cause. — 
Creatures present themselves to us as contingent 
beings, which, consequently, must have a cause; thus, 
by the principle of causality we are led to assign 
them a first uncreated cause. 

54. The knoidedge of God as first cause ofcdl create <^ 
beings contains in germ tdl the other notions luhich ic^ 
can acquire of him. — A cause must contain the perfec- 
tions which it communicates to the effect, and it must 
exclude the imperfections of the effect as such. But 
the First Cause, being the creator of all things, and, 
consequently, extending its power to all possible 
beings, immeasurably surpasses all the perfections 
of the creature. There are, however, three ways bv 
which we may know the divine attributes : by the 
relation of cause to effect, by the exclusion of the 
imperfections of creatures, by pre-eminent ]>ossession 
of every perfection. By the first, that of causalit>/, 
we know that God is the efficient, final, and exem- 
])hiry causp of all things, that he is their preserver 



HOW HUMAN KNOWLEDGi^: IS ACQUIUED. 97 

and ordainer ; by the second, that of exchisioii, we 
deny of God whatever in the creature implies some 
defect as limitation, dependence, matability ; by the 
third, that oi pre-eminence, we attribute to God in an 
infinite degree all perfections, such as goodness, 
icisdom, beauty. The union of these two ways of 
pre-eminence and exclusion enables us to form the 
most exalted idea that Ave can have of God. by 
conceiving him as the absolutely pure Being, that 
is, as the Being that simply is, without any augmen- 
tation or super-added determination to the simple 
and pure characteristic of existence. 

55. The idea of the finite is formed hy the union of 
being tcith that of j^rivation. — The finite is that which 
exists, but with limits, that is, it is affected by a 
privation of being. When the intellect " looks out 
upon an object external to itself," it forms the idea 
of being. On instituting a comparison between this 
object and objects which it knows already, it observes 
what is wanting in each, and thus conceives the idea 
of privation. The union of these two ideas gives 
the concept of tlie finite. From this explanation we 
see the error of Descartes and Malebranche, who 
assert that the idea of the finite is deduced from 
that of the infinite. 

56. The idea of the infinite is formed as a conse- 
quence from the idea of first cause. — The intellect, 
when in possession of the idea of the finite and the 
idea of God as first cause, easily perceives that the 
first cause cannot be limited by itself or by any 
other cause, and thus conceives it without limits, that 
is, as infinite. Locke and Condillac, confounding the 
idea of the infinite with that of the indefinite, assert 
that the idea of the infinite is obtained by constantly 



\)S CHIUSTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

addiug to a giveu perfection yet another perfection. 
But since tiie infinite is not susceptible of increase 
or diminution, this hypothesis would necessitate the 
intellect to know all the possible perfections con- 
tained in the infinite ; and this is absolutely impos- 
sible. 

57. From the idea of the finite is derived that of the 
conditional or contingent, that is, of being ivhich does 
not contaiii in itself the reason of its existence. — By 
the finite we mean limited being ; but that which is 
ever tending to being and not to absence of being, can- 
not limit itself ; it must, therefore, be limited by an 
external agent. But the external agent which gives it 
limits must also give it its existence, in which those 
limits are found. In other words, the being is 
contingent, since the contingency of a being consists 
precisely in this, that it receives existence from an- 
other, as from its cause. As the opposite of the 
finite is the infinite, so the opposite of the contingent 
is the necessary and absolute, or that which exists 
in virtue of its own essence, and in which all is pure 
^ct. 

ART. VI. — NECESSITY OF SENSIBLE IMAGES, IN OUR LIFE UP- 
ON EARTH, FOR THE ACT OF THE HUMAN INTELLECT. 

58. The human mind, in its ijresent state of u)iio}i 
with the body, can perceive no object ivithout the aid 
of a sensible representation apprehended by the imag- 
ination. — Experience teaches us that when the 
imagination is disturbed or incapable of acting, as in 
sickness or lethargy, the intellect is likewise troubled 
or powerless to produce any idea. It further shows 
us that when we wish to think of anything, even if 
it be spiritual, we always f(^rm a sensible represen- 



HOW HUMAN KNOWLEDGE IS ACQUIRED. 99 

tation ; and likewise, when we communicate our 
ideas to another, we make use of figures and sensible 
images. Besides this proof from experience, an a 
priori reason demonstrates that, in the present life, 
we cannot, without the concurrence of sensible 
images, either form ideas or even make use of the 
ideas which we already possess. For action follows 
being, that is, the action is a] 'ways conformed to the 
essence and mode of existence of the being that acts. 
But the essence of man is a soul substantially united 
to a body, and the actual mode in which his intellect 
exists is in union with the sensitive faculty. In 
order, then, that man may act as man, he must do 
so with the concurrence of the two principles of 
which he is composed ; moreover, the action of his 
intellect naturally requires the co-operation of the 
senses. We thus see the admirable harmony exist- 
ing between the subject that acts, the active faculty, 
and the object of the action. The subject is a com- 
posite of mind and body ; the active faculty is the 
intellect united to the sensitive faculty ; the object 
is an essence realized in individual and sensible 
conditions. 

59. It is in one sense more perfect for the intellect of 
man to acquire hioivleclge of tilings by means of a sen- 
sible representation. — There are two kinds of created 
intelligence, that of the angel and that of man. 
That of the angel knows from the first instant of its 
creation by means of ideas infused into it by God ; 
that of man is much less elevated and knows nothing 
at first, but is simply adapted to know. But, own- 
ing to its inferior nature, it is more perfect for the 
mind to have the concurrence of sensible images, 
than to receive ideas from God by infusion, for then 



100 CHEISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

it would know tliiugs. at least naturally, in a more 
confused and obscure manner. This principle may 
be rendered clearer by comparing the intellect to 
the eye of a near-sighted person, which is inferior by 
nature to an eye without any defect, but which for 
that very reason acts with greater perfection when 
the vision is strengthened or enlarged b}^ the use of 
spectacles. 

ARI. VII. — THE MODE OF COGNITION ' IN THE DIS- 
EMBODIED SOUL. 

60. Tlie disembodied soul retains the knoiuledge ac- 
quired during life. — Though the soul separated from 
the body loses the faculties which reside in a corporeal 
organ, yet it retains, along with its being and its 
purely spiritual faculties, the knowledge which resides 
in those faculties as in its proper subject. Although 
the soul, so long as it is united to the body, cannot 
acquire knowledge without the help of sensible im- 
ages, yet once separated from tlis body, it has no 
further need of those images. 

61. The disembodied soid has, besides the ideas which 
it retains ichen quitting this life, others which God is 
pleased to communicate to it. — While the soul is in the 
body, it receives images through tlie senses, and from 
these images it abstracts its ideas. But once 
separated from the body, it can no longer be directed 
towards sensible objects ; hence it must receive 
through species infused by God the new ideas which 
it possesses. 

' Cognition is " sometimes nsed to express any kind of idea or con- 
cept: but it is properly applied exclusively to judicial concepts, or 
judgments of the mind as distinguished from simple apprehension. ** 
Father Harper's Metaphysics of the School, vol. i., p. 578. 



KNOWLEDGE OF FIRST PRINCIPLES. 101 

62. The ideas infused by God complete and perfect 
those ivhich the soul has retained from this life. Both 
together constitute the means by ivhich the soul loill 
know all that it has known in its former state ; and in 
addition, the order of the universe of ivhich it forms a 
part, the angels, and other souls ; but of the things of 
this ivorld it ivill remain ignorant txcep>t in so far as 
God may be pleased to manifest them to it. — When the 
soul is separated from the body, it is united to 
superior intelligible species ; - and, consequently, its 
former ideas are raised to the grade of its new ac- 
quisitions, are perfected and completed. Thus, the 
soul will have the representation of all that it should 
be acquainted with according to its state ; it will 
know all that relates to its former life, the order of 
the universe of which it forms a part, all that belongs 
to its new state, as the angels and other souls. But 
as it has departed from this life, it will have no 
knowledge of what pertains to our world save that 
which God will be pleased to impart. ^ 



CHAPTEK 11. 

Kno^A^ledge of First Principles. 

ART. I. — WHAT IS MEANT BY PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE. 

63. A principle of knoivledge is that by ivhich some- 
thing is knoivn. — A principle, in general, is that from 

^ *' The intelligible species is that character or abstracted essence of 
the thing which is imprinted on the mind, and by which it produces in 
itself an intellectual likeness of tlie thing known or expresses the word 
(judgment) of the mind; and by this word is placed in the state of 
actually knowing." Transl. Jouin's Compendium Logicce et M6iap?„ysicce, 
editio quarta, p. 1.98. 



102 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPBY. 

wliicli something proceeds. Principles are of three 
kinds, metjiphj'sical principles, physical principles, 
and principles of knowledge. The last named include 
all those principles which when know^n lead to the 
knowledge of something else. In a more restricted 
sense, principles of knowledge, or simply principles, 
are those propositions which are so clear and evident, 
that they do not require proof. Hence they are also 
called axioms or self-evident truths. 

64. differ the 2)erceptio)i of essences, the intellect im- 
TnecUatehj perceives first principles. — The intellect pro- 
ceeding gradually in the act of knowledge, first per- 
ceives what is most elementary, viz., essences. This 
imperfect knowledge it immediately develops in ob- 
serving the relations, properties, and accidents of es- 
sences, thus calling into action the judgment and the 
reasoning. Of the judgments which it pronounces, 
some are formed immediately and others mediately. 
The former are called ^>%sY principles. 

ART. II. — THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTRADICTION. 

(do. Tlie first principle affirmed hij the intellect is: It is 
impossible for the same thing to he and not he at the 
same time. This is called the principle of contradiction. 
— As in the simple perception of essences there ex- 
ists a first universal idea, which precedes all others 
and serves as their basis ; so there must be a fii'st 
judgment, on which all others rest, and to which the 
mind must assent under penalty of being unable to 
accept any other truth whatever. This first truth is 
the principle of contradiction, and is formulated thus : 
It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to he at 
the same time and under the same conditions ; or, in a 
more didactic form, Beiiig is incompatible luith non- 



KNOWLEDGE OF FIRST PllINClPLES. 103 

being. Evidently this judgment is the first which the 
mind pronounces. For, in looking at being, it cannot 
but perceive the negation of being, or non-being. In 
comparing these two concepts, therefore, it compares 
its two primary concepts ; and in discovering and af- 
firming their absolute incompatibility, it affirms the 
principle which precedes all others. This principle 
is so evident that it is immediately known by every 
intellect, and cannot rationally be denied. ^ 

66. The princiijle of contradiction is implicitly con- 
tained in all other ])rinciples, even in tJiose loliicli are 
self-emdent ; it may he used to demonstrate them or, at 
least, to render them more evident, but can itself be 
proved by no other principle. — Besides the principle of 
contradiction, there are many other self-evident 
principles ; but, though the mind arrives at these by 
the simple perception of essence, and is not obliged 
to recur to a higher principle, yet in formulating them 
it must adhere, at least implicitly, to the principle of 
contradiction. Thus it is with the principle, Every 
being has its own essence, which is called the principle 
of identity ; with the principle, A thing either is or is 
not, which is known as the principle of excluded 
middle ; with the principle, There is no effect ivithout 
a cause, which is styled the principle of causality ; 
with the principle, Every accident supposes a substance, 
which is the principle of substance. So, too, is it with 
all the axioms ; as, The whole is greater than the part, 

1 Kant denies to the principle of contradiction all objective reality 
and puts forth his doctrine of Antinomies, or the principle that con- 
tradictories may exist side by side. The repugnance of the mind to as- 
sent to such a principle is due, he asserts, to the limited circle of our 
experience, within which contradictories exclude each other. But in 
the nature of things, he maintains, there is no reason why two and two 
should not make five. 



104: CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Two things equal to a third are equal to each other, etc. 
Although these principles do not require demonstra- 
tion, still they are made more evident by means of 
the principle of contradiction. Thus, for example, 
we demonstrate that the whole is greater than its 
part, from the fact that otherwise the \\hole would 
and would not be the whole. ^ 

ART. III. — THE PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY. 

67. The intellect has the idea of cause when it ascends 
by abstraction from the knowledqe of a imrticidar effect 
and a particular cause to the pure idea of effect and cause. 
— In the act of sensation, in the act of intellection, and 
in that of volition, we necessarily distinguish two 
things : the sensitive, intellective, or volitive act, and 
the agent which produces the act as the term of its ac- 
tion ; this is nothing but the cognition of a partic- 
ular effect produced by a particular cause. But from 
this particular cognition the intellect can b}' abstrac- 
tion form tlie pure idea of effect and of cause, that is, 
the idea, first, of something whicli exists only in vir- 
tue of the action of an agent, and the idea, secondly, 
of an agent which by its action produces a term dis- 
tinct from itself. Hence the idea of cause compre- 
hends two elements : the perception of an agent as 
producing an effect by its action, and the perception 
of this agent as distinct from the effect produced by 
its action. 

' Sir "Wm. llun.ilton denies that the principle of contradiction is 
the first of all principles, and intrudes into its place the principle of 
identitj'. But this intruder is not the true principle of identity, Every be- 
ing is its oivn nature, in which the two ideas are seen to be objectively 
identical, but a mere tautological proposition, A is A. This radical error 
in the principle of identity arises from Sir Wni. Hamilton's view of the 
idea as a mere bundle of qualities. 



KNOWLEDGE OF PIUNCIPLES. 105 

68. When the intellect has the idea of cause and ef- 
fect, it immediately perceives the principle of causality, 
which is expressed in the formula, There is no effect 
ivithoid a cause. — This principle expresses nothing 
more than the essential dependence of the effect on 
its cause. But this dependence is known from the 
very idea of effect, since, when we speak of effect, we 
mean a being dependent on a cause. The mind, 
therefore, analyzing the idea of effect, immediately 
perceives its dependence on a cause ; it expresses this 
dependence in the judgment : There is no effect luith- 
oiit a cause. ^ 

69. To the principle of causality is referred the prin- 
ciple of sufficient reason, ivhich is formulated in these terms: 
Whatever is, is conceived, or is made, must have a suffi- 
cient reason, either in itself, or in that ivhich produces 
it, conceives it, or causes it to exist. — This principle is 
only an extension of the principle of causality, but it 
has a more general application ; while the principle of 
causality properly applies only to things which con- 
stitute the real order, that of sufficient reason is ap- 
plied also to things of the ideal order. ^ 

' The word cause here means efficient cause, and is marked by two 
characteristics, " immediate influence and active influence." Mr. Mil] 
ignores these marks when he defines cause us an invariable^ unconditional 
antecedent. When, too, lie tries to establish, b}- means of the principle of 
causality, the Uniformity of Naiuy^e as the fundamental principle of his 
Experimental school, he implies the existence of this very uniformity 
and thus falls into a vicious circle. 

2 " After proving that all things save G-od have a sufficient reason in 
the efficient cause outside of themselves, and that God as the first cause 
has a sufficient reason of existence in Himself, we combine the Creator 
and his creatures under the universal Proposition, All things that exist 
have a sufficient reason. But this Proposition is no axiom or First Prm- 
ciple. It is a complex Proposition, which unites in itself the axiom, 
Evenj effect has a cause, with the derivative Proposition, The first cause 
is its oiun effect." Clarke's Logic, p. 18. 



106 CHRISTIAN THILOSOPHY. 

70. The principle of causa! if u is analytic, and not syn- 
thetic as Kant maintains. — A judpjment is synthetic 
when the idea of the predicate is not contained in 
that of the subject ; as, Tliis icood is green. A judg- 
ment is analytic, when the anah^sis of the subject 
enables us to find the predicate in it ; thus, the mere 
analysis of the idea of effect suffices to give the idea 
of dependence on a cause. 

71. The jn'inci pie of causality lias an objective vaue, 
uotu'itlistandinij the assertion of the contrary by many 
philos<)j)hers. among others Kant and Hume. — Many 
philosophers, recognizing that the destruction of the 
objective or real value of the principle of causality is 
the destruction of all science, profess the principle, but 
give it only a subjective or ideal value. It is evident, 
however, that the quality of depending on its cause, 
which the effect possesses, results from its nature as 
effect, and, consequently, is as real as the effect itself. 

ART. IV. — THE TRINCIPLE OF SUBSTANCE. 

72. llie idea of svbstance is formed from a sensible 
concrete object by abstraction, by which the -mind per- 
ceives in the coiicrete object tliat by ivhich it is reed. — 
When the mind perceives a sensible concrete object 
as existing, it has the power of abstracting from it ex- 
istence in itself. But this perception of existence in 
itself includes that of substance, viz., of that by which 
a thing is in itself, without requiring anything else 
as its subject ; and it is obtained b}^ abstracting from 
all the particular characteristics which accompany 
the substance in the order of reality. For, when the 
intellect has formed the idea of substance by abstrac- 
tion from a sensible concrete object, it contemplates 
this idea as it is in itself, and perceives that it is ap- 



KNOWLEDGE OF PRINCIPLES. 107 

plicable not only to corporeal beings, but also to 
spiritual beings. 

73. JVhen the intellect has the idea of substance and 
of accident, it immediately perceives the 'principle of 
substance, ivhich is formulated thus: Every accident 
supposes a substance. — With the idea of substance, the 
intellect possesses implicitly that of accident. The 
comparison of these two ideas results in the immediate 
perception that accident cannot exist without sab- 
stance, since that which does not exist in itself can 
exist only in another being which has existence in it- 
self. Hence the principle of substance is an analytic 
judgment. 

74. The Fhenomenalism of Hume, which denies the 
lyrincipde of substance, is absurd ; because, by denying 
the principle of substance, it makes the idea of accident 
contradictory. — Locke, by admitting no other source 
of ideas than that of the senses, was led to deny the 
idea of substance, and held that what is called sub- 
stance is in reality only a number of qualities held 
together by a common bond. But this is an absurd 
hypothesis ; for, if the bond is not substance, it must 
be accident, and hence in its turn requires a substance 
to support it. The principle of Locke led Berkeley to 
deny all corporeal substance, and Hume to deny all 
substance, corporeal and spiritual, and to assert that 
only qualities exist and are known to us. The phe- 
nomenalism of Hume, which rejects the very idea of 
substance, is absurd. For the accident exists either 
in itself or in another thing ; it cannot exist in itself, 
for it would then be no longer an accident ; therefore, 
it exists in something else. But this latter cannot 
itself be an accident, for we should then have to pro- 
ceed from one accident to another ad infinitum, thus 



108 CHRIS riAN PHILOSOPHY. 

postul.iting an infinite series of accidents resting on 
nothing ; wiiicli is absurd. Therefore, the accident 
must be supported by something which is not an ac- 
cident, that is, by substance. 



CHAPTER III. 

Language in Relation to the Development 
of KnoAA^ledge. 

ART. I. — UTILITY OF LANGUAGE IN DEVELOPING THE MIND. 

75. As men are composed of body and soul, they re- 
quire an exterior sign to communicate their thoughts to 
one another ; the most j)er feet sign is that of spetch. — 
Man is made to live in society ; but, since his intellect 
is joined to a body, he must make use of a sensible sign 
to communicate his thoughts. This sign may be of 
several kinds ; of these the easiest and most perfect 
is speech ; by it he can communicate the greatest 
number of things with the greatest clearness. 

76. Language is not absolutely necessary either for the 
spontaneous or the reflex development of the intellect. — 
The intellect has in itself the power, by abstracting 
ideas from sensible images, of immediately perceiv- 
ing first principles and of deducing the consequences 
of its first cognitions ; therefore, it is not absolutely 
necessary that these cognitions and their conse- 
quences should be communicated to the mind by 
language. 

77. Language is very useful, and even morally neces- 
sary, for the development of the intellect and for the ac- 
quisition of the greater jrnrt of our knowledge, especially 
of that which relates to spiritual bei)njs and to moraJ 



LANGUAGE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF KNOWLEDGE. 109 

truths. — If we consider the intellect in itself, we see 
that it requires a sensible image for the formation of 
the idea. But, as experience proves, this image 
formed by the imagination may also be an obstacle 
in speculative operations. But speech performs the 
essential function of the sensible image without hav- 
ing its inconveniences ; for it furnishes an image the 
most simple and the least material possible, an image 
not susceptible of being confounded with the idea, 
and easily concentrating the attention, since the words 
of a language are uniform and constant. Hence 
speech is ver^^ useful in the development of the in- 
tellect viewed in itself. But if we study it in its rela- 
tions to other intellects we must allow that speech is 
the principal means by which the greater part of our 
knowledge is communicated to us in a prompt and 
easy manner, especially that knowledge which relates 
to spiritual beings and to moral truths. Besides, 
every science requires the efforts and labors of many 
ages for its formation. How, then, could its discov- 
eries be transmitted or developed, if language were 
not at the service of the scientist to enable him to 
communicate to others the results of his labors ? 

ART. IL — THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE. 

78. Language is of divine institution. — This is 
proved : 1. By Holy Scripture and the traditions of 
nations ; 2. By the silence of profane history about the 
invention of language and the epoch of its invention ; 
3. By facts of philological science. The fact of the 
origin of language being then established, several hy- 
potheses are offered to explain how man received 
the gift of speech. Among these hypotheses, the 
simplest and most rational is, that man was created 



110 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

with the faculty of speaking a language already 
formed. 

79. Tlie invention of speecli tvoidd not have been ah- 
soJiitehj impossible to man. — The rationalistic philoso- 
phers, especially the Sensist school, maintain the 
possibility of the invention of language, but in the 
sense which they explain it, it is an absurdit3\ 
Other philosophers, as J. J. Rousseau, Be Bonald, and 
Ventura, have maintained the absolute impossibility 
of the invention of language. But some of the 
reasons which they give are false, and others are not 
wholly conclusive. Hence many eminent philoso- 
phers see no metaphysical impossibility in the hu- 
man invention of language. 



CRITERIOLOGY; 

OR, 

A Treatise on Certitude. 

1. Griteriolocjy, or a treatise on certitude ^ investigates 
the value of our faculties as means of acquiring knoivl- 
edge and determines th^ idtimate criterion of certitude. 
— It would be of little use to the mind to form cogni- 
tions if ifc were not certain that these cognitions had an 
objective reality. Hence, after ideology has deter- 
mined how the soul forms its ideas and acquires its 
cognitions, criteriology shows : 1. That the faculties 
by which we know afford us certain knowledge ; 2. 
That there is an ultimate principle, which constitutes 
a solid foundation of the certitude of our knowledge. 



CHAPTER I. 

Our Faculties as Means of Arriving at 
Truth. 

ART I. — OUR COGNOSCITIVE FACULTIES. 

2. Our cognoscitive faculties are: 1. The senses; 2. 
The intellect, including consciousness and reason. — We 
know^ two kinds of objects, viz., sensible and intel- 
ligible. The senses perceive the sensible; the intellect, 
the intelligible. When the intellect is considered 
as having for its object the soul and the internal facts 

of the soul, it is called consciousness; when it is con- 

111 



112 CHRISTIAN THILOSOPHY. 

sidered as iiiferring one truth from another, it is 
called recifion. 

ART. II. — THE VERACITY OF THE SENSES. 

3. Sensation, considered as a modification of the 
sentient subject^ is not an illusion hut a reality, — This is 
a primary fact which cannot reasonably be called in 
question. To say that the soul is in a state of illu- 
sion as to its own sensation is equivalent to asserting 
that it feels a sensation when there is no sensation, 
or that it feels when there is nothing to feel, which 
is a contradiction in terms. 

4. The senses f ichen in their normal state and exer- 
cised upon their proper sensible object, cannot deceive 
us. — No cognoscitive faculty can be deceived in re- 
gard to its proper object, when the conditions re- 
quired for the exercise of the power are fulfilled ; 
otherwise, it would be a power that could effect noth- 
ing, which implies a contradiction. 

5. The errors arising from the senses are not jyi'operhj 
attributable to the senses, but to the intellect. — Error is 
found only in the judgment ; but the senses do not 
judge ; therefore, the senses, properl}^ speaking, do 
not deceive us. When they are diseased, or when 
any cause modifies or impairs the sensation, the 
senses cannot but receive the sensation so modified 
or impaired, and transmit it as they receive it to 
the intellect. Hence the intellect should not be pre- 
cipitate in judging, and should take into account any 
abnormal conditions under which the sensation may 
be produced. 

6. The Idealism of Berkeley is absurd ; it admits no 
rrality but that of spirits. — The senses operating under 
fixed conditions cannot deceive us ; but the senses 



OUR FACULTIES TO ARRIVE AT TRUTH. 113 

attest the existence of bodies ; therefore, bodies real- 
ly exist. ^ 

ART. III. — THE VERACITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 

7. The veracity of consciousness is a jyf^iinctri/ fact, 
ivJuGh is affirmed even when it is doubted or denied. — 
He who doubts or denies the veracity of conscious- 
ness either does not know that he doubts or denies 
it, and therefore cannot say that it deceives him ; 
or else he does know that he doubts or denies the 
veracity of consciousness. But then, by what other 
faculty does he know this than by consciousness, 
the onl}^ witness of the internal facts of the soul? 
Therefore, he makes use of consciousness to deny 
consciousness, and is guilty of evident contradiction. 

8. It is al)surd to hold with Transcendental philoso- 
phers, that the testimony of consciousness is a. mere illu- 
sion. — The ancient Sceptics never questioned the vera- 
city of consciousness ; the German Transcendental 
philosophy alone has dared to do so, and it has thus 
arrived at absolute scepticism. According to Fichte, 
our life is a dream, and the existence of a real Ego is 
a mere illusion. But if our life is a dream, if the ex- 
istence of a real Ego is an illusion, there must be a 
subject which dreams or which is under illusion. 
And this, subject must, by the very consciousness by 
which it knows that it dreams, know also a real Ego, 
by means of which it is enabled to pi-onounce as an 
illusion the knowledge of the Ego which dreams. 
Thus the contradiction of the system is evident. 

^ Among the modern philosophers who deny, more or less, the trust- 
worthiness of the senses, are Mill, Bain, Clifford, Green, and Caird. 
See Manuals of Catholic Philosophy, First Principles of Knowledge, by 
John Rickaby, S. J., Part ii., chap. ii. 



114: CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

ART. IV.— THE VERACITY OF THE INTELLECT AND THE 
REASON. 

9. The intelUct cannot deceive us in immediate judg- 
ments lokich relate eitlter to the rational or to the ex- 
2^erimental order. — The intellect cannot be deceived 
in regard to its proper object, when this object is pre- 
sented to it in such a way as to necessitate its as- 
sent ; otherwise, it could not know anything with 
truth, and thus it would be a faculty unable to effect 
anything. Hence the intellect cannot be deceived in 
the perception of essences ; nor can it be deceived in 
the formation either of rational or of experimental 
first judgments. For these judgments are accom- 
panied with the character of evidence : the former, 
because the attribute which is affirmed of the sub- 
ject is found in the very idea of the subject ; the lat- 
ter, because they are only the complex perception of 
a fact, a perception which is transformed by judg- 
ment into a distinct and explicit cognition. There- 
fore, it is impossible for the intellect to be deceived 
in regard to immediate first principles, whether 
rational or experimental. 

10. Reason cannot deceive us in regard to conclu- 
sions readily deduced from first principles. — The whole 
art of reasoning consists in deducing from two given 
judgments a third judgment, which is found to be 
contained in them. Hence there is identity and, 
consequently, necessary connection between the con- 
clusion and the premises. But if the truth of the 
conclusion is based on the identity of the premises, 
reasoning evidently cannot deceive us, since a thing 
cannot both be and not be identical with itself. 
Hence arises the repugnance which the intellect ex- 
periences to dissent from the conclusions whicl] fol- 



SCEPTICISM. 115 

low from a principle ; also that secret displeasure 
which we feel when an adversary, having accepted 
certain principles, is unwilling to allow the conclu- 
sions which are logically drawn from them. But, on 
the other hand, when the conclusions are derived from 
a first principle only by long and intricate argumen- 
tations, the reason may be deceived, not because the 
reasoning in this case deceives, but because the nat- 
ural weakness of the mind is such that it easily al~ 
low^s the attention to wander and thus overlooks some 
of the law^s of reasoning. 

11. The objection raised against the veracity of rea- 
son on account of the errors of philosophers only proves 
that they made a had use of it. — From the fact that the 
abuse of reason gives rise to error, we must not infer 
that reason cannot in any case apprehend truth with 
certainty. This affirmation of La Mennais is contrary 
to good sense and sound logic. 



CHAPTER II. 

Scepticism. 

ART I. — NATUBE OF SCEPTICISM. — DIFFERENT KINDS OF 
SCEPTICISM. 

12. Scepticism is a denial of the existence of truth or 
of the possibility of hnowing it ivith certainty. 

13. Scepticism is partial or complete, modified or abso- 
lute. — Partial scepticism rejects the truth or certitude 
of only a certain class of cognitions. Thus, Ideal- 
ists, such as BerMey, reject the truth of sensible 
cognitions, while Materialists or Empiricists, with 
Loche and Condillac, admit as certain only facts per- 



116 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

ceivecl by the senses. Rationalists, like Descartes^ 
accept as certain only what appears evident to reason; 
the Sentimentalists, with Reid, consider as certain 
only what is not repugnant to instinct, to natural 
sentiment; the Traditionalists and Fideists, repre- 
sented by La 3IennaLs and Hfiet respectively, regard 
as certain only traditional or revealed truths. Partial 
scepticism, as experience shows, leads logically to 
complete scepticism. Complete scepticism rejects 
the truth or certitude of all knowledge, and is either 
absolute or modified. It is absolute, when it denies 
the existence of objective or ontological truth, admits 
that contraries may both exist, and regards all things 
as phenomena or illusions. This kind of scepticism 
was taught in ancient times chiefly by Gorgias 
and Protagoras; in modern times it has been dis- 
seminated by Kant, Ftchte, ScJieUlng, and Hegel. 
Scepticism is modified when it admits the existence 
of truth, but rejects the veracity of the means at our 
disposal to apprehend truth. The principal repre- 
sentatives of this phase of scepticism in ancient 
times wei*e Pyrrhus and Sextiis EmpiricuH: in modern 
times, Bayle and Hume are the most noted. ' 

ART. II. — REFUTATION OF SCEPTICISM. 

14. Scepticism is contradictory; it is logically and 
practicallij impossible. — The consistent sceptic ought 
not to reason nor even to think; for, in thinking of his 

' •• rnfortunately, though not going under the name of sceptics, but 
rather of agnostics, there is a largo party of our philosophers in this 
country wlio are pledged to the fundamental principles of scepticism ir 
accepting substantially the doctrine of Hume." First Principles nf 
Kaoiolefhie. by .John Rickaby, S. J. pp. 14:^, 144. Among these are 
Mill, n.imilton, Spencer. Baui, and (Jrocn. 



scErncisM. 117 

doubt, lie affirms his doubt, and consequently is no 
longer a, sceptic. Above all, a sceptic should not at- 
tempt to propagate his scepticism, for in doing so he 
simpl}^ uses reason against itself. The consistent 
sceptic should no longer act, for all action proceeds 
from an affirmation of the mind, and thus involves 
the sceptic in self-contradiction. ' 

15. Sc32Jficism is absurd, suice its consequence is the 
negation of all science and of all virtue. — Scepticism 
denies truth or the possibility of attaining truth with 
certitude, and thereby renders science impossible, 
for science is nothing more than the certain knowl- 
edge of truth. Scepticism subverts all morality, for 
it is a truth that every action is either good or bad ; 
but if we must deny or doubt all truth, evidentl}^ it 
is a matter of indifference whether we do this or that 
act. History, moreover, shows that the ages of 
scepticism have always been ages of intellectual and 
moral decay. 

16. Scepticism is contrary to the nature of man. — 
Certitude is the life of the intellect, as air is the life 
of the body ; thus, scepticism is a state contrary to 
nature, an abnormal, eKceptional state, in which the 
mind can be placed only by an abuse of reason. 

17. The facts brought forward by scepticism against 
certitude prove nothing. — Sceptics bring forward in 
support of their system the great variety of human 
opinions and the errors into which our faculties lead 
us. But if men differ in opinion on certain truths, 
they all agree on fundamental truths, and our facul- 

' " The position of the dogmatic sceptics, when the}- have done and 
said all, remains worse than that of the dumb man who tries to speak 
out and declare his own condition; or that of those who had to solve 
the old puzzle, how to believe, on a man's own testimony, that he is an 
unmitigated liar." First Principles of Knowledge, p. 137. 



118 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

ties do not deceive us, when we apply them to their 
proper object and they act under the requisite con- 
ditions. 



CHAPTER III. 

The Ultimate Foundation of Certitude. 

ART I. — WHAT IS MEANT BY THE ULTIMATE FOUNDATION 
OF CERTITUDE. 

18. Tlie principle of certitude is the motive which 
produces the adhesion of the mind to some truth. — Every 
cognoscitive faculty makes known the truth in regard 
to its proper object. But truth, properly speaking, 
resides solely in the intellect, which adheres firmly 
to a truth only when prompted by some motive. 
This motive is called the principle, or ultimate foun- 
dation, of certitude. 

19. The principle of certitude is twofold, intrinsic 
and, extrinsic. — The intellect adheres to a proposition 
either because the proposition itself manifests its in- 
trinsic truth to the mind, or because an extrinsic 
motive produces conviction in the intellect, though 
the mind does not perceive the truth of the proposi- 
tion by an analysis of the proposition itself. In the 
former case, the principle of certitude is intrinsic ; in 
the latter, it is extrinsic. 

ART. II. — THE INTRINSIC PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 

20. The intidnsic princip)le of certitude is the objective 
and ontological evidence of the thing. — That which 
causes the intellect to know the intrinsic truth of a 
thing is that the entity of the thing manifests itself 



THE ULTIMATE FOUNDATION OF CERTITUDE. 119 

to the mind. But that which produces in us the 
knowledge of truth also produces certitude, since 
certitude is only the state of the mind consequent on 
the possession of its proper object ; in other words, 
it is the repose of the mind in the possession of 
truth. The intrinsic principle of certitude, therefore, 
is the entity of the thing manifesting itself to the 
mind and determining its adhesion. This manifesta- 
tion of the entity of the thing is what is called the 
objective cuid ontological evidence of the thing. This 
evidence is immediate, or evidence of intuition, when 
the thing becomes manifest to the mind immediately 
and by its own light ; as, The lohole is greater than the 
j)art ; it is mediate, or evidence of deduction, when it 
becomes manifest only after some mental process, 
and by means of a second object. 

2 1 . Htcet bases all certitude on revelation ; La Men- 
nais on the aidhority of common sentiment; Reid 
and the Sentimentalist school, on instinct and internal 
sentiment ; Descartes, on the clear and distinct idea of 
the thing ; Leibnitz and Arnaidd, on the principle of 
contradiction ; Cousin, on the impersonality of reason ; 
Galluppi, on the testimony of consciousness ; Kant, on 
practical reason ; Rosmini, on the idea of possible being ; 
Gioberti and the Ontologists, on the vision of the divine 
essence, or on the vision of the divine ideas. All these 
systems must be rejected as erroneons. — If, with Huet, 
we doubt that which we know by the senses, by con- 
sciousness, or by the intellect, and of which we are 
certain only by the intrinsic evidence of the thing, it 
is manifest that we must also doubt that which is 
known to us by divine revelation itself, since we can 
know what divine revelation teaches only by means 
of our senses and our intellect. 



120 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Our knowledge of the consent of mankind to a truth 
is obtained through the senses and the intellect ; 
therefore, according to the very principles of La 
Mennais, we are necessitated to doubt our knowledge 
of this consent. Besides, mankind is made up of 
individuals ; but, if certitude is impossible to the 
individual as such, the mere assemblage of the uncer- 
tain cognitions of individuals can never produce 
certain cognition. 

The adhesion of the mind, being the act of a ra- 
tional being, cannot be determined without a motive. 
But the instinct and internal sentiment of Beid 
are blind causes wliich do not make known the mo- 
tive of adhesion ; therefore, they cannot be the prin- 
ciple of human certitude. Instinct is peculiar to the 
animal and not to the intelligent being ; far from 
explaining anything, it requires explanation itself. 

Descartes regards evidence as the foundation of 
certitude ; but, according to him, evidence consists 
in the clear idea of the thing, and is purely subjec- 
tive ; that is, it is merely an act of the mind, and not 
the manifestation of the object to the mind. It is, 
consequently, variable and changiug. But the certi- 
tude which puts us in possession of truth must 
proceed from an immutable and objective principle, 
like truth itself. The clear idea of Descartes, being 
a pure modification of the cognoscitive act, cannot 
be the principle of certitude. 

Wo cannot, with Leibnitz and Arnaidd, base certitude 
on the principle of contradiction ; for our assent to 
this principle must be determined by a motive, and 
this motive is its intrinsic evidence. 

Besides the manifest absurdity that would result 
from admitting the Impersonal Keason of Cousin 



THE ULTIMATE FOUNDATION OF CERTITUDE. 1*21 

and his school, we must remark that this reason, 
even if supposed to be real, could not produce cer- 
titude, unless there were also a different motive 
present. 

We cannot agree with Gallap^n in founding certi- 
tude on the testimony of consciousness. For con- 
sciousness testifies only to facts of the internal sense, 
and is a purely subjective witness ; hence it cannot 
produce objective certitude. 

The practical reason of Kant must necessarily 
have speculative reason for its basis ; therefore, if 
the speculative order is destroyed, the practical 
order will share the same fate. 

Rosmini errs in placing the principle of certitude in 
the idea of possible being ; for, aside from the falsity 
of the innateness of this idea, it cannot produce ob- 
jective certitude, since it is purely subjective. 

According to Ontologism, the intellect does not 
form to itself representations of the object known ; 
hence the ideal order is destroyed, and consequently, 
that of knowledge also. Thus, direct vision of the 
divine essence or of the divine ideas, far from being 
the principle of certitude, is the negation of all 
knowledge and of all certitude. 

ART. III. — THE EXTRINSIC PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 

22. The extrinsic principle of certitude is the authority 
of him who affirms the fact, 

23. The extrinsic p)rinciple of the certitude of anything 
is either divine or human authority : the latter is the 
authority of mere human testimony^ if there he question of 
fact ; or the authority of the testimony of scientists, 
if there be question of scientific truths ; or the authority 
of the testimony of common sentiment, if there he question 



122 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

of the principal truths necessary to our intellectual or 
moral life. 

24. The authority of divine te.^^timony, or revelation, 
is a 2^rinciple producing a certitude which is superior to 
all others and perfect. — God neitlier wishes to deceive 
us nor can be deceived himself. His infallibility 
gives us the must perfect certitude regarding the 
truths which he reveals to us. 

25. Human testimony produces certitude in us when 
ive knoiu that the luitnesses cannot he deceived and do not 
loish to deceive. — The knoidedge and veracity of the 
witnesses are, therefore, the two essential conditions 
on which the authority of human testimony is based. 

26. The absolute impossibility of the facts testified to, 
and in certain cases, tJte improhahility of the facts, argue 
against the acceptance of the testimony.— Ji a fact is 
absolutely impossible, evidently the testimony borne 
to it is false. If the fact is improbable, the testimony 
requires more careful examination. But it is some- 
times difficult to determine whether the fact is im- 
possible ; hence we should rely mainly on the positive 
sign afforded us in the knowledge and veracit}' of the 
witnesses. 

27. IVe have a certain indication of the hioioledge and 
veracity of witnesses, ichen they agree in reporting a 
fact in the same ivay. — The testimony of a single w^it- 
ness does not, of itself, afford a guarantee of truth ; 
but if the witnesses are numerous and if they agree 
in their testimony, wo cannot call their testimony in 
question ; for then we must suppose either that all 
are deceived in the observation of the same fact, or 
that they all agree to deceive in reporting the fact. 
But, on the one hand, it cannot happen that many 
men should at the same time be subject to the same 



THE ULTIMATE FOUNDx\TION OF CERTITUDE. 125 

defect in the organs of sense- perception ; and on 
the other hand, many men cannot maintain the same 
error in the same way. since a lie is produced by the 
passions, and the passions vary with individuals. 
But if the witnesses report facts humiliatir^ to 
themselves ; if they are very numerous, of different 
ages and conditions ; if they endure torments and 
pven death in support of their testimony ; if they 
leport public facts of great importance, which are 
not contradicted, but rather confirmed by the very 
persons whom these facts condemn, then their testi- 
mony produces perfect certitude. Such is the testi- 
mony in support of the truths on which Christianity 
rests. 

ART IV. — THE MEANS BY WHICH TESTIMONY IS TRANS- 
MITTED. 

28. Tlie three means hy which human testimony is 
transmitted are : tradition, history, and monuments. — 
Tradition is an oral account transmitted from mouth 
to mouth. History is a written record of past events. 
3Ionuments are all the works of men which may serve 
as signs of accomplished facts ; they comprise pillars, 
inscriptions, medals, charters, etc. Their testimony 
is indirect, if they afford knowledge which they were 
not intended to convey ; thus, the magnitude of the 
pyramids indirectly testifies to the power of the 
Egyptian kings. It is direct, when they make known 
the fact which they were designed to transmit ; thus, 
the medal commemorative of a victory bears direct 
testimony to that event. 

29. When tradition is constant and relates to a public 
and important fact, it is a source of certitude. — Contem- 
poraneous witnesses of an event give certain in form a- 



12J: CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

tion of it to those who come after them. The 
latter may weigh the value of the testimony, but they 
will find deception and error impossible, if the wit- 
nesses to the fact are numerous. Hence, they can, 
in their turn, produce in those who succeed them a 
certitude equal to their own, and so the knowledge 
of the events may be carried down to the most remote 
ages. We thus see the falsity of the opinion of Locke, 
who holds that a tradition gradually loses its value 
by the lapse of time. 

30. It is absurd to object against the value of tracU' 
tioii the fables current during many ages among different 
nations. — The account of these fables has come down 
to us devoid of consistency and universality, and the 
fact that it has at all times been easy to show their 
falsity is a proof that they cannot be confounded 
with true tradition. 

31. Monuments are a source of certitude when ive can 
establish their authenticity. — At the time when a monu- 
ment is erected, it testifies that the fact the remem- 
brance of which it is intended to perpetuate is 
certain and universally believed. It is impossible 
for a counterfeit fact to be generally believed by those 
who are its contemporaries. But if it is to make 
known the truth, evidently the monument must really 
belong to the epoch to which it is referred ; a monu- 
ment erected subsequent to the event is simply a 
false witness. Doubt as to the authenticity of a 
monument produces doubt concerning the fact which 
it attests. 

33. History is a source of certitude ichen it is authen- 
tic and uncorrupted. — When a historical narrative is 
published, it is equivalent to a public testimony by 
its contemporaries to its authenticity. If they receive 



THE ULTIMATE FOU.NDATION OF CEKTITUDE. 125 

such a work as truthful, and if it has undergone no 
alterations in the lapse of ages, it merits equal cre- 
dence in all times. 

83. We are certain that a writing is authentic : 1. 
When, hy (in unbroken tradition, it is recognized as 
such ; 2. When it is in harmony with the manners and 
customs of tlie time to tchich it is referred, and ivith the 
character and the genius of tlie author to tvh.om it is as- 
crihed ; 3. When by its nature it makes ini2)osition 
impossible. — If from the epoch to which it is referred 
a writing has always been recognized by the tradi- 
tion of the common people or of the learned as the 
production of a particular author, if the contents of 
the Avriting be in harmony with the known customs 
of the age, and with the life and genius of the author, 
its authenticity cannot be disputed. For this is es- 
pecially guaranteed l)y the moral impossibility of pub- 
lishing the writing without the immediate discovery 
of imposture. 

34. We are certain that a ivriting is uncorrupted : 1. 
When its component parts agree both in matter and in 

form ; 2. When the copies ivhich have been made of it 
in different times and places are identical ; 3. When, on 
account of its importance and the great number of per- 
sons interested in it, alteration becomes impossible. — The 
intrinsic proof of the integrity of a writing is found in 
the perfect harmony of the different parts which 
compose it : the extrinsic proof consists in the iden- 
tity of the extant codices of the writing. Finally, 
if the writing interests a great number of persons, 
and if they have never protested against any altera- 
tion, the integrity of the work reaches its highest 
degree of certainty. 

35. The veracity of a ivriting is established from the 



126 CHllISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

very nature of the icritmg and from tlie hwivledge and 
veracity of the \oriters. — The intrinsic indications of 
the veracity of a writing are the notoriet}' of the 
facts recorded, their importance, and their relation 
to other facts which occurred at the same time. The 
knowledge and veracity of tlie writers are established 
in accordance with the rules of ordinary testimony. 
We should examine whether they are unbiassed by 
passions or prejudices, whether they could easily 
have ascertained the facts, and especially, whether 
they agree with other writers recording the same 
facts. To some extent, these rules apply in the ex- 
amination of the veracity of a monument. 

36. The objections of scepticism against tJie value of 
historic testimony serve only to establish it the more 
firmly. — It is objected that many books, once received 
as authentic, have proved later to be forgeries. But 
if we have the means of establishing the spuriousness 
of certain writings, evidently the authenticit}^ of 
other works only remains the more firmly established. 
Again, it is true that many copies of ancient works 
have come down to us with alterations. But if the 
parts in which these copies do not agree prove that 
alteration has taken place, other parts, in which they 
do agree, prove that the original text has been pre- 
served intact. 

ART. V. — AUTHENTICITY OF THE TESTIMONY OF COMMON 
SENTIMENT AND OF SCIENTISTS. 

37. By the testimony of common sentiment is meant 
the general and constant assent of mankind to some 
truth. — To know this general assent, it is not neces- 
sary to question all men ; it suffices to know the 
views of enlightened men and the opinion of nations 
in iX'Mieral. 



THE ULTIMATE FOUNDATION OF CERTITUDE. 127 

38. Common sentiment is a source of certitude in re- 
gard to the tndhs to ivhich it bears testimony. — That 
men in different times and in different places may be 
unanimous in affirming a thing, it is necessary that 
this affirmation be produced in them by their very 
nature. But that which is the effect of nature cannot 
deceive ; we must, therefore, admit the testimony of 
■common sentiment. 

39. The truths affirmed by common sentiment are : 
1. Principles ivhich are readily hioion by the natural 
use of reason ; 2. Those moral and religious truths the 
knoiuledge of ivhich is necessary to the moral life of 
man. — There are both immediate and mediate prin- 
ciples the cognition of which is easy and requires 
only the natural development of reason : as, TJie 
whole is greater than the part. These principles, 
therefore, are known to all men. The principal 
moral and religious truths, however, the knowledge 
of which is indispensable to man, are not readily 
known. But few minds could have attained to them, 
■and even then only after much time, with an inter- 
mixture of error, and in an uncertain manner. Con- 
sequently, if they are known and accepted by all 
men, it is in virtue of a primitive revelation made by 
God to the first man, and handed down to his de- 
scendants by unbroken tradition. 

40. It is vain to object against the authority of com- 
mon sentiment the corruption of primitive traditions 
among nations and the almost universal diffusion of 
certain errors. — The alterations produced in primi- 
tive tra^ditions are neither constant nor universal ; 
they are then without value. Thus, polytheism was 
professed only during a certain period among differ- 
•ent nations, and it was not universaL While admit- 



128 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

ting the reality of certain errors, like that of the 
revolution of the sun around the earth, we must also 
observe that they are rather the result of ignorance ; 
but ignorance should not be confounded with error. 

41. Prudence warns us to yield to the authority of 
scientists in matters relating to the science lohich tJiey 
teach. — The authority of the scientist in his science 
should be respected by the unlearned, since he who 
by the culture of his mind is fitted to apprehend a 
truth may impose it on him who could not of himself 
attain to its knowledge. But as scientists themselves 
are competent to examine the particular truths in 
question, they should judge the authority of other 
scientists by their own reason. Hence we may for- 
mulate the following three rules : 1. The authority of 
scientists should be accepted so long as there is no 
reasonable ground to believe it false or to suspect it ; 
it should be rejected, if it is known to be false ; 2. 
Every scientist is a competent judge only in the 
science of which he is master ; 3. One scientist 
should accept as authoritative the affirmations of 
another, when he cannot himself ascertain their 
truth or demonstrate their falsity. ' 

AllT. VI. — IMPORTANCE TO OUR COGNITIONS OF THE . AU- 
THORITY OF TESTIMONY AS A PRINCIPLE OF 
CERTITUDE. 

42. Testimony is the condition of the com^oletc de- 
velopment of our mind and the source of the greater port 
of our knoioledge. — Without the aid of testimony, man 
could, indeed, acquire the knowledge of some truths ; 

' For a clear exposition of the liarmony between the positive results 
of science and the truths of faith, Qon9,\\\l Apologie de la Foi Chre'denne. 
See also Jouin's Evidences of Religion, p2). 300, 301. 



THE ULTIMATE FOUNDATION OF CERTITUDE. 129 

but, if we except those which are sensible and ele- 
mentary, they would be very limited and bound up 
with many errors. Testimony develops his mind 
promptly and without fatigue, enriches it with a 
store of cognitions which it could never acquire by 
itself, either on account of their elevation or of the 
time required for their acquisition or of insurmount- 
able material difiQculties. It is because testimony 
is the condition of the normal and complete develop- 
ment of the intellect, that the mind is naturally 
inclined to accept authority, especially during the 
early years of life. 



